Greece and its neighbourhood(s) in 2020

One of the major symptoms of Greek foreign policy is its chronic inability to be a protagonist beyond its immediate neighbourhoods, i.e. the Balkans, Turkey, and the Mediterranean – in spite of its extensive conscious involvement in the first two regions since the end of the Cold War. Successive Greek governments have used analogous rhetoric and set similar objectives – the need to ‘Europeanise’ Greece’s northern and eastern neighbours, the need to see them integrated into the European Union, the need for the wider neighbourhood to become ‘normal’, ‘boring’, ‘regular’.

The diplomatic and political energy spent on assuring that the aforementioned comes to pass has been both inexhaustible and exhausting yet results (i.e. change in the desired direction) have been slow almost at snail’s pace. In part, this is due to the inability/unwillingness of the neighbours to completely transform themselves; in part it is due to the inability of the Greek foreign policy machinery to convince neighbours and partners within the EU alike of the inevitability of the process. On the whole, though, the basic problem which supersedes all others has been and, unfortunately, continues to be the inability of Greece and its neighbours to shift their focus from an overt concentration on the past with its myriad of historical baggages and legacies to formulate a joint vision of a common future as has been the case of the Franco-German relationship since the end of the Second World War after three apocalyptic wars and then some between the two countries over an 80 year span.

Much is heard these days about jumpstarting accession talks especially for the countries of the Western Balkans. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, almost from the get go of his term in office has been calling for the entry of all Western Balkan candidates into the EU in 2014, one hundred years after the start of World War I in 1914, much as the International Commission on the Balkans had recommended back in 2005. The 2014 date is important for Greece and the region for another reason as well – it will coincide with the country holding the Presidency of the Union during the first six months of that year.

The opportunities provide by the Greek Presidency in 2014 in combination with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (5 years into its functions) with its enhanced foreign policy chief and the in situ presence of the European External Action Service (the EU’s Diplomatic Corps) in the various capitals of the western Balkan states makes the possibility of enlargement a very real prospect. One can also add to this argument, the imminent membership of Croatia now that the Lisbon Treaty allows for it would signal to the rest of the candidate countries that the EU is committed to eventually including them in its ranks. In this sense, the reality of all of Greece’s land borders in the north being with EU partners (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria) and the fact that these new member states would also border other EU member states fundamentally changes the perceptual landscape – from that of exclusion or being cut off to that of inclusion. The one remaining border with Turkey would be one with a candidate state – Turkey.

Hence the ‘Europeanisation’ paradigm expounded diachronically by successive Greek administrations becomes a matter of fact. The relevance of the inclusion of the Greece’s northern neighbours into the Union should not be underestimated or taken lightly at a time when the debate regarding Turkey’s future prospects is in full ebullition across Europe. If Turkey’s path ends with membership so much the better for the stability, security and prosperity of Greece and its neighbourhoods; if it does not, Greece would have to invest time and energy in redefining its already packed agenda and relations with its neighbour. In this sense, the europeanisation, securitization and normalization of its northern neighbourhood releases Greece from its chronic occupation with two fronts simultaneously.

In this context, on the road to 2020, the relationship between Greece and its neighbourhoods could potentially be different than what it is today albeit the possible thorn regarding Turkey’s European future. Nevertheless, the europeanisation of the neighbourhood combined with the focus on the future rather than the past could conceivably provide for a new dimension in Greece’s foreign policy – that of promoting peaceful change in its ‘wider’ neighbourhood. In other words, the country could begin to reconsider its role in the Mediterranean or parts of it such as its eastern part and the Middle East whose relevance are enhanced due to their proximity. This could in part be done through a more active involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean, the successor policy of the Euro-Mediterranean Process which was launched in 2008 and its priority projects which include the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters; a Mediterranean solar energy plan; higher education and research and the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia; and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. In all aforementioned policy areas, Greece could begin to systematically cultivate an enhanced role for herself within the geographic confines of immediate interest.

The point is that Greek diplomacy is better served by being multi-vectored and pro-active rather than on the defensive. The EU, for example, needs to step up its presence in the Black Sea region, a region where Greece has vital commercial interests given the potential of the Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian markets among others. It could probably start drafting a strategy for the Union in order to stimulate interest. The foreign ministry has the wherewithal for such an engagement given the country’s participation in the wider Black Sea region’s regional cooperation processes since 1992 when it became a founding member of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the only inclusive and institutionally comprehensive organisation of the region. By 2020, the debate regarding the future membership prospects of Ukraine and Georgia, inter alia, would have crystallised and an EU strategy with the imprimatur of the Hellenic Republic could go a long way in contributing to the security of the region given the presence of hegemonic Russia and Turkey and the energy card.

Even more importantly as a country committed to greater cooperation within the EU, Greek initiatives in its wider neighbourhood suggest vital contributions to the promotion of policies postulating cohesion in the Union’s foreign policy mechanisms. In other words, greater involvement in the Union’s activities through the promotion of initiatives and strategies will serve the country better to stand its ground on issues of national interest rather than exclusively focussing on these. The ‘europeanisation’ of its neighbourhoods can only but enhance Greece’s ability to be pro-active and a respected leader in forward-looking cooperative schemes of interest to all.

The 2020 date is particularly relevant in this context. Only a decade away, it exemplifies how close Greece is, given the right policies, in contributing to the transformation of its neighbourhood to a markedly different one and the potential this makeover can have in liberating the country’s foreign policy agenda. Time will tell whether this thesis will eventually materialise.

Greek-Turkish Rapprochement Revisited

The ongoing deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey as evidenced by dogfights over the Aegean, overflights over inhabited and uninhabited Greek islands by the Turkish Air Force, illegal immigration and the postponement of the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey has much to do with the different foreign policy perceptions in the two countries. The issue at hand is whether there can ever be a point of conjecture between the two approaches or the ongoing rapprochement between the two countries since 1999 is under threat. Although the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 1988 calls for a moratorium of activity over the Aegean during the summer months, the only time it was fully implemented by the Turkish side was in the summer of 2004 (when Athens hosted the Olympic Games). What makes the current spate of activity over the Aegean a concern for Athens is the increased number of mock dogfights by armed aircraft (thereby increasing the possibility of accidents) and the systematic overflights over specific/targeted inhabited islands. On the other hand, the quick containment of a possible crisis over the island of Ro last week showed that the CBMS in place between the two sides can be effective.

From a Greek perspective, it seems inevitable that Turkey’s European Union (EU) journey is undoubtedly intertwined with bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. While the EU Summits of December 2003 and December 2004 marked a turning point in Turkey’s relations with the EU, the pending issues of obligations on the part of the candidate state, the ever evolving acquis comunautaire and the absorption capacity of the EU will keep emerging and will have to be dealt with if the accession process is to come to a positive end. Hence, the EU will continue to be unwavering in its calls for Turkey’s international conduct to be in accordance with European standards and the principles and values of the Union. As such, this implies assuring the irreversibility of the political reform process and the full and comprehensive implementation of fundamental freedoms and full respects of human rights. The December 2004 decision also clearly calls for Turkey’s commitment to good-neighbourly relations and the settlement of outstanding border differences by political means in accordance with the United Nations Founding Charter, including possibly whenever necessary to have recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The EU has also been persistent in its demands for Turkey to allow the Customs Union to operate with all 27 current EU member states, including Cyprus by the end of this year.

Why is all of the above so important in terms of Greek-Turkish relations, you ask? From a Greek standpoint, the EU dimension has provided the opportunity to include the whole gamut of bilateral differences from both a legal and a political perspective within an EU framework. Whether we are talking about the Continental Shelf issue, which Greece considers to be the only legal difference between the two countries, or the status quo of the Aegean, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the rights of the Greek minority and the resolution of the Cyprus issue, inter alia, Greece feels that Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have provided the relevant framework for resolution. After all, as a midsize EU member state, Greece in its differences with its neighbour and regional powerhouse, Turkey, has to depend on the diplomatic and legal tools provided by international law and the European Union. In fact, the issue of illegal immigration has of late come to the fore where Greece, whose islands have been inundated with illegal immigrants coming from the Turkish coast, has managed to mobilize EU support to weight on Turkey to implement bilateral agreements it has signed for the readmission of third party nationals that illegally enter other countries from its territory (the relevant accord with Greece dates back to 2001). Nevertheless, Greece has been and continues to be the most unwavering supporter of Turkey’s EU bid.

From the perspective of Athens, every time Turkey feels pressured to meet an obligation vis-à-vis the EU which is especially difficult to implement (such as the opening of airports and ports to Cypriot-flagged vessels by the end of 2009, or curbing illegal immigration to the EU), it ups the ante by increasing its activity in the Aegean whether through overflights or dogfights or by challenging the Greek position regarding the continental shelf by giving licenses for oil exploration in areas which Greece considers to be its territory. Turkey’s attempt and ability to project itself as a greater than regional power especially in today’s post-American world as a “stand alone” power seems to blur its commitment to be fully anchored into the European Union (where incidentally other great powers such as France, the UK and Germany promote both European standards, norms and values and seek a greater global role for themselves).

Thus, for Athens the question is whether Ankara can be fully anchored into the EU and be a great power simultaneously. To date, Athens has for the last decade been patiently waiting for Ankara to make up its mind about what it is and where it wants to go. If it cannot, then the question is whether the fact that Greece is the most steadfast promoter of Turkey’s EU accession process relevant at all in the context of Greek-Turkish relations? The concern stems from the fact that Greece’s Turkey policy since 1999 has been grounded to on a positive evolution of the Turkey-EU relationship. If Turkey’s tilt toward the lone wolf position becomes a permanent feature then the premise of Greece’s approach is furthered weakened. Hence, for Athens a major policy reevaluation may be in the offing -- sustaining rapprochement predicated upon the further evolution of EU-Turkish relations post-2009, the ability of the Union to become more cohesive and assertive as a global actor with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and Ankara’s willingness to cooperate. Thus, the waiting game is bound to continue for some time.

The Nabucco Pipeline and Energy Dilemmas

In 1990, John Mearsheimer wrote a much discussed article on how he viewed the Post-Cold War world at least on the European continent titled “Back to the Future”. According to Mearsheimer, there would be no new era of peace; instead multipolarity and increased competition between great powers would probably take hold, thereby increasing instability, inequality, unpredictability and uncertainty. In recent years, Mearsheimer’s thesis as well as those of other proponents of the realist school of thought (be it classical realism, offensive realism, structural realism, etc.) seems to be gaining strength albeit the popularity of post-modern schools of thought over the last two decades.

Why all this theoretical babble, you ask? Mearsheimer clearly comes to mind when one attempts to analyse the competition between and among great powers in Europe (and neighbouring regions) today in particular with reference to the energy paradigm. On 13 July 2009, the Prime Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on the planned natural gas Nabucco pipeline from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria. Is Nabucco finally on track or was the ceremony an example of triumphalism on the part of the signatories?

An interesting interpretation is that more than anything the Nabucco signing ceremony is closely linked to the geopolitical realignments at play globally and particularly in Europe. A point of reference is President Obama’s visit to Moscow where he pressed the reset button with Russia leading to an agreement on reduction of nuclear stockpiles and frank talk on a number of other issues. This fundamental upgrade of Russia’s status is having repercussions on how other regional powers (whether of the minor or major kind) interpret the evolving relationship between Moscow and Washington.

An obvious effect is on Turkey – a regional powerhouse aspiring to a greater global standing. Ankara seeks to assure that its unsteady status quo with Moscow in their common neighbourhood (Black Sea and Caucasus) is maintained while it retains (if not augments) its “critical ally” position with Washington. One obvious instrument (both in political and foreign policy terms) to redress the evolving balance of power is the energy card.

For a postmodern entity like the European Union with its negotiated common positions (a product of ongoing power struggles among exigent greater and smaller member states), the energy card is just as relevant. The EU external energy strategy is focused on sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply whereby the diversification of suppliers is crucial in order to avoid overdependence given the fact that the EU on the whole is dependent on imported hydrocarbons. It should be noted that under current trends, the Union’s energy dependence will jump from 50% of total EU energy consumption today to about 65% in 2030 – gas imports will jump from 57% to 84% and oil from 82% to 93% by 2030. Simultaneously, the global demand for oil is bound to grow by 41% during the same period.

What does all of this imply? Basically, energy needs seem to be a crucial contributing factor in defining the world today and, in particular, the relationship between states. The Nabucco signing is indicative. Albeit its shortcomings and uncertainties – Can Turkmenistan come through on its promises of supplying the pipeline with gas given its geography whereby supply can only be through Iran or across the Caspian Sea which has no seabed agreement to date? Will Azerbaijan deliver before the Nagorno Karabakh issue is resolved in a manner suitable to its interests? Will Iran be allowed to become a supplier as Turkey and other states would want without a redefinition of its relations with the United States? Has Turkey’s overreach with its demands for a 15% stake of the pipeline’s potential supply for its own markets or for resale been addressed? Is the principle of “if you build first, the gas will come” viable at the time when the estimated cost of the pipeline tops 7.9 billion euros while construction commitments from the EIB and the European Commission are small and the global financial crisis deters potential investors?

While the pipeline is expected to meet only about 10% of the EU’s gas needs when it becomes operational at up to 31 bcm per year, Russia currently exports 140 bcm of natural gas a year to the EU. Even more telling are the overall figures regarding Caspian oil and gas, where Russia dwarfs all other Caspian and Central Asian producers in terms of reserves, production and export availabilities (and consumption). Thus, the questions as to whether the Nabucco project contributes to the avoidance of overdependence on Russia natural gas; addresses effectively the issue of energy security; and tackles the issue of diversification remain on the table. Nabucco bypasses Russia as well as Ukraine. What does this imply for the latter? What is China’s impact on Central Asia since it is the main driver of the increase in global demand for hydrocarbons? The China-Turkmenistan energy connection is relevant here.

More than anything the Nabucco project has managed to raise awareness of the interests of regional and global stakeholders. For one, it could be interpreted as a catalyst for a more cohesive EU energy security strategy. It has raised the stakes regarding Iran’s present and potential role. It has paradoxically brought Russia and Turkey closer together with Moscow openly talking about Ankara’s participation in the South Stream project. It has also somewhat brought Russia closer to the project with the potential supply of Russian gas to Nabucco via the Blue Stream pipeline. Finally, the perspective of Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi gas gives the whole endeavour a geopolitical dimension.

As such, the Nabucco project contains both the seeds of further great power competition of the Mearsheimer mould as well as the potential for further symbiosis as energy superpowers might reconsider the benefit of using oil and natural gas as extensions of their foreign policies. Verdi’s opera is famous for its inspirational “Va, pensiero” chorus; time will tell whether the more mundane Nabucco pipeline can arouse greater energy cooperation in today’s increasingly complicated world.

Μεγάλοι Έλληνες

Παρακολούθησα με ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον και θαυμασμό το τελικό των Μεγάλων Ελλήνων στην τηλεόραση του Σκαϊ στις 18 Μαΐου 2009. Το μορφωτικό και διανοητικό επίπεδο των συμμετεχόντων υψηλότατο και εντυπωσιακό. Παρόλο που επρόκειτο για μία άσκηση επί χαρτού ο ενθουσιασμός και το πάθος από τους παραβρισκόμενους να στηρίξουν με εμμονή την επιλογή τους ήταν διάχυτος και βαθύτατα ειλικρινής. Και διερωτώμαι σε αυτό το σημείο πού είναι αυτό το πάθος στην αντιμετώπιση της μίζερης πραγματικότητα μας; Σκεφτόμουν παρακολουθώντας την εκπομπή ότι αξίζουμε μία καλύτερη μοίρα από την γκρίζα, άοσμη, μπανάλ εποχή μας. Σκεφτόμουν ότι οι δέκα μεγάλοι έλληνες του τελικού, όπως πολλοί άλλοι στην λίστα των υπολοίπων ενενήντα, αποδεικνύουν και αναδεικνύουν ταυτόχρονα τις δυνατότητες μας ως λαός (ατομικά και συλλογικά), να συσπειρωθούμε και να κάνουμε την υπέρβαση. 

Το ερώτημα που τίθεται είναι πως η πνευματικότητα που εξέπεμπαν τόσο οι «αληθινοί» πρωταγωνιστές όσο και οι παρουσιαστές της εκπομπής μπορεί τελικά να ενθαρρύνει και να κινητοποιήσει τη θετική μας πλευρά – την δημιουργικότητα, την εργατικότητα, την ουσία – ώστε να επέλθει η απαραίτητη ανατροπή και να αφήσουμε την μιζέρια στο λυκόφως της ιστορίας; Αυτή η παθιασμένη και φορτισμένη ανταλλαγή απόψεών και γνώσεων μεταξύ αξιοσέβαστων ελλήνων μπορεί να εκφραστεί και να αναδειχθεί τελικώς και εκτός τηλεόρασης; Ή απλώς την Δευτέρα ζήσαμε ένα παραμύθι που δεν έχει καμία σχέση με την μετριότητα των ελλήνων σήμερα; Την Δευτέρα το βράδυ άρχισα να πιστεύω ξανά στο ελληνικό «φως», αλλά όταν τελείωσε η εκπομπή επανήλθε δριμύτατα το σκοτάδι. Μήπως αυτό που ένιωσα κατά τη διάρκεια της εκπομπής δεν ήταν τίποτα άλλο τελικά παρά μια μοναχική και μοναδική στιγμή αναλαμπής και υπέρβασης; Ελπίζω πως όχι διότι ένας λαός θαμπωμένος μόνο με το παρελθόν του είναι ένας λαός χωρίς μέλλον. Θα ήθελα να πιστεύω ότι οι μεγάλοι έλληνες κρύβονται μέσα μας και περιμένουν να τους ανακαλύψουμε.

The European Union and its Eastern Neighbourhood: Challenges and Prospects

• In a recent European Commission on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2008, it is stated that the ENP is “a growing partnership based on mutual interdependence.” This is evermore necessary since 2008 has been a year of crises that have led to gridlock both in the South and the East. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza in December 2008/January 2009 and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of January 2009 coupled with the growing negative impact on growth, trade, and investment of the global financial and economic crisis are all indicative on the frailty of the EU’s neighbourhoods. 

 

• On 7 May 2009, the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit took place amidst great expectations from its promoters in an effort to further solidify/strengthen the bonds between the European Union and its member states and their Eastern European Partners (hereinafter ENP East partners – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus). Though the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was conceived to bring the ENP East countries that so desire closer to the EU, to date it has fallen short of expectations because states like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have been hit by domestic dissent, spats with their neighbours and stalled modernisation processes. The fact that EU member states like Poland and the Czech Republic have so warmly sponsored the initiative may suggest ulterior motives in their approach toward their Eastern neighbourhood is very much in evidence.

 

• The Russia factor is one that will not go away anytime soon as the parameters and content of future EU-Russia relations are currently being deliberated since June 2008 in the form of a new EU-Russia agreement replacing the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement concluded in 1994 and into force since 1 December 1997. At that time Russia was weaker and less self-confident than it is today. Albeit the Russian Federation’s adventurism in Georgia in August 2008 and its systematic attempts to prevent the further trespass of the European Union (and NATO) on its neighbourhood or near abroad, Russia’s economic ties with the EU and its role in energy security cannot be discounted.

 

• When the European Neighbourhood Policy was first promoted in 2003, it attempted to address a number of emerging concerns for the European Union. The first had to do with the limits of enlargement given that big bang enlargement was about to become a reality in 2004. As such the ENP was conceived as a policy aimed at curbing further membership – an “anything but membership” policy where it made sense to group southern and eastern neighbour states together. As such bilateral action plans were promoted allowing southern and eastern partners to enhance their relations with the EU at their own pace. The second concern stemmed from the repercussions of the post-Cold War world with the emergence of new forms of global terrorism and ethno-nationalist secessionist movements becoming the fad in the wider post-Communist space (former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union) with McMafia type transnational crime, weak state institutions and rule of law in abundance.

 

• The European Security Strategy of December 2003 very much reflected these concerns. It stated explicitly, the EU has the strategic objective to ‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’ Furthermore, the European Union has acknowledged the shared common neighbourhood with Russia as a space where the ‘EU and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common concerns.’

 

• The last point being that the non-polarising concept of a common neighbourhood where it is both in the interest of Russia and the EU to assure the neighbourhood’s stability, security and prosperity lest it become even more infested with the diseases the post-Cold War Pandora’s box had unleashed. In other words, the European Union as a postmodern soft power entity saw itself as promoting a concept which was non-threatening to its eastern neighbours.

 

• For Russia, though, the notion of neighbourhood (its ‘CIS space’) has been based on preserving its ‘historical and spiritual heritage’ which was encroached upon by the West in the early 1990s when as the key successor state of the Soviet Union it went through dire political and economic upheaval. According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,

 

‘Not only Russia has privileged interests, first and foremost, in relations with our closest neighbors; they also have the same privileged interests in Russia. Failing to understand it and trying to destroy what rests on our combined objective history and on the interdependence and intertwining of our economies, infrastructures, cultures and humanitarian spheres of life means to go against history.’

 

• As a consequence, for Russia, the EU’s neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership among others are revisionist policies which strive to remove from Russian influence the post-Soviet space thereby the ‘voluntary or involuntary aim of such method is to preserve the dividing line in Europe and move it ever closer to the Russian border.’
• The Black Sea region is a telling example of the challenges in EU-Russian relations since all ENP East partners except Belarus are considered by the EU to be part of it. For Russia, the wider Black Sea area is an important part of its foreign policy given that is constitutes part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and its relevance as an energy transit region. More specifically, Russia seeks to remain as one of the main stakeholders in the region “given the emergence of new strong regional (Turkey) and external actors (the US/NATO)”; it wants to counter and curb extremism, separatism and terrorism in the region; it wants to secure continuous energy, trade, civil and military communications “within and throughout the Black Sea and the [Bosporus] Straits”; and it seeks to prevent new dividing lines in the region including “the expansion of military coalitions which exclude Russia as a full member.”
• At the same time, Russia is not convinced that the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy could successfully contribute to making the shared neighbourhood more stable (an objective shared by Russia) as it does not effectively bar the road to further future EU enlargement. The analysis by Arkady Moshes is indicative:

 

‘Brussels cannot ignore a consolidated push of EU new member states to be more active on the eastern periphery. As long as it denies membership perspective for its neighbours, the policy of Wider Europe that it pursues, (however palliative it may look) nevertheless stimulates their search for alternatives to staying within the same geopolitical and geo-economic space as Russia. Moscow, in this situation, starts viewing the EU not so much as a partner, but rather as a systematic rival to its foreign policy goals in the Western NIS and the Caucasus; a revisionist power; and is instinctively inclined to get involved in a ‘zero-sum game’ type of relationship with the EU.’

 

• Thus the notion of neighbourhood and how it is perceived by key stakeholders is a major conundrum. Does it enhance further cooperation or further division/competition? As the limits of the ENP became evident over time and the EU began to uncouple its neighbourhood policy with the evolution of the Union for the Mediterranean in the South and the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) policy in the East in 2007/2008, further dividing lines emerged. The BSS epitomises the concept of regional cooperation. It put the Black Sea region on the radar screen of the EU as a single distinct policy area (the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, both Black Sea states, on 1 January 2007 effectively contributed to this process). The BSS promoted the concept of regional cooperation between the EU and the region as well as between the states of the region. It also sought to work with regional institutions such as the BSEC (Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) which had been in place since 1992 without EU direct involvement but with the participation of all regional stakeholders (including Russia and Turkey) thereby promoting a sense of regional and local ownership (something ENP South partners and Western Balkan states have strived for as well) of the process. Through its emphasis on sectoral cooperation (such as transport, environment, energy, trade inter alia), it also promoted the need for solid institutions, good governance principles, rule of law and accountability – in other words, it allowed in a non threatening manner concepts of Europeanisation to the region.

 

• Yet hardly a year having past before the BSS was introduced to the world, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which paradoxically the EU-27 have committed to just as much as they did for the BSS, which seeks ever closer relations with the ENP East partners testing the limits of Russian discomfort and EU unity  while duplicating many of the priorities of the BSS.

 

• As such today, the EU beset by its own institutional inabilities to move beyond the restrictions of the Nice Treaty, awaiting (some would say praying for) the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its implementation, amidst a full-blown global financial crisis (which can only imply a hardening of mental and economic borders) finds itself sending contradictory signals to its ENP East partners and strategic political and economic partner Russia because its member states have found it convenient to exploit the lack of leadership and direction by transforming their national prerogatives and priorities into European ones (much of the same it could be argued is in evidence in the Mediterranean). In fact, the new EU member states have increasingly divergent perspectives regarding further enlargement to the East.

 

• Nevertheless, the reality that the EU has to have some sort of neighbourhood policy (however many adaptations it undergoes) and the symbiotic/interdependent nature of the relationship between Russia and the Union at least in the economic front coupled with the devastating impact of the global financial crisis is having on both neighbours implies that over the mid- to long-term there is much more that unites rather than divides the two sides. It is worth keeping in mind that the Union is Russia’s main trading partner accounting for over 52% of Russia’s main trade turnover and the main investor in Russia while 50% of Russian oil exports and 63% of its natural gas exports go to the EU. The challenge is to convert or at least spill over the economic interdependency into the political realm.

 

• In order to advance though, the need for relevance and less policy confusion, more flexibility and pragmatism coupled with policy harmonisation, the avoidance of policy duplication and greater co-ownership is paramount. Otherwise, the strain on human and financial resources and objectives will only to greater policy disarray within the EU as well as fewer incentives and tools to effectively assure that the notion of a common neighbourhood is effectively promoted.

Bibliography

Alexandrova-Arbatova, Nadia. 2008. Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area in the Context of EU-Russia Relations, ICBSS Xenophon Paper, no. 5. Athens: ICBSS.

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, COM (2009) 188/3, Brussels, 23 April 2009.

General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008.

---------. A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Geoana, Mircea. “Why we mustn’t look at Eastern Europe as a single bloc,” Europe’s World, Spring 2009.

Glenny, Misha. 2008. McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld. New York: Knopf.

Lavrov, Sergei. 2008. “Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation” in Diplomatic Yearbook 2008 (Moscow). http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/19e7b14202191e4ac3257525003e5de7?OpenDocument

Moshes, Arkady. 2006. “Prospects For EU-Russia Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation”. The EU-Russia Review, No. 2: 22-27.

Tsantoulis, Tannis. “Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?”. ICBSS Policy Brief no. 12, Athens, March 2009.

Wallace, Helen. 2009. “The European Union and its Neighbourhood: Time for a Rethink”. ELIAMEP Thesis, 4/2009, Athens, May 2009.

Yannis, Alexandros. “The European Union and the Black Sea Region: The New Eastern Frontiers and Europeanisation”. ICBSS Policy Brief no. 7, Athens, May 2008

Αθήνα, 11 Μαρτίου 2009, Αφιέρωμα στον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή

Βιβλιοπαρουσίαση του βιβλίου:

Δ. Τριανταφύλλου, Κ. Υφαντής, Ε. Χατζηβασιλειου (επιμ.) Διεθνείς Σχέσεις: Σύγχρονη θεματολογία και προσεγγίσεις – Αφιέρωμα στον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 2008)

Σήμερα, ημέρα χρέους και ευθύνης, χαράς και αναγνώρισης προς το πρόσωπο του καθηγητή Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή, ως εκπρόσωπος των τριών επιμελητών του τιμητικού τόμου - Διεθνείς Σχέσεις: Σύγχρονη θεματολογία και προσεγγίσεις – θα ήθελα να αναφερθώ εν τάχει στους λόγους που μας παρακίνησαν να ξεκινήσουμε αυτό το φιλόδοξο εγχείρημα.

Αυτό το βιβλίο, όπως θα έχετε ήδη διαπιστώσει, συνιστά ένα φόρο τιμής στον καθηγητή Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή. Έστω και αν ένας τιμητικός τόμος είναι μία φτωχή απόπειρα να τιμηθεί ένας άνθρωπος σαν τον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή, το εν λόγω σύγγραμμα, πιστεύουμε, πως είναι τελικά ο πιο άμεσος και αποτελεσματικός τρόπος έκφρασης αγάπης και εκτίμησης προς το πρόσωπο ενός εκπαιδευτικού και διορατικού παρατηρητή των Διεθνών Σχέσεων που από τον επαναπατρισμό του στην Ελλάδα από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1980 συνέβαλλε –και συνεχίζει να συμβάλει έως και σήμερα – όσο κανείς άλλος στην αυτόνομη και γόνιμη ανάπτυξη της επιστήμης των Διεθνών Σχέσεων σε αυτή τη χώρα.

Πράγματι, η προσφορά του Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή στα γράμματα είναι ανεκτίμητη και δύσκολα μπορεί κανείς να την αποτιμήσει. Το πλέον χαρακτηριστικό και απτό δείγμα της προσφοράς του μπορεί να το διαπιστώσει κανείς μελετώντας το κλασσικό –πλέον– βιβλίο του Εξουσία και δικαιοσύνη – ένα βιβλίο το όποιο χαίρει ευρύτερης αποδοχής τόσο στην διεθνή όσο και στην ελληνική ακαδημαϊκή κοινότητα. Να σημειωθεί μάλιστα, ότι ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής, ακούραστος όπως πάντα, επανεξέδωσε πέρσι μια επικαιροποιημένη έκδοση του βιβλίου του. Φυσικά, δεν πρέπει να παραγνωρίζει κανείς τη συνεισφορά του επίσης στη μελέτη της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής και στην ανάλυση των ελληνο-τουρκικών σχέσεων, μελέτες οι οποίες έτυχαν επίσης παρόμοιας υποδοχής.

Για τον Κώστα Υφαντή και τον Ευάνθη Χατζηβασιλείου, επιμελητές αυτού του έργου, που όπως πολλοί άλλοι είχαν το προνόμιο να το γνωρίσουν από κοντά, τόσο ως δάσκαλο όσο και ως συνάδελφο στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, και για μένα που είχα την τιμή να συνεργαστώ μαζί του στο ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ στο παρελθόν και τώρα πλέον στα πλαίσια του ελληνο-τουρκικού φόρουμ, ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής υπήρξε φωτεινό παράδειγμα. Μας έχει επηρεάσει βαθειά και συνεχίζει να το πράττει με το ήθος του, την ανθρωπιά του, την προθυμία του να ακούσει την άποψη του «Άλλου» και φυσικά με τις πάντοτε αιχμηρές τοποθετήσεις του επί ζητημάτων που άπτονται του παγκόσμιου γίγνεσθαι και των κρίσιμων ζητημάτων της εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Και στους τρεις από μας, ο καθηγητής Κουλουμπής υπήρξε – και συνεχίζει να είναι – κοντά μας πάντα έτοιμος να ακούσει τις ανησυχίες και τους προβληματισμούς μας ως νεώτεροι μελετητές και εκπαιδευτικοί.

Για αυτόν τον λόγο, θεωρήσαμε ότι θα έπρεπε να δημιουργήσουμε ένα βιβλίο που κατά τη γνώμη μας θα μπορούσε να συνεισφέρει ουσιαστικά στην ελληνική βιβλιογραφία καλύπτοντας σημαντικά κενά. Αυτό που επιδιώξαμε εξαρχής ήταν να συγκεντρώσουμε τους πιο καταξιωμένους επιστήμονες του χώρου, συμπεριλαμβανομένων αυτών που διαπρέπουν στο εξωτερικό, και να ενσωματώσουμε τις πλέον σύγχρονες θεωρητικές εξελίξεις και τάσεις στον τομέα των διεθνών σχέσεων σε ένα βιβλίο. Το γεγονός ότι τόσοι πολλοί καταξιωμένοι συνάδελφοι, 36 για την ακρίβεια, που αντιπροσωπεύουν διαφορετικές γενεές μελετητών, αποδέχτηκαν με χαρά την πρόταση μας και συνέβαλαν ο καθένας ξεχωριστά και όλοι μαζί στην εκπόνηση αυτού του τόμου επιβεβαιώνει την αξία του Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή και συνιστά παράλληλα την μεγαλύτερη ίσως επιβράβευση της συνολικής προσφοράς του στην πνευματική ζωή του τόπου. Ως γνωστόν, η αναγνώριση του έργου του από τους ομότεχνους του είναι αναμφίβολα και η σημαντικότερη.

Σε αυτό το σημείο θα ήθελα να επισημάνω, πως αυτή η επίπονη προσπάθεια, που διήρκεσε πάνω από δυόμιση έτη, δεν θα είχε έρθει εις πέρας χωρίς τη βοήθεια μερικών προσώπων που αξίζουν ιδιαίτερη αναφορά.

Κατ' αρχάς, θα θέλαμε να ευχαριστήσουμε τον φίλο και συνάδελφο μας Σωτήρη Ντάλη, διευθυντή της σειράς «Διεθνής και Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική» και τον εκδότη, τον αδικοχαμένο Βίκτωρα Παπαζήση για την θερμή υποστήριξη τους. Επίσης,  θα θέλαμε να ευχαριστήσουμε θερμά και την Όλγα Μπόρου, υποψήφια διδάκτορα Διεθνών Σχέσεων, για την ακούραστη υποστήριξη της στη συλλογή των άρθρων και συνολική επεξεργασία του βιβλίου. Πρέπει να αναγνωρίσουμε ότι χωρίς τη συνδρομή της Όλγας, το φιλόδοξο αυτό εγχείρημα ίσως να είχε παραμείνει ανεκπλήρωτο.

Τέλος, σε ένα πιο προσωπικό επίπεδο θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τους γονείς μου, που βρίσκονται σήμερα σε αυτή την αίθουσα, που με έχουν διδάξει με την προσωπική τους στάση και ήθος πάντα να θυμάμαι, να σέβομαι και να αναγνωρίζω αυτούς που ενήργησαν και συνεχίζουν να ενεργούν ως πρότυπα και μέντορες μου συμβάλλοντας στην καλλιέργεια μου – άνθρωποι δηλαδή όπως ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπης. Τέτοιες στιγμές μου έρχονται στο μυαλό οι λέξεις του Milan Kundera: «Ο αέναος αγώνας του ατόμου ενάντια στην ισχύ είναι ο αέναος αγώνας της μνήμης έναντι της λήθης».

Ακριβώς όπως και ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής αγωνίστηκε και συνεχίζει να αγωνίζεται για να διασφαλίσει ότι η επιστήμη των Διεθνών Σχέσεων έχει στέρεες βάσεις στον ελληνικό ακαδημαϊκό κόσμο και για να εμπνεύσει τους νεώτερους μελετητές να συνεχίσουν με αμείωτο ρυθμό και ένταση αυτόν τον αγώνα, είναι πρωταρχικό χρέος μας όχι μόνο να μην λησμονήσουμε, αλλά και να αναγνωρίσουμε το ρόλο, την αφοσίωση και την ανεκτίμητη προσφορά του.

Θεόδωρε Κουλουμπή, σε ευχαριστούμε. 

Engaging the Black Sea region - the time for action is now

The international order has entered into a new era. Barack Obama has taken formally the reigns of power in Washington, the dismantling of a number of Bush-era policies has begun and the expectations of hope across the globe take hold. Amidst an ongoing, evergrowing international financial and economic crisis (where estimates of negative growth globally for the first time since 1950 abound), and the realities of the aftermath of the killing fields of Gaza, Obama’s agenda is filled to the brim and bound to overflow.

The Black Sea region – a region encompassing the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and some of the European Union’s member states – will undoubtedly constitute a high priority region, not in the least due to the presence of Russia. The issues at hand are many, they are complex and they are challenging. They could augur instability as well as the potential for constructive, long-standing cooperation and stability. For one, an interesting challenge has to do with the sort of relationship that will emerge between Russia and the United States. Will the probable engagement of Russia by the Obama administration on a variety on longstanding global imperatives, elevate Russia to greater than regional power status as the Kremlin’s current leadership aspires? As a consequence, what will be the implications of this power shift on the Black Sea region as a whole?[1] How will another regional heavyweight like Turkey with aspirations for an ever greater regional and global role (participation in the G-20, role model as moderate Islamic country, Alliance for Civilizations co-chair, regional leader, etc.) react to greater Russian influence?

As things stand today, at least in the opinion of this analyst, some of the key issues are the following:

1. Energy and energy security. The last act in the ongoing energy feud between Russia and Ukraine is a clear indicator of the importance of energy security for the region and its customers, especially the European Union. Oil and natural gas – together with their exploration, production, and transport – are commodities that flow across borders however tenuous these might be.
   
2. The recent winter energy gridlock between the two aforementioned countries has also led to a more balanced, less ideological and subjective analysis regarding Russia and its role. In other words, the muckraking whether periodic, systematic or inherent regarding Russian and its current regime has given way to more realist analyses, especially in western media outlets and research centres regarding the foreign policy and role of the countries of the region. Concepts such as the inevitability of a “soft war” with Russia[2] have given way to concerns about the ability of Ukraine (and Georgia earlier last year) to be reliable partners. Nevertheless the prevailing vestiges of ideological or bloc divisions (whether these come from Moscow or Western capitals) remain a challenge.
   
3. This shaken credibility in Ukraine and Georgia or to be more precise in their current leaderships to bring about the requisite transformation inspired by the Orange and Rose revolutions respectively has placed their eventual Euro-Atlantic integration on the back burner. The question remains as to whether this also implies the end of European integration for Ukraine in particular or a renewed effort to integrate based not on the undelivered promises of reform but on clear conditionality where a condition is cooperation with all its neighbours.
   
4. The redefinition of US-Russian relations as previously mentioned could and would seriously define whether the region enhances cooperation or is further divided. The impact on the uneasy status quo between Turkey and Russia is an important dimension. Turkey recently felt the limits of overreach when it received a firm rebuke from some EU states when it attempted to link its support for the Nabucco pipeline to its EU accession talks.[3]
   
5. The European Union’s role in the region to date leaves much to be desired. EU leadership is needed but is it feasible? The EU is involved in the region in a number of fronts – it launched the Black Sea Synergy in 2007 and the Eastern Partnership in 2008. Both are ambitious policies though somewhat contradictory policies calling for more engagement in the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Union has deployed since October 2008 a monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) under the European security and defence policy. It was also actively involved in mediating the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Finally the EU adopted in December 2008 a report beefing up its European Security Strategy by giving prominence to issues such as energy security, the various protracted conflicts, human security and greater engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood. On the other hand, the lack of progress on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which would beef up the Union’s foreign policy prospects, the continued inability to achieve consensus regarding the status of Kosovo (and hence its implication for separatist region of the Caucasus and their recognition) place serious restraints on the Union’s ability to pull its weight in the region. For example, the inability to arrive on a modus vivendi with Russia on the development of their common neighbourhood continues to be a thorn for the EU.
   
6. Finally, a number of issues that are down the list in terms of priorities will eventually make their way up to the surface and will need to be handled by all stakeholders concerned. One such concern has to do with the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet once the lease on Sevastopol expires in 2017. Reports of the construction of a naval base in Abkhazia actually suggest that the issue needs to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Beyond the tricky issue of the Fleet’s future deployment, the economic impact of the withdrawal of the fleet on Sevastopol itself is a concern in itself. Ideas such as the one propounded by the city’s mayor that Sevastopol become a Free Economic Area merit consideration. Another possible flashpoint has to do with Crimea’s future.[4] Imaginative solutions that assure its future within Ukraine need further study.
   

In light of the aforementioned concerns, what needs to be done? Conceivably, the countries of the region have to constructively work together either bilaterally or regional within the framework of existing cooperative arrangements such as the BSEC and others. This continued cooperation which in the BSEC, for example, has survived the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war acts as a confidence building measure or mechanism for all stakeholders. In this context, the European Union in its capacity as an observer to the BSEC needs to assert itself that regional cooperation is part and parcel of successful engagement and ever closer ties with its ENP East partners. A lesson from both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s recent troubles with Russia is that attention needs to be paid to their neighbour(s) while they seek to integrate with the West. In other words, further integration into euro-atlantic structures need not imply the severing of relations with powerful neighbours that have no such aspirations. Regional cooperation helps states eventually move away from zero sum thinking and actions. In fact, the BSEC together with other regional initiatives should actually be seen as promoting economic cooperation as a source of security “on the basis of a paradigm of security that is linked to democracy, respect for human rights and good governance.”[5]

Hence, the question that remains is whether the European Union at 27 has the ability to lead and put to use the “smart power” paradigm which Hillary Clinton in her Senate confirmation recently expounded for her country.[6] The transformative experience of the European Union is a manifold process which is sorely needed in the region. At a time when the United States is putting its house in order and seeks to redefine its international relations; the Union is still coping to achieve coherence in its external action as the Lisbon Treaty escapes ratification.

The wider Black Sea region - part EU region and large part of its neighbourhood - seeks guidance, cooperative action and greater engagement by all stakeholders. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. For example, as was recently proposed at a conference on the Black Sea, the Russian proposal for a new Europe-wide security pact could be an opportunity for the EU to introduce and promote the notion of “overriding European interests” and include the dimensions of energy and energy security in the discussions on the shape of the new security framework. Simultaneously, the promotion of a set of commonly defined principles regarding energy and energy security in the BSEC or some other inclusive regional cooperation framework could also be another targeted action that engages all sates of the region and obliges key energy producing and transit states to work with their neighbours. The time for action is now.

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[1] Incidentally, in a recent article by Henry Kissinger on what the new US administration ought to do in the international arena, Russia is not mentioned even once. See Henry Kissinger, “The chance for a new world order,” International Herald Tribune, 12 January 2009.

[2] See, in particular, Bruce P. Jackson, “The ‘Soft War’ for Europe’s East,” Policy Review, June-July 2006.

[3] On a visit to Brussels, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister said on 19 January 2009 that "if we are faced with a situation where the energy chapter remains blocked, we would of course rethink our position [on Nabucco],". Reacting to Erdogan’s remarks, Germany’s Economy Minister, Michael Glos said that “Turkey is engaged in ‘political blackmail’. See “Turkey plays energy card in stalled EU accession talks,” EurActiv.com, 20 January 2009 and “Turkey Blackmailing EU Over Gas Pipeline, German Minister Says,” dw-world.de, 20 January 2009.

[4] See, in particular, Merle Maigre, “Crimea – The Achilles’ Heel of Ukraine,” www.icds.ee, November 2008.

[5] See Felix Ciuta, “Region? Why Region? Security, Hermeneutics, and the Making of the Black Sea Region,” Geopolitics, 13:1, 2008.

[6] “We must use what has been called “smart power”: the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.” Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, nominee for Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.