Dimitrios' World

Dimitrios' World: The launch of the Space Shuttle and a nation's des...

2011-07-09T10:14:00.000+02:00

Dimitrios' World: The launch of the Space Shuttle and a nation's des...: "As I watched Space Shuttle Atlantis take off yesterday and remembered watching, as a teenager in California, Space Shuttle Columbia in Apr..."

The launch of the Space Shuttle and a nation's destiny

2011-07-09T10:08:00.002+02:00

As I watched Space Shuttle Atlantis take off yesterday and remembered watching, as a teenager in California, Space Shuttle Columbia in April 1981 take the shuttle program into space and recall all its ups and downs (with the disasters in 1986 and 2003), I also understand the sense of destiny that makes a nation proud (in this case the US and its space quest).... The emotions are always the same - goose bumps, tears that cannot be held back, and a sense of pride of having had the privilege to live and study in the US for a significant part of my life. .... And then I always reflect on my country...What about my country, what is its sense of destiny?...It seems to have none, perpetually lost is its pettiness, unable to overcome the burden of its glorious past and the gifts its peoples gave to the world starting with the greatest of all - democracy.

The shuttle program is coming to an end with the Atlantis mission but I do not have any doubts that the United States will be leading the way for future travel in space... What about beautiful, tormented Greece? I have my idea of what it should forward to...I only wish all of us look ahead individually and collectively and dare to dream...

I remember being enthralled in 1986 by reading the Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age by Walter McDougall, my professor at UC Berkeley at the time (I still have an autographed copy somewhere). I remember watching Philip Kaufman's 1986 epic film The Right Stuff , later Ron Howard's captivating Apollo 13 in 1995, as well as numerous documentaries on the first moon landing on 20 July 1969....Truly great, emotional, thought provoking and inspiring feats linked to a nation's assumption that it can conquer space and proudly show the world that it can be done and that there is more to it than Yuri Gagarin's earth-shattering feat as the first man in space on 12April 1961. Despite the setbacks, the mission must go on...

Again my thoughts return to my country and hope that amidst its current travails, it possesses the wherewithal, the backbone and the chutzpah to rise proudly and dare project its destiny for generations to come....one that contributes to the moral, intellectual, and ideological well being of the world. Let the dream and the reality of the conquest of space act as a guide and inspiration...

The Audacity to Hope and the Audacity to Dare

2011-06-04T14:55:00.007+02:00

Much is being written these days about the nature of the "Indignants’' that are out en masse in the main squares of Greek cities. How can such a heterogeneous movement full of contradictory demands and aspirations really be an expression of the fundamental need for political, social, and economic change? How can such a movement contribute to lifting society and the country out of its morass? One well know journalist who has been ahead of the curve by repeatedly daring to make Greek taboos known to the rest of the world, Takis Michas, wrote an interesting piece in protagon.gr titled "Where were you Indignant?". He presents an endless list of figures that show the slow decay of the country such as the fact that the consumer index was 12% than the average in the EU while the average income in Greece was 5% below the EU average and productivity was 20% below the EU average, etc.. Others question the demand and feasibility of "direct democracy" that seems to be a growing demand by the "Indignants". Yet others such as Paschos Mandravelis, a respected liberal columnist, correctly in my view, deride the methods of some of the “Indignants” including the blocking of Parliament, the throwing of stones, eggs, etc. at Ministers and any political figure that happens to be recognized…comparing these to fascism.

Like many others, I fear that the indignation and the outrage if not channeled properly and if there is no systematic attempt by the government and Parliament to clearly demonstrate the necessity and fairness of the harsh economic measures (such as the reduction of salaries and pensions as well as the fundamental restructuring of the public sector and an effective tax collection mechanisms that makes offenders pay for being free riders), the soup will hit the fan, to put it mildly.

Yet, we should all not lose sight of what the movement has done. It has undoubtedly brought about hope (at least an itsy bitsy expression of it) that the silent majority that has benefited from the system in place for some 30 years (and its siblings that cannot be accommodated by it anymore) is aware for the need for change. In part the citizens accept their mea culpa for their input in the current mess; they fundamentally understand that rebuilding means that the rights and privileges that are currently being scaled back cannot be justified under current conditions any more – I dare hope.

Apart from hope, the “Indignants” movement has allowed for a more lively exchange of views as to what needs to be done for the country to be reborn. One of the many placards held up by the outraged in Constitution writes “You have stolen our smiles”. The challenge is how to regain these on a much sounder basis.

One tract that is making inroads in the press and the internet by a group of intellectuals is titled “Dare”. It basically is a call against populist and irresponsible public rhetoric that remind us all that societies, especially healthy ones, can only be built with toil and sacrifices across generations. Negating all means negating the benefits of accession to the European Union and the adherence to western norms and values; negating all implies believing that we are a nation without brethren and deluding ourselves that we can stand alone. The system is broken; it therefore needs repair both in terms of its institutions and the human resources that comprise it and lead it. This call for change and its magnitude is not new; it has become more vocal and public over the last few years while acquiring more vociferous opposition by the systemic vested interests and many on the streets today that had been co-opted by it.

The recipes are many but they are all tough as they all necessitate a primordial rewiring of how a vibrant democratic, economically prosperous, socially inclusive society that is an EU member states operates. These include measures such as the ones Panagiotis Ioakimides, a perennial insider, presents in a recent article – separation of government and state institutions; separation between Church and State; lifting of the asylum law for universities; etc… The road ahead is difficult and painful but it risks becoming tortuous and without seeing the light at the end of the tunnel if the outrage and indignation falls victim to populism and destruction.

A few days ago, the BBC had a very interesting story about how Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, was not among the lucky ones in getting tickets for his family for the 2012 London Olympics as his on-line application was rejected. His response was that this made him “proud to be British”, and that no other country in the world would reject the mayor of the host city's application for tickets. I can only hope this would be the case in my country as well on day. One of the rallying cries of the “Indignants” is a Mahatma Gandhi quote that “poverty is the worst form of violence”; though equating Gandhi’s struggle and his world to today’s Greece is undeniably far-fetched, poverty is and can be a rallying call to build a more egalitarian and accountable society.

The audacity to dare and hope is within our grasp…if only we can all direct all our energy there, albeit the outrage and indignation.

Keeping the Outrage in Perspective

2011-05-31T23:27:00.005+02:00

The street protests in Greece are raising a big debate about their purpose, their cohesion and their effectiveness. After the initial feeling of elation that comes with a spontaneous expression of discontent with the state of the country and the ineffectiveness of the political system much ado is being made as to whether this largely heterogeneous mass of citizens with very disparate perspectives can actually express a cohesive platform of positions and possibly even evolve into some sort of political movement.

Herein the danger. The street protests are meant to mobilise the political elite into taking action but as long as the governing and the main opposition parties are ineffective (or perceived to be ineffective) in leading, the street protests will quickly disintegrate into an unruly mob with an anti West, anti EU, anti IMF, anti anything that is not Greek populist movement. The presence of many Greek flags (a sign that the lines between patriotism and nationalism are becoming blurred) and the ease with which many protesters heap insults on who they deem responsible for their condition is a volatile mix. The populist rallying cry by Mikis Theodorakis on 31 May among others against the sell out of the country against a background of anti creditor and anti Semitic chants is a case in point. Another example of a worsening danger was the blocking of all exits from Parliament thereby trapping MPs and staff inside.

Indignation and outrage is slowly turning into restlessness, hate, and populist rhetoric and this does not augur well for what is to come. Where I in Greece I would probably still be in the main square of Athens in indignation of where my country is heading but I would also be increasingly worried about how this outrage is channelled.

Outrage! The Greek Political Class Finally Revolts

2011-05-29T10:05:00.002+02:00

The feeling of outrage is growing among the professional political elite in Greece. It can be easily understood -- they have been running this country for over 35 years (and some for much more) and now the people they represent or at least a part of them have been taking to the streets to protest! What ires the despondent and indignant politicians is that the people in the squares and streets are not protesting within the organised confines of the unions and political parties that have been formed to allow citizens to vent their anger and to to be co-opted but, how dare they, these new protests have been taking place without the approval of the party machines! Even worse, whenever anyone shows up waiving the symbols of any of our benevolent political formations, they are derided and threatened.

As a result of this growing phenomenon, the politicians feel the very core of their existence under threat. If they cannot govern as they have to date with their vested interests, the widespread use of clientelism, the passing of the baton to their siblings, the bloating of the public sector, etc... what will become of them? Their indignation has led to their revolt.

The political class has finally woken up and is trying to regain the upper hand. They have decided to show the citizens that have repeatedly voted for them all these years who is in charge! They have decided to change the rules of the game. Friday, 27 May was a good example... Meeting with great fanfare under the watchful eye of the President of the Republic (another wise and exemplary representative of post-1974 democratic political elite with close ties both to Milosevic and Qaddafi), the enlightened leaders of the five parties represented in that well-oiled chamber called Parliament decided that they will not consent to consensus, that they will not agree on a plan to saving the country from further political, social and economic degradation, that all that counts is showing who's the boss. Let the facebook revolutionaries filling the country's main city squares over the last few days take heed, our benevolent leaders have reacted with courage, chuzpah, audacity and vision!

I am so proud of my leaders. I can't wait for the next elections to vote for them again and perpetuate their stay in office. If only the electoral system would allow me to vote for all of them (now, that is an interesting proposal for electoral reform)! Surely those pseudo-indignants in the squares of Greece will see the error of their ways and go home and let the brave professionals rule!

God bless the Greek Political Class! May they eternally continue to bless the country with their brave forward looking leadership (or lack thereof, for avoiding to take tough decisions can only be an act of political courage -- who are we the mere laymen to doubt them?)!

The politicians are finally outraged! The country is about to be saved. Amen...

(I better stop here and run to the bathroom before I make a mess of things... the urge to vomit cannot be held back ...)

The Malaise of being a Greek Today

2010-10-10T12:40:00.001+02:00

It wasn’t that difficult to decide, in my current state of mind, that my present and future do not lie in today’s Greece. I thus took the decision to emigrate and move to another city, another country, another university, another work environment where my talents, ideas, and work experience, whatever these might be or are perceived to be, were sought after and appreciated. In the short while that I have left Athens (not even a full month), I feel energized and creative again, full of aspirations, and more committed and hopeful in not only fulfilling my duties and obligations but helping, with the means at my disposal, my country stand on its feet and prosper far more than I have been able since I lived and worked in Greece.

The malaise of being a Greek today is overburdening. It possesses you as a fundamental human necessity – hope – seems to have lost its presence. I hope it is hidden behind a passing cloud or trying to unlock itself from the closet it finds itself imprisoned. If ‘hope is a waking dream’, as Aristotle was reputed to have said; in present day Greece, it is not nowhere near to being awakened.

‘Stay and fight for change like we are doing,’ I heard from many friends, colleagues and students, yet it my beleaguered state of being, the decision to leave was a no-brainer. It allows me to breathe without feeling the uneasiness of putting on a brave face for months to my colleagues at the think tank I used to run as I fought to ensure that their jobs were not at risk. More importantly, I felt I could not face my students at the university for another term with bravado full of empty optimism which I did not believe in. If ‘a leader is a dealer in hope’, I for one as an educator refuse to deal in false hope any longer. A telling example of where we have come in terms of our moral bankruptcy as a society is an incident which I was involved in a few months ago. In one of my weekly flights back and forth to Rhodes in order to teach at my university department, a young stewardess approached me and asked me if I remembered her in an emotional voice barely holding back her tears. She did look very familiar and I could only think that she was former student of mine. She was. She reminded me that I had written her a letter of recommendation to do an MA in International Relations at a UK university a couple of years ago. She was accepted in the programme and received her degree only to return to Greece to find the job market limited that she managed to take the job with the airline because of her foreign language skills. Her pent up emotions upon seeing me, her teacher, personified her crushed aspirations of pursuing a career in a domain she had the intellectual wherewithal to do well and the sad reality of being lucky enough to find a job in order to avoid joining the ranks of the growing unemployed, in particular among her generation. Her parting words were the most crushing – ‘Professor Triantaphyllou, I would have preferred not to have run into you today.’

This meeting has stigmatised me. It also helped me reaffirm my belief that my life belonged elsewhere, to paraphrase Milan Kundera. If I had stayed and accepted the norms, rules, and restraints of making ends meet in today’s Greece, I would have found myself increasingly marginalised, despondent, and impotent especially as I continued to exercise my responsibilities as a university professor considered a part of the social elite that have much to be blamed together with their political counterparts for the decadence of post-1974 democratic Greece. In order to survive I would have had to make a break, resign from the university and restart my life anew as an honest man making an honest living as a dishwasher, a painter, a farmer, a bus driver, etc. with the hope that with hard work life can only but get better. I chose to leave in order to salvage what I could of who I am intellectually, spiritually, and professionally. Some might consider this running away, I think it is more about finding hope again, about believing that hope is real, tangible, and omnipresent and transmitting it through my teaching, my writings, my conversations in whatever amount is allocated to my fellow Greeks because I believe in it. The malaise in being a Greek today is to have stopped believing. I can only hope that by moving abroad, I will.

Why?

2010-05-05T21:20:00.002+02:00

It goes without saying that these are not the best of times for my country. I constantly find myself with dewy eyes trying to ensure that tears do not flow especially in front of others. After all, it is so unbecoming of a soon to be forty four year old university professor, I say too myself. Rage, anger is what I feel, for what is happening to Greece. And it occurs to me that this occurring too often lately. The wildfires of September 2007 and the accompanying loss of human life were debilitating, having me and most not directly involved in the heat of things (no pun intended) stuck in front of their television screens shocked, concerned, distressed. The riots of December 2008 that saw Athens burning was a wake up call that something was horribly amiss. A small segment of society that saw itself as disenfranchised wanted blood, police blood in this case, and for a few days saw their numbers swell with 14-year olds and other misguided youth that saw the limits of the clientelist system in place since 1974 and the very real possibility that it could not accommodate them in their search for a job as an excuse to show their rights of passage. The interesting development was that a collective buzz took hold that the political, social and economic system in place needs major reform. But life went back to its normal routine and the buzz became but a memory.

And now this, today’s protest turning violent and tragic – a result of years of putting up with a system of governance and a buddy and clientelist scheme, society (every single one of us) has come to accept and become in varying degrees a party to it. The demonstration was massive, the shock and anger with the austerity measures, with the forthcoming decline in standards of living, and the lack at this moment of light at the end of the tunnel spurring people on the streets. I chose to work, maybe I should not have. On the other hand, the violence and its fatal end result have no justification. I refuse to accept the value system of those that readily put on masks, motorcycle helmets or hoods to cover their faces and throw Molotov cocktails at all they abhor. Yet, like every single one of my fellow citizens, we have preferred to turn a blind eye to them, accepting the fact that the full brunt of the rule of law should not be applied to them for fear of greater violence. After all why rock a system that accommodates us?

It is becoming all the more evident that we all need to face the music, to accept our responsibility for putting up with rot for so long. As a friend wrote on Facebook “I am saddened by the death of innocent people, but I am guilty as hell for tolerating and even nurturing a rotten system and mentality in Greece... It is a matter of collective accountability and individual criminal responsibility.” Stathis Kalyvas, a political scientist from Yale was even more succinct – “a country commits suicide.”

Another wake up call like so many others in the recent past. Will this one be heard? Will the buzz turn into a more substantial and permanent civil dialogue and systemic reform? One can only hope. I think I do my part to nurture change but it is probably not enough. At the point we have come, I wonder whether I have the strength to do more. Yet, I know that not doing anything is like being dead.

A Return to Realpolitik? A Snapshot

2010-04-26T23:46:00.002+02:00

In a recent analysis of Barrack Obama’s foreign policy much was made of the fact that in contrast to his predecessor’s value-laden approach, Obama seems to favour Realpolitik. In another recent article it is suggested that the “democracy narrative” was losing ground as all “colour” or “velvet” revolutions of recent years – the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, its Orange counterpart in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip or Pink Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and even the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005 – have failed to produce much especially in terms of the long-term democratisation and liberalisation of the countries at hand. In fact, it may well be that the ideological underpinnings of the aforementioned revolutions pitting the so-called “good guys” versus the “bad guys” have found themselves lacking sponsors today given the current withdrawal of the neocons from the limelight.

The return to realpolitik is also symbolised, inter alia, by the “reset button” paradigm between the United States and Russia; the strategic arms talks and the signing of the new START Treaty between the two countries on 8 April in Prague; the limited access Georgia’s leader, Mikhail Shaakashvili, has to the Obama administration; the tug of war between Israel’s current government and the United States; and the reported deal between the new Ukrainian leadership and Russia regarding the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in exchange for lower gas prices. Even the new developing interest-based cooperation between Poland and Russia as a result of tragedy is evidence of steady change in international relations – changed marked by strategic imperatives among and between global and regional stakeholders that think in strategic terms.

The missing power in all this manifestations of global change is the European Union (EU) which lacks strategic punch although it has been slowly attempting to acquire it as first expressed almost a decade ago with its European Security Strategy. Yet global change is rapid and the EU is slow in leaving its mark. Recently, we have evidenced, and still are to a large extent witnessing, the failure of the EU to rise up to the challenges posed by financial governance in light of the economic crisis and the stability of its common currency – the euro – where national reflexes based on obtaining necessary domestic political consensus seem to take precedence over joint action (the current German reticence to putting into effect the EU/IMF bailout package for Greece due to domestic political and electoral considerations is a case in point). Similarly, the delayed coordination and the subsequent economic damage caused to air transport by the ash clouds coming from Iceland’s unpronounceable Eyjafjallajokull volcano is another example of slow reaction time. Other examples of slow coordination include the post-Lisbon tug-of-war among and between EU institutions and member states over the shape, form and content of the European External Action Service (EEAS) or even the failure to convince other stakeholders in the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change that a binding agreement is vital and necessary.

It stands to reason that in spite all aforementioned examples of EU failure to lead effectively, the demand for a greater EU role is actually increasing. The critique centres around the need for it to do more, not that it is insignificant. Nevertheless, although its consensual-driven approach is time consuming and difficult to achieve, the Union needs to overcome its growing pains and act faster and better to meet the many global challenges that arise.

In the Black Sea region context, the EU presence is more than imperative today. Given the evident great power politics at play, the Union better sharpen its reflexes and impact in order to avoid the further securitisation of the region which might seriously damage the forces of regionalism and regional cooperation that it has so carefully and nurtured in the last few years. The return to realpolitik might be more than a passing fad yet it needs to be harnessed within a twenty-first century context where the Union, its member states and its many proponents need to play a key role.

Το εγχειρίδιο του Ευρωπαίου Διπλωμάτη-Τεχνοκράτη

2010-01-26T21:27:00.003+02:00

Βιβλιοκριτική

Αλέξανδρος Γιαννής, Από το «Εγώ» στο «Εμείς». Εξωτερική Πολιτική στην εποχή της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Παγκοσμιοποίησης, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 2009, σελ. 144.

Διαβάζοντας το νέο βιβλίο του Αλέξανδρου Γιαννή με τίτλο «Από το «Εγώ» στο «Εμείς». Εξωτερική πολιτική στην εποχή της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Παγκοσμιοποίησης», ο αναγνώστης μπορεί να καταλήξει σε δύο βασικές παρατηρήσεις. Η πρώτη είναι ότι το βιβλίο αποτελεί αναμφίβολα μια σημαντική συμβολή στη συζήτηση που διεξάγεται αναφορικά με το καίριο ερώτημα «γιατί υπάρχει ανάγκη για περισσότερη Ευρώπη». Η δεύτερη είναι ότι είναι δύσκολο για τη βασική θέση του βιβλίου, την οποία ο γράφων υιοθετεί σε μεγάλο βαθμό, να βρει απήχηση στο ελληνικό περιβάλλον ιδίως αν αναλογιστεί κανείς ότι προϋποθέτει την ανάγκη αναγωγής του εθνικού συμφέροντος σε ευρωπαϊκό. Σε αυτό το σημείο πρέπει να επισημανθεί ότι ο συγγραφέας του βιβλίου, ως μελετητής της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΕΕ) και της πολυμερούς διπλωματίας, και ως μέλος της Γενικής Γραμματείας του Συμβουλίου της Ένωσης, διαθέτει την πνευματική ικανότητα και την απαιτούμενη πρακτική εμπειρία ώστε να αποπειραθεί μία τόσο απαιτητική ανάλυση.

Από κάθε άποψη, το βιβλίο θα μπορούσε κάλλιστα να θεωρηθεί «Tο εγχειρίδιο του Ευρωπαίου Διπλωμάτη – Τεχνοκράτη» καθώς ο συγγραφέας με σαφήνεια επεξηγεί το raison d'être για την ανάληψη κοινής δράσης εκ μέρους της ΕΕ στον τομέα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής δίνοντας έμφαση τόσο στην διαδικασία της «ενοποίησης», έναντι τόσο της επικράτησης του έθνους-κράτους όσο και της ιδιότυπης «συνύπαρξης» της realpolitik που αποτελεί το βασικό –σε κάποιο βαθμό- πλαίσιο δράσης των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών ως παγκόσμιας δύναμης. Το βασικό επιχείρημα του Γιαννή είναι σαφές – η παγκοσμιοποίηση δεν απειλεί το έθνος-κράτος, αλλά αντιθέτως του υπαγορεύει τις προκλήσεις προσαρμογής του στο νέο πλαίσιο. Στην ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο, αυτό μπορεί να επιτευχθεί καλύτερα στα πλαίσια της Ένωσης, η οποία αποτελεί ένα χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα κοινών διεθνών αξίων και δράσης. Με άλλα λόγια, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως ο πιο αυθεντικός εκπρόσωπος ενοποιητικών αντιλήψεων στις διεθνείς σχέσεις επιτρέπει κατά τον καλύτερο –και πιο ανώδυνο– τρόπο την προσαρμογή των εθνών-κρατών στις προκλήσεις της διεθνούς τάξης. Ως εκ τούτου, για τον συγγραφέα, βρισκόμαστε ενώπιον πολλαπλών μεταβάσεων. Συγκεκριμένα, τη μετάβαση από το «εθνικό στο «ευρωπαϊκό», από το «ευρωπαϊκό» στο «παγκόσμιο», από το «διμερές» στο «πολυμερές». Συνολικά όλες αυτές συνοψίζονται στη θεμελιώδη μετάβαση από το «εγώ» στο «εμείς».

Σύμφωνα με το Γιαννή, η μετάβαση σε ένα πολυμερές ή τουλάχιστον ένα πιο συμμετοχικό μοντέλο διακυβέρνησης έχει ήδη ξεκινήσει και προς απόδειξη αυτού ο συγγραφέας χρησιμοποιεί συγκεκριμένα απτά παράδειγματα. Αναφέρει το παράδειγμα των συνεργειών που δημιουργούνται στα πλαίσια του G20 –έναντι του προγενέστερου G8– για την αντιμετώπιση της παγκόσμιας οικονομικής κρίσης, όπου τόσο η ΕΕ, όσο και ορισμένα κράτη μέλη του πυρήνα έχουν διαδραματίσει ηγετικό ρόλο. Επίσης, αναφέρεται στην πρωτοπόρα Ευρωπαϊκή Στρατηγική Ασφάλειας του Δεκεμβρίου του 2003 που είναι ουσιαστικά η πρώτη προσπάθεια της Ένωσης να κωδικοποιήσει το σκεπτικό, στο οποίο βασίζεται η ανάληψη κοινής διεθνούς δράσης δίνοντας έμφαση στην «αποτελεσματική πολυμερή προσέγγιση» (“effective multilateralism”). Τέλος, σε επίπεδο εθνών-κρατών, επισημαίνει τις δύο πρόσφατες Λευκές Βίβλους της Γαλλίας που εστιάζουν στην εξωτερική πολιτική, στην άμυνα και στην εθνική ασφάλεια, που κάνουν συγκεκριμένη αναφορά στην ταύτιση των γαλλικών εθνικών συμφερόντων με αυτά της ΕΕ. Αντιστοίχως, στη Γερμανία το 2008, οι Χριστιανοδημοκράτες εξέδωσαν ένα κείμενο πολιτικής το οποίο χαρακτηρίζει τη στρατηγική εθνικής ασφάλειας της χώρας μέρος της «Ευρωπαϊκής Στρατηγικής Ασφάλειας». Ακόμη και η Μεγάλη Βρετανία αναγνωρίζει – έστω και σε μικρότερο βαθμό από τους ευρωπαϊκούς εταίρους της – ότι το εθνικό συμφέρον της συνδέεται με το ευρωπαϊκό περιβάλλον. Άλλο παράδειγμα που καταδεικνύει το συσχετισμό μεταξύ των εθνικών και ευρωπαϊκών συμφέροντων στα οποία ο συγγραφέας δεν κάνει ιδιαίτερη μνεία περιλαμβάνουν μεταξύ άλλων τη μετονομασία των Υπουργείων Εξωτερικών της Αυστρίας και της Κροατίας σε Ομοσπονδιακό Υπουργείο Ευρωπαϊκών και Διεθνών Υποθέσεων και σε Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών και Ευρωπαϊκής Ολοκλήρωσης αντιστοίχως.

Εντούτοις, το πρόβλημα που τίθεται εν προκειμένω για τον συγγραφέα είναι διττό. Από τη μία πλευρά, υπάρχουν κράτη που δεν έχουν κατορθώσει να κάνουν την υπέρβαση και να προσεγγίσουν την εξωτερική τους πολιτική και τους διακηρυγμένους της στόχους σε όρους που υπερβαίνουν την περιοριστική και παρωχημένη λογική του έθνους-κράτους (βλ. Ελλάδα), με αποτέλεσμα τη δημιουργία πολλαπλών επίπεδων προσαρμογής στο πλαίσιο της παγκοσμιοποίησης εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Από την άλλη πλευρά, αν και ο ίδιος ο συγγραφέας αναμένει με ανυπομονησία την εφαρμογή της Συνθήκης της Λισαβόνας, ιδίως τις διατάξεις που αφορούν στην εξωτερική πολιτική, είναι ιδιαίτερα επικριτικός και χαρακτηρίζει τη διατήρηση της αρχής της ομοφωνίας στη λήψη αποφάσεων ως «τον ομφάλιο λώρο» της μετάβασης σε πιο συμμετοχικές και ενοποιητικές μορφές διακυβέρνησης σε ευρωπαϊκό και παγκόσμιο επίπεδο.

Ως εκ τούτου, η ιδέα της περαιτέρω ολοκλήρωσης των ευρωπαϊκών αξιών και κανόνων για τους γείτονες της Ένωσης παραμένει όμηρος σε ανταγωνιστικά εθνικά συμφέροντα και υπάγεται σε μία γενικότερη λογική παίγνιου μηδενικού αθροίσματος. Υπο αυτήν την έννοια, ο συγγραφέας σχολιάζει αρνητικά (είναι ιδιαίτερα καυστικός) τη θέση της Ελλάδας έναντι της ΠΓΔΜ και τη στάση της στο ζήτημα της αναγνώρισης της ανεξαρτησίας του Κοσσυφοπεδίου, καθώς όπως υποστηρίζει ακυρώνουν ουσιαστικά το πνεύμα της ιστορικής διαδικασίας της ολοκλήρωσης στην Ευρώπη, όπως καταγράφηκε στην ευρωπαϊκή λύση στο ιστορικό πρόβλημα των γαλλο-γερμανικών σχέσεων.

Ο συγγραφέας ίσως κατηγορηθεί για αποστασιοποίηση από το εθνικό πλαίσιο λήψης αποφάσεων, όπως είναι η Αθήνα στην περίπτωση της Ελλάδας, και τις πραγματικότητες και τους περιορισμούς, στους οποίους υποβάλλεται η εξωτερική πολιτική των εθνικών κυβερνήσεων, συμπεριφορές που ενίοτε επιβάλλονται από τους ψηφοφόρους. Συνεπώς, αυτό που έχει ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα στο ευρωπαϊκό ή στο πολυμερές επίπεδο, δεν χαίρει κατ 'ανάγκη της αντίστοιχης αποδοχής από τα κράτη μέλη. Επίσης, είναι δυνατόν η δύναμη της έλξης (power of attraction) της ΕΕ να μην είναι κατ’ ανάγκη από μόνη της αρκετή για τη μετάβαση από το «Εγώ» στο «Εμείς», αλλά να εξαρτάται και από την προθυμία των γειτονικών χωρών όπως η ΠΓΔΜ και η Τουρκία να υιοθετήσουν τα απαιτούμενα πρότυπα συμπεριφορών και τις αξίες ή τουλάχιστον να παρουσιάσουν την προθυμία να το πράξουν, συμβάλλοντας έτσι καθοριστικά με αυτόν τον τρόπο στη διαμόρφωση της πλατφόρμας, στο πλαίσιο της οποίας καλούνται να επαναπροσδιορίσουν τα εθνικά τους συμφέροντα.

Ωστόσο, το επιχείρημα του συγγραφέα ότι η ειρήνη θα πρέπει να συνιστά το βασικό πολιτικό στόχο της εξωτερικής πολιτικής χρειάζεται να γίνει κτήμα και του ελληνικού πολιτικού και ακαδημαϊκού κόσμου που στην πλειοψηφία του, δυστυχώς, εξακολουθεί να πιστεύει ότι το εθνικό συμφέρον προσδιορίζεται από το παρελθόν, όχι από το μέλλον. Αυτός ο στενός ορισμός του εθνικού συμφέροντος αναμφίβολα θα απομακρύνει την χώρα μας περισσότερο από την περαιτέρω διεθνοποίηση της ευρωπαϊκής ιδέας και θα περιορίσει τελικώς και τη δυνατότητά της να ανταποκριθεί στις προκλήσεις της σύγχρονης διακυβέρνησης και της παγκοσμιοποίησης. Για το λόγο αυτό και μόνο, το βιβλίο αποτελεί σημαντική συμβολή στην εγχώρια συζήτηση περί εξωτερικής πολιτικής, και έρχεται να προστεθεί στις πολυσυζητημένες παρεμβάσεις της πρόσφατης αρθρογραφίας του καθ. Χρήστου Ροζάκη («Τρεις και μία σκέψεις για την Εξωτερική Πολιτική», Καθημερινή, 15 Μαρτίου 2009) ή και τη μηνιαία άρθρογραφία στην Καθημερινή ακαδημαϊκών, όπως ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής, ο Λουκάς Τσούκαλης και ο Γιώργος Παγουλάτος.

The Path toward Collective Action

2010-01-14T20:47:00.004+02:00

Crises by definition portend systemic adjustments and instabilities. At the same time, however, they –by and large– provide opportunities, be it structural economic and political changes, domestic reforms and cooperation with other states and non-state actors at the regional and international level. The global economic crisis exemplifies this duality. Also, the crisis is at the same time economic and geopolitical in scope. The current crisis also introduces a time element as its likely duration and span are uncertain.

The economic effects lie beyond this commentary albeit it is safe to say that the relevant economic and social models of choice applied by governments to cope with it impact upon their political instruments and policy choices. This is particularly the case given the pressure and demand for the state authorities to assume a more intervening role in the functioning of the market

The crisis finds the international order in flux having entered into a new era characterised by dramatic changes both in terms of structure and process, thus resulting in the emergence of a precarious new world balance. With the election of Barack Obama in 2008 to the Presidency of the United States, the dismantling of a number of policies of the Bush era, and Russian-American relations somewhere between ‘reset’ (to use Hillary Clinton’s term and ‘reconfiguration’ (in the words of Sergei Karaganov), the prospects for increased constructive cooperation at the international level in order to meet global challenges have significantly improved. Nevertheless, security dilemmas ranging from the perpetual Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 terrorist attacks in India combined with the tense relations with Pakistan and the ‘Iranian enigma’, to name a few, persist thereby charging the international (security) agenda.

A number of questions arise in need to redress: Is there a link between the global financial and economic crisis and governance? What is its effect on democracy? What is its effect on the EU? Does the crisis provide for opportunity?

Within the Black Sea regional context in particular, the global economic crisis has undoubtedly impacted it as much as it has other parts of the world, except maybe for the English Premier League where foreign investors continue buying football clubs at exorbitant prices. In fact, the sustained economic growth of the region over the last decade was halted abruptly by the crisis. In other words, while real GDP growth from 2000-2008 averaged 6.0% per annum denoting a cumulative real economic expansion of 68% during this period, the estimate is that GDP growth fell to 4.3% on 2008 and that it is bound to be even lower in 2009 (projected at -6.4%) and 2010.

Nevertheless, the Black Sea Region in 2009 is radically different from what it was two decades ago, both economically and politically. While all the economic indicators over the said period have demonstrated a tremendous rise, indicative to a certain extent of the transformation processes in the former communist space in the post-Cold War period and the advent of globalisation and regionalisation, the changes in relations between the West and Russia have intruded on the political environment with a turn for the worse almost simultaneously with the incursion of the economic crisis. The democracy backlash is particularly relevant. In fact, there is a concern among democracy scholars about the ability of newer and less consolidated democracies to avoid political breakdowns as sharp drops in income and increases in unemployment occur.

The dual nature of the crisis shows how governments have to cope both with the challenges the crisis has posed and to seize the opportunities it has presented in terms of domestic and foreign policy rethinking. Faced with the threat of a democratic backlash in new democracies such as Georgia and Ukraine and with Russia’s renewed determination to regain its lost influence in its “near abroad,” the EU needs to rethink its regional role and to assume a greater leadership role.

This implies a number of dilemmas for the Union such finding the right balance between an ‘ethical foreign policy’ and one that contains elements of realist thinking and ‘hard power’. This is particularly tricky with reference to the Black Sea region where regional hegemons such as Russia and Turkey, have a preference, each for their own particular reasons, for realpolitik. In this context, are collective responses to problems possible? The EU also has to cope with its waning power of attraction in its eastern neighbourhood both because of Russia efforts to exert its influence there and the low expectations (especially financially) of its policies in the region. Another conundrum has to do with the rise of the promotion of effective multilateralism versus effective policies in its eastern neighbourhood. Which comes first in times of crisis? Finally, its prolonged period of institutional introspection with repeated delays at Treaty ratifications implies the need for a rapid implementation of the Lisbon Treaty if the Union is to regain the upper hand as the model of choice in its neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, the myriad of provisos, both real and perceived, that can act as barriers to cooperative action in order to tackle the negative effects of the global crisis should not be an obstacle to joint action. The crisis brings at the forefront the need for coordination among nation states and organizations within the current global financial architecture while it also generates debate on the design of a new global mechanism or structure. The question is how to turn the negative effects of the crisis into an opportunity. In the post-crisis world, will the EU’s Black Sea neighbours demand to establish closer relations with the EU thus promoting integration? Will the EU have the requisite policies in place to accommodate its eastern neighbours? Can Russia and the West develop a more sober relationship, profiting from their shared bitter experience in confronting the crisis?

The crisis conceivably provides the opportunity for a new paradigm, a new strategy in the relations between the European Union and the Black Sea Region which accommodates the interests of regional hegemons like Russia and Turkey as well as those of their smaller and less powerful neighbours. A coordinated common approach very well follows the logic of the promotion of “effective multilateralism” which was highlighted in its 2003 European Security Strategy. With all EU initiatives towards the East (European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy) having their set of problems, a rethink of policy is necessary. The focus should be on stopping neighbouring states from collapsing into deeper crisis (the opportunity) and to curb the return of spheres of influence in the region (the challenge). In order for this to work, the formulation of a new regional dimension enhancing existing policies might be necessary.

Conditions might actually be ripe for a consensus to emerge given a thaw of sorts between Russia and Georgia, and between Russia and the West. Also, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provides for a more cohesive and institutional approach in its international relations (this was very much in evidence in the EU’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of 2008/2009). As such, as key players in the emerging model of global governance, the European Union, Russia and Turkey have a responsibility to put their hubris aside and promote collective action.

Greece and its neighbourhood(s) in 2020

2009-11-24T12:32:00.002+02:00

One of the major symptoms of Greek foreign policy is its chronic inability to be a protagonist beyond its immediate neighbourhoods, i.e. the Balkans, Turkey, and the Mediterranean – in spite of its extensive conscious involvement in the first two regions since the end of the Cold War. Successive Greek governments have used analogous rhetoric and set similar objectives – the need to ‘Europeanise’ Greece’s northern and eastern neighbours, the need to see them integrated into the European Union, the need for the wider neighbourhood to become ‘normal’, ‘boring’, ‘regular’.

The diplomatic and political energy spent on assuring that the aforementioned comes to pass has been both inexhaustible and exhausting yet results (i.e. change in the desired direction) have been slow almost at snail’s pace. In part, this is due to the inability/unwillingness of the neighbours to completely transform themselves; in part it is due to the inability of the Greek foreign policy machinery to convince neighbours and partners within the EU alike of the inevitability of the process. On the whole, though, the basic problem which supersedes all others has been and, unfortunately, continues to be the inability of Greece and its neighbours to shift their focus from an overt concentration on the past with its myriad of historical baggages and legacies to formulate a joint vision of a common future as has been the case of the Franco-German relationship since the end of the Second World War after three apocalyptic wars and then some between the two countries over an 80 year span.

Much is heard these days about jumpstarting accession talks especially for the countries of the Western Balkans. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, almost from the get go of his term in office has been calling for the entry of all Western Balkan candidates into the EU in 2014, one hundred years after the start of World War I in 1914, much as the International Commission on the Balkans had recommended back in 2005. The 2014 date is important for Greece and the region for another reason as well – it will coincide with the country holding the Presidency of the Union during the first six months of that year.

The opportunities provide by the Greek Presidency in 2014 in combination with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (5 years into its functions) with its enhanced foreign policy chief and the in situ presence of the European External Action Service (the EU’s Diplomatic Corps) in the various capitals of the western Balkan states makes the possibility of enlargement a very real prospect. One can also add to this argument, the imminent membership of Croatia now that the Lisbon Treaty allows for it would signal to the rest of the candidate countries that the EU is committed to eventually including them in its ranks. In this sense, the reality of all of Greece’s land borders in the north being with EU partners (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria) and the fact that these new member states would also border other EU member states fundamentally changes the perceptual landscape – from that of exclusion or being cut off to that of inclusion. The one remaining border with Turkey would be one with a candidate state – Turkey.

Hence the ‘Europeanisation’ paradigm expounded diachronically by successive Greek administrations becomes a matter of fact. The relevance of the inclusion of the Greece’s northern neighbours into the Union should not be underestimated or taken lightly at a time when the debate regarding Turkey’s future prospects is in full ebullition across Europe. If Turkey’s path ends with membership so much the better for the stability, security and prosperity of Greece and its neighbourhoods; if it does not, Greece would have to invest time and energy in redefining its already packed agenda and relations with its neighbour. In this sense, the europeanisation, securitization and normalization of its northern neighbourhood releases Greece from its chronic occupation with two fronts simultaneously.

In this context, on the road to 2020, the relationship between Greece and its neighbourhoods could potentially be different than what it is today albeit the possible thorn regarding Turkey’s European future. Nevertheless, the europeanisation of the neighbourhood combined with the focus on the future rather than the past could conceivably provide for a new dimension in Greece’s foreign policy – that of promoting peaceful change in its ‘wider’ neighbourhood. In other words, the country could begin to reconsider its role in the Mediterranean or parts of it such as its eastern part and the Middle East whose relevance are enhanced due to their proximity. This could in part be done through a more active involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean, the successor policy of the Euro-Mediterranean Process which was launched in 2008 and its priority projects which include the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters; a Mediterranean solar energy plan; higher education and research and the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia; and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. In all aforementioned policy areas, Greece could begin to systematically cultivate an enhanced role for herself within the geographic confines of immediate interest.

The point is that Greek diplomacy is better served by being multi-vectored and pro-active rather than on the defensive. The EU, for example, needs to step up its presence in the Black Sea region, a region where Greece has vital commercial interests given the potential of the Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian markets among others. It could probably start drafting a strategy for the Union in order to stimulate interest. The foreign ministry has the wherewithal for such an engagement given the country’s participation in the wider Black Sea region’s regional cooperation processes since 1992 when it became a founding member of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the only inclusive and institutionally comprehensive organisation of the region. By 2020, the debate regarding the future membership prospects of Ukraine and Georgia, inter alia, would have crystallised and an EU strategy with the imprimatur of the Hellenic Republic could go a long way in contributing to the security of the region given the presence of hegemonic Russia and Turkey and the energy card.

Even more importantly as a country committed to greater cooperation within the EU, Greek initiatives in its wider neighbourhood suggest vital contributions to the promotion of policies postulating cohesion in the Union’s foreign policy mechanisms. In other words, greater involvement in the Union’s activities through the promotion of initiatives and strategies will serve the country better to stand its ground on issues of national interest rather than exclusively focussing on these. The ‘europeanisation’ of its neighbourhoods can only but enhance Greece’s ability to be pro-active and a respected leader in forward-looking cooperative schemes of interest to all.

The 2020 date is particularly relevant in this context. Only a decade away, it exemplifies how close Greece is, given the right policies, in contributing to the transformation of its neighbourhood to a markedly different one and the potential this makeover can have in liberating the country’s foreign policy agenda. Time will tell whether this thesis will eventually materialise.

Greek-Turkish Rapprochement Revisited

2009-08-11T07:23:00.003+02:00

The ongoing deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey as evidenced by dogfights over the Aegean, overflights over inhabited and uninhabited Greek islands by the Turkish Air Force, illegal immigration and the postponement of the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey has much to do with the different foreign policy perceptions in the two countries. The issue at hand is whether there can ever be a point of conjecture between the two approaches or the ongoing rapprochement between the two countries since 1999 is under threat. Although the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 1988 calls for a moratorium of activity over the Aegean during the summer months, the only time it was fully implemented by the Turkish side was in the summer of 2004 (when Athens hosted the Olympic Games). What makes the current spate of activity over the Aegean a concern for Athens is the increased number of mock dogfights by armed aircraft (thereby increasing the possibility of accidents) and the systematic overflights over specific/targeted inhabited islands. On the other hand, the quick containment of a possible crisis over the island of Ro last week showed that the CBMS in place between the two sides can be effective.

From a Greek perspective, it seems inevitable that Turkey’s European Union (EU) journey is undoubtedly intertwined with bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. While the EU Summits of December 2003 and December 2004 marked a turning point in Turkey’s relations with the EU, the pending issues of obligations on the part of the candidate state, the ever evolving acquis comunautaire and the absorption capacity of the EU will keep emerging and will have to be dealt with if the accession process is to come to a positive end. Hence, the EU will continue to be unwavering in its calls for Turkey’s international conduct to be in accordance with European standards and the principles and values of the Union. As such, this implies assuring the irreversibility of the political reform process and the full and comprehensive implementation of fundamental freedoms and full respects of human rights. The December 2004 decision also clearly calls for Turkey’s commitment to good-neighbourly relations and the settlement of outstanding border differences by political means in accordance with the United Nations Founding Charter, including possibly whenever necessary to have recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The EU has also been persistent in its demands for Turkey to allow the Customs Union to operate with all 27 current EU member states, including Cyprus by the end of this year.

Why is all of the above so important in terms of Greek-Turkish relations, you ask? From a Greek standpoint, the EU dimension has provided the opportunity to include the whole gamut of bilateral differences from both a legal and a political perspective within an EU framework. Whether we are talking about the Continental Shelf issue, which Greece considers to be the only legal difference between the two countries, or the status quo of the Aegean, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the rights of the Greek minority and the resolution of the Cyprus issue, inter alia, Greece feels that Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have provided the relevant framework for resolution. After all, as a midsize EU member state, Greece in its differences with its neighbour and regional powerhouse, Turkey, has to depend on the diplomatic and legal tools provided by international law and the European Union. In fact, the issue of illegal immigration has of late come to the fore where Greece, whose islands have been inundated with illegal immigrants coming from the Turkish coast, has managed to mobilize EU support to weight on Turkey to implement bilateral agreements it has signed for the readmission of third party nationals that illegally enter other countries from its territory (the relevant accord with Greece dates back to 2001). Nevertheless, Greece has been and continues to be the most unwavering supporter of Turkey’s EU bid.

From the perspective of Athens, every time Turkey feels pressured to meet an obligation vis-à-vis the EU which is especially difficult to implement (such as the opening of airports and ports to Cypriot-flagged vessels by the end of 2009, or curbing illegal immigration to the EU), it ups the ante by increasing its activity in the Aegean whether through overflights or dogfights or by challenging the Greek position regarding the continental shelf by giving licenses for oil exploration in areas which Greece considers to be its territory. Turkey’s attempt and ability to project itself as a greater than regional power especially in today’s post-American world as a “stand alone” power seems to blur its commitment to be fully anchored into the European Union (where incidentally other great powers such as France, the UK and Germany promote both European standards, norms and values and seek a greater global role for themselves).

Thus, for Athens the question is whether Ankara can be fully anchored into the EU and be a great power simultaneously. To date, Athens has for the last decade been patiently waiting for Ankara to make up its mind about what it is and where it wants to go. If it cannot, then the question is whether the fact that Greece is the most steadfast promoter of Turkey’s EU accession process relevant at all in the context of Greek-Turkish relations? The concern stems from the fact that Greece’s Turkey policy since 1999 has been grounded to on a positive evolution of the Turkey-EU relationship. If Turkey’s tilt toward the lone wolf position becomes a permanent feature then the premise of Greece’s approach is furthered weakened. Hence, for Athens a major policy reevaluation may be in the offing -- sustaining rapprochement predicated upon the further evolution of EU-Turkish relations post-2009, the ability of the Union to become more cohesive and assertive as a global actor with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and Ankara’s willingness to cooperate. Thus, the waiting game is bound to continue for some time.

The Nabucco Pipeline and Energy Dilemmas

2009-07-16T19:21:00.001+02:00

In 1990, John Mearsheimer wrote a much discussed article on how he viewed the Post-Cold War world at least on the European continent titled “Back to the Future”. According to Mearsheimer, there would be no new era of peace; instead multipolarity and increased competition between great powers would probably take hold, thereby increasing instability, inequality, unpredictability and uncertainty. In recent years, Mearsheimer’s thesis as well as those of other proponents of the realist school of thought (be it classical realism, offensive realism, structural realism, etc.) seems to be gaining strength albeit the popularity of post-modern schools of thought over the last two decades.

Why all this theoretical babble, you ask? Mearsheimer clearly comes to mind when one attempts to analyse the competition between and among great powers in Europe (and neighbouring regions) today in particular with reference to the energy paradigm. On 13 July 2009, the Prime Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on the planned natural gas Nabucco pipeline from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria. Is Nabucco finally on track or was the ceremony an example of triumphalism on the part of the signatories?

An interesting interpretation is that more than anything the Nabucco signing ceremony is closely linked to the geopolitical realignments at play globally and particularly in Europe. A point of reference is President Obama’s visit to Moscow where he pressed the reset button with Russia leading to an agreement on reduction of nuclear stockpiles and frank talk on a number of other issues. This fundamental upgrade of Russia’s status is having repercussions on how other regional powers (whether of the minor or major kind) interpret the evolving relationship between Moscow and Washington.

An obvious effect is on Turkey – a regional powerhouse aspiring to a greater global standing. Ankara seeks to assure that its unsteady status quo with Moscow in their common neighbourhood (Black Sea and Caucasus) is maintained while it retains (if not augments) its “critical ally” position with Washington. One obvious instrument (both in political and foreign policy terms) to redress the evolving balance of power is the energy card.

For a postmodern entity like the European Union with its negotiated common positions (a product of ongoing power struggles among exigent greater and smaller member states), the energy card is just as relevant. The EU external energy strategy is focused on sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply whereby the diversification of suppliers is crucial in order to avoid overdependence given the fact that the EU on the whole is dependent on imported hydrocarbons. It should be noted that under current trends, the Union’s energy dependence will jump from 50% of total EU energy consumption today to about 65% in 2030 – gas imports will jump from 57% to 84% and oil from 82% to 93% by 2030. Simultaneously, the global demand for oil is bound to grow by 41% during the same period.

What does all of this imply? Basically, energy needs seem to be a crucial contributing factor in defining the world today and, in particular, the relationship between states. The Nabucco signing is indicative. Albeit its shortcomings and uncertainties – Can Turkmenistan come through on its promises of supplying the pipeline with gas given its geography whereby supply can only be through Iran or across the Caspian Sea which has no seabed agreement to date? Will Azerbaijan deliver before the Nagorno Karabakh issue is resolved in a manner suitable to its interests? Will Iran be allowed to become a supplier as Turkey and other states would want without a redefinition of its relations with the United States? Has Turkey’s overreach with its demands for a 15% stake of the pipeline’s potential supply for its own markets or for resale been addressed? Is the principle of “if you build first, the gas will come” viable at the time when the estimated cost of the pipeline tops 7.9 billion euros while construction commitments from the EIB and the European Commission are small and the global financial crisis deters potential investors?

While the pipeline is expected to meet only about 10% of the EU’s gas needs when it becomes operational at up to 31 bcm per year, Russia currently exports 140 bcm of natural gas a year to the EU. Even more telling are the overall figures regarding Caspian oil and gas, where Russia dwarfs all other Caspian and Central Asian producers in terms of reserves, production and export availabilities (and consumption). Thus, the questions as to whether the Nabucco project contributes to the avoidance of overdependence on Russia natural gas; addresses effectively the issue of energy security; and tackles the issue of diversification remain on the table. Nabucco bypasses Russia as well as Ukraine. What does this imply for the latter? What is China’s impact on Central Asia since it is the main driver of the increase in global demand for hydrocarbons? The China-Turkmenistan energy connection is relevant here.

More than anything the Nabucco project has managed to raise awareness of the interests of regional and global stakeholders. For one, it could be interpreted as a catalyst for a more cohesive EU energy security strategy. It has raised the stakes regarding Iran’s present and potential role. It has paradoxically brought Russia and Turkey closer together with Moscow openly talking about Ankara’s participation in the South Stream project. It has also somewhat brought Russia closer to the project with the potential supply of Russian gas to Nabucco via the Blue Stream pipeline. Finally, the perspective of Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi gas gives the whole endeavour a geopolitical dimension.

As such, the Nabucco project contains both the seeds of further great power competition of the Mearsheimer mould as well as the potential for further symbiosis as energy superpowers might reconsider the benefit of using oil and natural gas as extensions of their foreign policies. Verdi’s opera is famous for its inspirational “Va, pensiero” chorus; time will tell whether the more mundane Nabucco pipeline can arouse greater energy cooperation in today’s increasingly complicated world.

Μεγάλοι Έλληνες

2009-05-20T18:41:00.002+02:00

Παρακολούθησα με ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον και θαυμασμό το τελικό των Μεγάλων Ελλήνων στην τηλεόραση του Σκαϊ στις 18 Μαΐου 2009. Το μορφωτικό και διανοητικό επίπεδο των συμμετεχόντων υψηλότατο και εντυπωσιακό. Παρόλο που επρόκειτο για μία άσκηση επί χαρτού ο ενθουσιασμός και το πάθος από τους παραβρισκόμενους να στηρίξουν με εμμονή την επιλογή τους ήταν διάχυτος και βαθύτατα ειλικρινής. Και διερωτώμαι σε αυτό το σημείο πού είναι αυτό το πάθος στην αντιμετώπιση της μίζερης πραγματικότητα μας; Σκεφτόμουν παρακολουθώντας την εκπομπή ότι αξίζουμε μία καλύτερη μοίρα από την γκρίζα, άοσμη, μπανάλ εποχή μας. Σκεφτόμουν ότι οι δέκα μεγάλοι έλληνες του τελικού, όπως πολλοί άλλοι στην λίστα των υπολοίπων ενενήντα, αποδεικνύουν και αναδεικνύουν ταυτόχρονα τις δυνατότητες μας ως λαός (ατομικά και συλλογικά), να συσπειρωθούμε και να κάνουμε την υπέρβαση.

Το ερώτημα που τίθεται είναι πως η πνευματικότητα που εξέπεμπαν τόσο οι «αληθινοί» πρωταγωνιστές όσο και οι παρουσιαστές της εκπομπής μπορεί τελικά να ενθαρρύνει και να κινητοποιήσει τη θετική μας πλευρά – την δημιουργικότητα, την εργατικότητα, την ουσία – ώστε να επέλθει η απαραίτητη ανατροπή και να αφήσουμε την μιζέρια στο λυκόφως της ιστορίας; Αυτή η παθιασμένη και φορτισμένη ανταλλαγή απόψεών και γνώσεων μεταξύ αξιοσέβαστων ελλήνων μπορεί να εκφραστεί και να αναδειχθεί τελικώς και εκτός τηλεόρασης; Ή απλώς την Δευτέρα ζήσαμε ένα παραμύθι που δεν έχει καμία σχέση με την μετριότητα των ελλήνων σήμερα; Την Δευτέρα το βράδυ άρχισα να πιστεύω ξανά στο ελληνικό «φως», αλλά όταν τελείωσε η εκπομπή επανήλθε δριμύτατα το σκοτάδι. Μήπως αυτό που ένιωσα κατά τη διάρκεια της εκπομπής δεν ήταν τίποτα άλλο τελικά παρά μια μοναχική και μοναδική στιγμή αναλαμπής και υπέρβασης; Ελπίζω πως όχι διότι ένας λαός θαμπωμένος μόνο με το παρελθόν του είναι ένας λαός χωρίς μέλλον. Θα ήθελα να πιστεύω ότι οι μεγάλοι έλληνες κρύβονται μέσα μας και περιμένουν να τους ανακαλύψουμε.

The European Union and its Eastern Neighbourhood: Challenges and Prospects

2009-05-17T15:24:00.004+02:00

In a recent European Commission on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2008, it is stated that the ENP is “a growing partnership based on mutual interdependence.” This is evermore necessary since 2008 has been a year of crises that have led to gridlock both in the South and the East. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza in December 2008/January 2009 and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of January 2009 coupled with the growing negative impact on growth, trade, and investment of the global financial and economic crisis are all indicative on the frailty of the EU’s neighbourhoods.

On 7 May 2009, the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit took place amidst great expectations from its promoters in an effort to further solidify/strengthen the bonds between the European Union and its member states and their Eastern European Partners (hereinafter ENP East partners – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus). Though the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was conceived to bring the ENP East countries that so desire closer to the EU, to date it has fallen short of expectations because states like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have been hit by domestic dissent, spats with their neighbours and stalled modernisation processes. The fact that EU member states like Poland and the Czech Republic have so warmly sponsored the initiative may suggest ulterior motives in their approach toward their Eastern neighbourhood is very much in evidence.

The Russia factor is one that will not go away anytime soon as the parameters and content of future EU-Russia relations are currently being deliberated since June 2008 in the form of a new EU-Russia agreement replacing the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement concluded in 1994 and into force since 1 December 1997. At that time Russia was weaker and less self-confident than it is today. Albeit the Russian Federation’s adventurism in Georgia in August 2008 and its systematic attempts to prevent the further trespass of the European Union (and NATO) on its neighbourhood or near abroad, Russia’s economic ties with the EU and its role in energy security cannot be discounted.

When the European Neighbourhood Policy was first promoted in 2003, it attempted to address a number of emerging concerns for the European Union. The first had to do with the limits of enlargement given that big bang enlargement was about to become a reality in 2004. As such the ENP was conceived as a policy aimed at curbing further membership – an “anything but membership” policy where it made sense to group southern and eastern neighbour states together. As such bilateral action plans were promoted allowing southern and eastern partners to enhance their relations with the EU at their own pace. The second concern stemmed from the repercussions of the post-Cold War world with the emergence of new forms of global terrorism and ethno-nationalist secessionist movements becoming the fad in the wider post-Communist space (former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union) with McMafia type transnational crime, weak state institutions and rule of law in abundance.

The European Security Strategy of December 2003 very much reflected these concerns. It stated explicitly, the EU has the strategic objective to ‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’ Furthermore, the European Union has acknowledged the shared common neighbourhood with Russia as a space where the ‘EU and Russia need to work together, as neighbours, on common concerns.’

The last point being that the non-polarising concept of a common neighbourhood where it is both in the interest of Russia and the EU to assure the neighbourhood’s stability, security and prosperity lest it become even more infested with the diseases the post-Cold War Pandora’s box had unleashed. In other words, the European Union as a postmodern soft power entity saw itself as promoting a concept which was non-threatening to its eastern neighbours.

For Russia, though, the notion of neighbourhood (its ‘CIS space’) has been based on preserving its ‘historical and spiritual heritage’ which was encroached upon by the West in the early 1990s when as the key successor state of the Soviet Union it went through dire political and economic upheaval. According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,

‘Not only Russia has privileged interests, first and foremost, in relations with our closest neighbors; they also have the same privileged interests in Russia. Failing to understand it and trying to destroy what rests on our combined objective history and on the interdependence and intertwining of our economies, infrastructures, cultures and humanitarian spheres of life means to go against history.’

As a consequence, for Russia, the EU’s neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership among others are revisionist policies which strive to remove from Russian influence the post-Soviet space thereby the ‘voluntary or involuntary aim of such method is to preserve the dividing line in Europe and move it ever closer to the Russian border.’
The Black Sea region is a telling example of the challenges in EU-Russian relations since all ENP East partners except Belarus are considered by the EU to be part of it. For Russia, the wider Black Sea area is an important part of its foreign policy given that is constitutes part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and its relevance as an energy transit region. More specifically, Russia seeks to remain as one of the main stakeholders in the region “given the emergence of new strong regional (Turkey) and external actors (the US/NATO)”; it wants to counter and curb extremism, separatism and terrorism in the region; it wants to secure continuous energy, trade, civil and military communications “within and throughout the Black Sea and the [Bosporus] Straits”; and it seeks to prevent new dividing lines in the region including “the expansion of military coalitions which exclude Russia as a full member.”
At the same time, Russia is not convinced that the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy could successfully contribute to making the shared neighbourhood more stable (an objective shared by Russia) as it does not effectively bar the road to further future EU enlargement. The analysis by Arkady Moshes is indicative:

‘Brussels cannot ignore a consolidated push of EU new member states to be more active on the eastern periphery. As long as it denies membership perspective for its neighbours, the policy of Wider Europe that it pursues, (however palliative it may look) nevertheless stimulates their search for alternatives to staying within the same geopolitical and geo-economic space as Russia. Moscow, in this situation, starts viewing the EU not so much as a partner, but rather as a systematic rival to its foreign policy goals in the Western NIS and the Caucasus; a revisionist power; and is instinctively inclined to get involved in a ‘zero-sum game’ type of relationship with the EU.’

Thus the notion of neighbourhood and how it is perceived by key stakeholders is a major conundrum. Does it enhance further cooperation or further division/competition? As the limits of the ENP became evident over time and the EU began to uncouple its neighbourhood policy with the evolution of the Union for the Mediterranean in the South and the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) policy in the East in 2007/2008, further dividing lines emerged. The BSS epitomises the concept of regional cooperation. It put the Black Sea region on the radar screen of the EU as a single distinct policy area (the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, both Black Sea states, on 1 January 2007 effectively contributed to this process). The BSS promoted the concept of regional cooperation between the EU and the region as well as between the states of the region. It also sought to work with regional institutions such as the BSEC (Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) which had been in place since 1992 without EU direct involvement but with the participation of all regional stakeholders (including Russia and Turkey) thereby promoting a sense of regional and local ownership (something ENP South partners and Western Balkan states have strived for as well) of the process. Through its emphasis on sectoral cooperation (such as transport, environment, energy, trade inter alia), it also promoted the need for solid institutions, good governance principles, rule of law and accountability – in other words, it allowed in a non threatening manner concepts of Europeanisation to the region.

Yet hardly a year having past before the BSS was introduced to the world, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which paradoxically the EU-27 have committed to just as much as they did for the BSS, which seeks ever closer relations with the ENP East partners testing the limits of Russian discomfort and EU unity while duplicating many of the priorities of the BSS.

As such today, the EU beset by its own institutional inabilities to move beyond the restrictions of the Nice Treaty, awaiting (some would say praying for) the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its implementation, amidst a full-blown global financial crisis (which can only imply a hardening of mental and economic borders) finds itself sending contradictory signals to its ENP East partners and strategic political and economic partner Russia because its member states have found it convenient to exploit the lack of leadership and direction by transforming their national prerogatives and priorities into European ones (much of the same it could be argued is in evidence in the Mediterranean). In fact, the new EU member states have increasingly divergent perspectives regarding further enlargement to the East.

Nevertheless, the reality that the EU has to have some sort of neighbourhood policy (however many adaptations it undergoes) and the symbiotic/interdependent nature of the relationship between Russia and the Union at least in the economic front coupled with the devastating impact of the global financial crisis is having on both neighbours implies that over the mid- to long-term there is much more that unites rather than divides the two sides. It is worth keeping in mind that the Union is Russia’s main trading partner accounting for over 52% of Russia’s main trade turnover and the main investor in Russia while 50% of Russian oil exports and 63% of its natural gas exports go to the EU. The challenge is to convert or at least spill over the economic interdependency into the political realm.

In order to advance though, the need for relevance and less policy confusion, more flexibility and pragmatism coupled with policy harmonisation, the avoidance of policy duplication and greater co-ownership is paramount. Otherwise, the strain on human and financial resources and objectives will only to greater policy disarray within the EU as well as fewer incentives and tools to effectively assure that the notion of a common neighbourhood is effectively promoted.

Bibliography

Alexandrova-Arbatova, Nadia. 2008. Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area in the Context of EU-Russia Relations, ICBSS Xenophon Paper, no. 5. Athens: ICBSS.

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, COM (2009) 188/3, Brussels, 23 April 2009.

General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008.

---------. A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Geoana, Mircea. “Why we mustn’t look at Eastern Europe as a single bloc,” Europe’s World, Spring 2009.

Glenny, Misha. 2008. McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld. New York: Knopf.

Lavrov, Sergei. 2008. “Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation” in Diplomatic Yearbook 2008 (Moscow). http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/19e7b14202191e4ac3257525003e5de7?OpenDocument

Moshes, Arkady. 2006. “Prospects For EU-Russia Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation”. The EU-Russia Review, No. 2: 22-27.

Tsantoulis, Tannis. “Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?”. ICBSS Policy Brief no. 12, Athens, March 2009.

Wallace, Helen. 2009. “The European Union and its Neighbourhood: Time for a Rethink”. ELIAMEP Thesis, 4/2009, Athens, May 2009.

Yannis, Alexandros. “The European Union and the Black Sea Region: The New Eastern Frontiers and Europeanisation”. ICBSS Policy Brief no. 7, Athens, May 2008

Αθήνα, 11 Μαρτίου 2009, Αφιέρωμα στον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή

2009-03-11T19:05:00.003+02:00

Βιβλιοπαρουσίαση του βιβλίου:

Δ. Τριανταφύλλου, Κ. Υφαντής, Ε. Χατζηβασιλειου (επιμ.) Διεθνείς Σχέσεις: Σύγχρονη θεματολογία και προσεγγίσεις – Αφιέρωμα στον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 2008)

Σήμερα, ημέρα χρέους και ευθύνης, χαράς και αναγνώρισης προς το πρόσωπο του καθηγητή Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή, ως εκπρόσωπος των τριών επιμελητών του τιμητικού τόμου - Διεθνείς Σχέσεις: Σύγχρονη θεματολογία και προσεγγίσεις – θα ήθελα να αναφερθώ εν τάχει στους λόγους που μας παρακίνησαν να ξεκινήσουμε αυτό το φιλόδοξο εγχείρημα.

Αυτό το βιβλίο, όπως θα έχετε ήδη διαπιστώσει, συνιστά ένα φόρο τιμής στον καθηγητή Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή. Έστω και αν ένας τιμητικός τόμος είναι μία φτωχή απόπειρα να τιμηθεί ένας άνθρωπος σαν τον Θεόδωρο Κουλουμπή, το εν λόγω σύγγραμμα, πιστεύουμε, πως είναι τελικά ο πιο άμεσος και αποτελεσματικός τρόπος έκφρασης αγάπης και εκτίμησης προς το πρόσωπο ενός εκπαιδευτικού και διορατικού παρατηρητή των Διεθνών Σχέσεων που από τον επαναπατρισμό του στην Ελλάδα από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1980 συνέβαλλε –και συνεχίζει να συμβάλει έως και σήμερα – όσο κανείς άλλος στην αυτόνομη και γόνιμη ανάπτυξη της επιστήμης των Διεθνών Σχέσεων σε αυτή τη χώρα.

Πράγματι, η προσφορά του Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή στα γράμματα είναι ανεκτίμητη και δύσκολα μπορεί κανείς να την αποτιμήσει. Το πλέον χαρακτηριστικό και απτό δείγμα της προσφοράς του μπορεί να το διαπιστώσει κανείς μελετώντας το κλασσικό –πλέον– βιβλίο του Εξουσία και δικαιοσύνη – ένα βιβλίο το όποιο χαίρει ευρύτερης αποδοχής τόσο στην διεθνή όσο και στην ελληνική ακαδημαϊκή κοινότητα. Να σημειωθεί μάλιστα, ότι ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής, ακούραστος όπως πάντα, επανεξέδωσε πέρσι μια επικαιροποιημένη έκδοση του βιβλίου του. Φυσικά, δεν πρέπει να παραγνωρίζει κανείς τη συνεισφορά του επίσης στη μελέτη της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής και στην ανάλυση των ελληνο-τουρκικών σχέσεων, μελέτες οι οποίες έτυχαν επίσης παρόμοιας υποδοχής.

Για τον Κώστα Υφαντή και τον Ευάνθη Χατζηβασιλείου, επιμελητές αυτού του έργου, που όπως πολλοί άλλοι είχαν το προνόμιο να το γνωρίσουν από κοντά, τόσο ως δάσκαλο όσο και ως συνάδελφο στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, και για μένα που είχα την τιμή να συνεργαστώ μαζί του στο ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ στο παρελθόν και τώρα πλέον στα πλαίσια του ελληνο-τουρκικού φόρουμ, ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής υπήρξε φωτεινό παράδειγμα. Μας έχει επηρεάσει βαθειά και συνεχίζει να το πράττει με το ήθος του, την ανθρωπιά του, την προθυμία του να ακούσει την άποψη του «Άλλου» και φυσικά με τις πάντοτε αιχμηρές τοποθετήσεις του επί ζητημάτων που άπτονται του παγκόσμιου γίγνεσθαι και των κρίσιμων ζητημάτων της εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Και στους τρεις από μας, ο καθηγητής Κουλουμπής υπήρξε – και συνεχίζει να είναι – κοντά μας πάντα έτοιμος να ακούσει τις ανησυχίες και τους προβληματισμούς μας ως νεώτεροι μελετητές και εκπαιδευτικοί.

Για αυτόν τον λόγο, θεωρήσαμε ότι θα έπρεπε να δημιουργήσουμε ένα βιβλίο που κατά τη γνώμη μας θα μπορούσε να συνεισφέρει ουσιαστικά στην ελληνική βιβλιογραφία καλύπτοντας σημαντικά κενά. Αυτό που επιδιώξαμε εξαρχής ήταν να συγκεντρώσουμε τους πιο καταξιωμένους επιστήμονες του χώρου, συμπεριλαμβανομένων αυτών που διαπρέπουν στο εξωτερικό, και να ενσωματώσουμε τις πλέον σύγχρονες θεωρητικές εξελίξεις και τάσεις στον τομέα των διεθνών σχέσεων σε ένα βιβλίο. Το γεγονός ότι τόσοι πολλοί καταξιωμένοι συνάδελφοι, 36 για την ακρίβεια, που αντιπροσωπεύουν διαφορετικές γενεές μελετητών, αποδέχτηκαν με χαρά την πρόταση μας και συνέβαλαν ο καθένας ξεχωριστά και όλοι μαζί στην εκπόνηση αυτού του τόμου επιβεβαιώνει την αξία του Θεόδωρου Κουλουμπή και συνιστά παράλληλα την μεγαλύτερη ίσως επιβράβευση της συνολικής προσφοράς του στην πνευματική ζωή του τόπου. Ως γνωστόν, η αναγνώριση του έργου του από τους ομότεχνους του είναι αναμφίβολα και η σημαντικότερη.

Σε αυτό το σημείο θα ήθελα να επισημάνω, πως αυτή η επίπονη προσπάθεια, που διήρκεσε πάνω από δυόμιση έτη, δεν θα είχε έρθει εις πέρας χωρίς τη βοήθεια μερικών προσώπων που αξίζουν ιδιαίτερη αναφορά.

Κατ' αρχάς, θα θέλαμε να ευχαριστήσουμε τον φίλο και συνάδελφο μας Σωτήρη Ντάλη, διευθυντή της σειράς «Διεθνής και Ευρωπαϊκή Πολιτική» και τον εκδότη, τον αδικοχαμένο Βίκτωρα Παπαζήση για την θερμή υποστήριξη τους. Επίσης, θα θέλαμε να ευχαριστήσουμε θερμά και την Όλγα Μπόρου, υποψήφια διδάκτορα Διεθνών Σχέσεων, για την ακούραστη υποστήριξη της στη συλλογή των άρθρων και συνολική επεξεργασία του βιβλίου. Πρέπει να αναγνωρίσουμε ότι χωρίς τη συνδρομή της Όλγας, το φιλόδοξο αυτό εγχείρημα ίσως να είχε παραμείνει ανεκπλήρωτο.

Τέλος, σε ένα πιο προσωπικό επίπεδο θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τους γονείς μου, που βρίσκονται σήμερα σε αυτή την αίθουσα, που με έχουν διδάξει με την προσωπική τους στάση και ήθος πάντα να θυμάμαι, να σέβομαι και να αναγνωρίζω αυτούς που ενήργησαν και συνεχίζουν να ενεργούν ως πρότυπα και μέντορες μου συμβάλλοντας στην καλλιέργεια μου – άνθρωποι δηλαδή όπως ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπης. Τέτοιες στιγμές μου έρχονται στο μυαλό οι λέξεις του Milan Kundera: «Ο αέναος αγώνας του ατόμου ενάντια στην ισχύ είναι ο αέναος αγώνας της μνήμης έναντι της λήθης».

Ακριβώς όπως και ο Θεόδωρος Κουλουμπής αγωνίστηκε και συνεχίζει να αγωνίζεται για να διασφαλίσει ότι η επιστήμη των Διεθνών Σχέσεων έχει στέρεες βάσεις στον ελληνικό ακαδημαϊκό κόσμο και για να εμπνεύσει τους νεώτερους μελετητές να συνεχίσουν με αμείωτο ρυθμό και ένταση αυτόν τον αγώνα, είναι πρωταρχικό χρέος μας όχι μόνο να μην λησμονήσουμε, αλλά και να αναγνωρίσουμε το ρόλο, την αφοσίωση και την ανεκτίμητη προσφορά του.

Θεόδωρε Κουλουμπή, σε ευχαριστούμε.

Engaging the Black Sea region - the time for action is now

2009-01-28T16:41:00.003+02:00

The international order has entered into a new era. Barack Obama has taken formally the reigns of power in Washington, the dismantling of a number of Bush-era policies has begun and the expectations of hope across the globe take hold. Amidst an ongoing, evergrowing international financial and economic crisis (where estimates of negative growth globally for the first time since 1950 abound), and the realities of the aftermath of the killing fields of Gaza, Obama’s agenda is filled to the brim and bound to overflow.

The Black Sea region – a region encompassing the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and some of the European Union’s member states – will undoubtedly constitute a high priority region, not in the least due to the presence of Russia. The issues at hand are many, they are complex and they are challenging. They could augur instability as well as the potential for constructive, long-standing cooperation and stability. For one, an interesting challenge has to do with the sort of relationship that will emerge between Russia and the United States. Will the probable engagement of Russia by the Obama administration on a variety on longstanding global imperatives, elevate Russia to greater than regional power status as the Kremlin’s current leadership aspires? As a consequence, what will be the implications of this power shift on the Black Sea region as a whole?[1] How will another regional heavyweight like Turkey with aspirations for an ever greater regional and global role (participation in the G-20, role model as moderate Islamic country, Alliance for Civilizations co-chair, regional leader, etc.) react to greater Russian influence?

As things stand today, at least in the opinion of this analyst, some of the key issues are the following:

Energy and energy security. The last act in the ongoing energy feud between Russia and Ukraine is a clear indicator of the importance of energy security for the region and its customers, especially the European Union. Oil and natural gas – together with their exploration, production, and transport – are commodities that flow across borders however tenuous these might be.
The recent winter energy gridlock between the two aforementioned countries has also led to a more balanced, less ideological and subjective analysis regarding Russia and its role. In other words, the muckraking whether periodic, systematic or inherent regarding Russian and its current regime has given way to more realist analyses, especially in western media outlets and research centres regarding the foreign policy and role of the countries of the region. Concepts such as the inevitability of a “soft war” with Russia[2] have given way to concerns about the ability of Ukraine (and Georgia earlier last year) to be reliable partners. Nevertheless the prevailing vestiges of ideological or bloc divisions (whether these come from Moscow or Western capitals) remain a challenge.
This shaken credibility in Ukraine and Georgia or to be more precise in their current leaderships to bring about the requisite transformation inspired by the Orange and Rose revolutions respectively has placed their eventual Euro-Atlantic integration on the back burner. The question remains as to whether this also implies the end of European integration for Ukraine in particular or a renewed effort to integrate based not on the undelivered promises of reform but on clear conditionality where a condition is cooperation with all its neighbours.
The redefinition of US-Russian relations as previously mentioned could and would seriously define whether the region enhances cooperation or is further divided. The impact on the uneasy status quo between Turkey and Russia is an important dimension. Turkey recently felt the limits of overreach when it received a firm rebuke from some EU states when it attempted to link its support for the Nabucco pipeline to its EU accession talks.[3]
The European Union’s role in the region to date leaves much to be desired. EU leadership is needed but is it feasible? The EU is involved in the region in a number of fronts – it launched the Black Sea Synergy in 2007 and the Eastern Partnership in 2008. Both are ambitious policies though somewhat contradictory policies calling for more engagement in the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Union has deployed since October 2008 a monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) under the European security and defence policy. It was also actively involved in mediating the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Finally the EU adopted in December 2008 a report beefing up its European Security Strategy by giving prominence to issues such as energy security, the various protracted conflicts, human security and greater engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood. On the other hand, the lack of progress on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which would beef up the Union’s foreign policy prospects, the continued inability to achieve consensus regarding the status of Kosovo (and hence its implication for separatist region of the Caucasus and their recognition) place serious restraints on the Union’s ability to pull its weight in the region. For example, the inability to arrive on a modus vivendi with Russia on the development of their common neighbourhood continues to be a thorn for the EU.
Finally, a number of issues that are down the list in terms of priorities will eventually make their way up to the surface and will need to be handled by all stakeholders concerned. One such concern has to do with the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet once the lease on Sevastopol expires in 2017. Reports of the construction of a naval base in Abkhazia actually suggest that the issue needs to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Beyond the tricky issue of the Fleet’s future deployment, the economic impact of the withdrawal of the fleet on Sevastopol itself is a concern in itself. Ideas such as the one propounded by the city’s mayor that Sevastopol become a Free Economic Area merit consideration. Another possible flashpoint has to do with Crimea’s future.[4] Imaginative solutions that assure its future within Ukraine need further study.

In light of the aforementioned concerns, what needs to be done? Conceivably, the countries of the region have to constructively work together either bilaterally or regional within the framework of existing cooperative arrangements such as the BSEC and others. This continued cooperation which in the BSEC, for example, has survived the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war acts as a confidence building measure or mechanism for all stakeholders. In this context, the European Union in its capacity as an observer to the BSEC needs to assert itself that regional cooperation is part and parcel of successful engagement and ever closer ties with its ENP East partners. A lesson from both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s recent troubles with Russia is that attention needs to be paid to their neighbour(s) while they seek to integrate with the West. In other words, further integration into euro-atlantic structures need not imply the severing of relations with powerful neighbours that have no such aspirations. Regional cooperation helps states eventually move away from zero sum thinking and actions. In fact, the BSEC together with other regional initiatives should actually be seen as promoting economic cooperation as a source of security “on the basis of a paradigm of security that is linked to democracy, respect for human rights and good governance.”[5]

Hence, the question that remains is whether the European Union at 27 has the ability to lead and put to use the “smart power” paradigm which Hillary Clinton in her Senate confirmation recently expounded for her country.[6] The transformative experience of the European Union is a manifold process which is sorely needed in the region. At a time when the United States is putting its house in order and seeks to redefine its international relations; the Union is still coping to achieve coherence in its external action as the Lisbon Treaty escapes ratification.

The wider Black Sea region - part EU region and large part of its neighbourhood - seeks guidance, cooperative action and greater engagement by all stakeholders. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. For example, as was recently proposed at a conference on the Black Sea, the Russian proposal for a new Europe-wide security pact could be an opportunity for the EU to introduce and promote the notion of “overriding European interests” and include the dimensions of energy and energy security in the discussions on the shape of the new security framework. Simultaneously, the promotion of a set of commonly defined principles regarding energy and energy security in the BSEC or some other inclusive regional cooperation framework could also be another targeted action that engages all sates of the region and obliges key energy producing and transit states to work with their neighbours. The time for action is now.

[1] Incidentally, in a recent article by Henry Kissinger on what the new US administration ought to do in the international arena, Russia is not mentioned even once. See Henry Kissinger, “The chance for a new world order,” International Herald Tribune, 12 January 2009.

[2] See, in particular, Bruce P. Jackson, “The ‘Soft War’ for Europe’s East,” Policy Review, June-July 2006.

[3] On a visit to Brussels, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister said on 19 January 2009 that "if we are faced with a situation where the energy chapter remains blocked, we would of course rethink our position [on Nabucco],". Reacting to Erdogan’s remarks, Germany’s Economy Minister, Michael Glos said that “Turkey is engaged in ‘political blackmail’. See “Turkey plays energy card in stalled EU accession talks,” EurActiv.com, 20 January 2009 and “Turkey Blackmailing EU Over Gas Pipeline, German Minister Says,” dw-world.de, 20 January 2009.

[4] See, in particular, Merle Maigre, “Crimea – The Achilles’ Heel of Ukraine,” www.icds.ee, November 2008.

[5] See Felix Ciuta, “Region? Why Region? Security, Hermeneutics, and the Making of the Black Sea Region,” Geopolitics, 13:1, 2008.

[6] “We must use what has been called “smart power”: the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.” Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, nominee for Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.

Demolition Derby versus Pericles

2009-01-06T13:51:00.007+02:00

Undeniably, the riots of December 2008 in Athens and elsewhere in Greece have made a return to normalcy extremely difficult. Yesterday, we heard that 31 shots with the intention to kill were fired against three policemen on guard duty with one in stable but critical condition after marathon surgery. The holiday season is over and trouble is about to break loose again. While I try to convince myself that the end of apathy and the audacity of hope are near, if not here, the continued downswing of my country where what seems to prevail is the violence of a tiny minority, where the authorities are at a loss as to how to (re)act, where the police do not know anymore how to act, where should the violence and destruction begin anew, fear will become all the more prevalent should the rock and Molotov throwers become the norm.

A demolition derby is in place, in full swing while we, most ordinary citizens, watch stupefied, irritated, apathetic at times and at a loss to react at others. I keep telling myself that the time to rebuild is here yet is this just wishful thinking on my part? Am I blinded by the incompetence that prevails, unable or not wanting to accept the reality that is my country? And in my perpetual inner turmoil the idea of flight becomes all the more prescient. Yet the need to resist, to contribute to changing the reality, to convert the downswing into an upswing is just as great, if not a more profound call.

In his Funeral Oration delivered in 431 BC, Pericles says:

“Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. Our government does not copy our neighbors', but is an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while there exists equal justice to all and alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty an obstacle, but a man may benefit his country whatever the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private business we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private business, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having a particular regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.” (http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/PERICLES.HTM)

Am I and my fellow citizens not deserving of a political and social system described by Pericles? Wasn’t the return of Democracy in 1974 supposed to represent the return of Pericles’ enlightened democracy? Unfortunately, this is not the case.

Stay, fight, contribute, I tell myself. “Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country” is probably the most apt, accurate description of what is wrong with Greece and what needs to be done.

Clientelism and corruption have brought us to a great extent to the brick wall we seem unable to pull down. We have become demandeurs instead of participants in the political life of the country, accepting mediocrity in the shape of lifelong public sector jobs instead of contributing to the creation of a vibrant meritocracy with world class education, regional leadership, and the like. We have forgotten not only our heritage (sic. the attempts to put fire to the National Archaeological Museum and the National Library, to deface the University of Athens among other public and historic buildings, and to use the Acropolis for political sloganeering) but the fact that its values transcend our sovereign and temporal borders.

At a time when real GDP in the United States, Japan and the Euro-zone countries is in decline with fall in output and rising unemployment with the probable decline in global output growth for the first time since 1950, the street protests are indicative of a growing malaise among the young generations of rage, that the future is not as bright as it is meant to be. Paradoxically, as a result, necessary reform of education and social systems are put on hold as in this climate of anger, a proper understanding of what needs to be done is impossible. If one is to add the new tangible threat of climate change and the need to cope with it, the frustration grows.

And herein lies the fascination with the Greek case and the fears of its exportation elsewhere in Europe. The fact that the uprisings are taking place in Greece inspire historically knowledgeable Europeans in that much that is worth fighting for comes from Greece and the ideals it embodies – democracy, meritocracy, equal justice, equal opportunity, striving for the greater good of the community, and excellence in education or Paideia. The resistance to the military junta helped lead to its downfall in July 1974 especially when it acquired an international dimension based on defending democratic values. While other enlightened Europeans are inspired and concerned by the magnetic appeal of Greece and all it represents, here we have uncovered ourselves as deeply ahistorical and uninspiring – either struggling to maintain the clientelist political system in place or not to reform education and modernise society at all as if time has stood still since the return of democracy. This cannot remain the norm anymore. The demolition derby will continue as long as we refuse to listen to Pericles.

The End of Apathy, the Audacity of Hope

2008-12-16T12:41:00.004+02:00

It is hard to put into words what has been happening in Greece since 6 December with the shooting of a 15 year old by a policeman who thought he is a combination of Rambo and Dirty Harry while forgetting that both celluloid heroes sought to protect the innocent. Although rage and a feeling of helplessness still make concentration and proper expression extremely difficult at this time, I cannot help thinking that maybe 6 December 2008 is as important a date for Greece as 23 July 1974, the day the military government in Greece collapsed and democracy was reinstalled with Konstantinos Karamanlis becoming Prime Minister a day later.

Since 1974, the country has fully reintegrated into NATO, joined the European Community/European Union in 1981, adopted the Euro, significantly contributed to the ‘europeanisation’ of its neighbourhood with Balkan states either having joined the EU or committed to join in the future and Turkey negotiating its candidacy, helped ensure the membership of Cyprus to the Union, hosted successfully the 2004 Olympic Games, etc. At the same time, basic socioeconomic indicators have improved the quality of life of its citizens with the country’s GDP per capita ranked 18^th out of 180 countries according to the IMF, its Human Development Index ranked 24^th out of 177 countries according to the UNDP, and its Worldwide Quality of Life Index ranked 22nd out of 111 countries according to the Economist, while annual growth has averaged over 4% between 2003 and 2007, among others. Yet malaise prevails.

Why? A closer look at some of the indicators could begin to provide some of the answers. For example, while official unemployment figures for September 2008 show that it stands at 7,4%, it is over 24% for the 15-24 age group and 10% for the 25-34 age group and twice as much for women than for men. This implies the need for major structural reforms of the economic and social system, in particular in the sectors of education, health and the public sector at large. Yet, reform has been an ongoing theme of all governments since 1974. Why have they failed? Vested interests have profited from chronic structural woes which the public at large seems to have accepted as part and parcel of their daily lives. The Economist may unfortunately be right when it suggests that “Life is tough for youngsters with energy and talent but no cash or connections.”

Yet, the malaise which is compounded by the world economic crisis is even deeper. Has the political system gone bankrupt? Since the return of democracy, Greece has been governed by two parties that were founded at the time – PASOK and New Democracy in September and October 1974 respectively. While the two aforementioned parties are still the only ones that actually possess the wherewithal to rule the country with relatively reliable and mainstream party platforms committed to the further integration of Greece to the core of European integration, the fact that the choice is still one between a Karamanlis and a Papandreou while lesser political families continue to play key roles in both parties implies that many if not most feel that the political system is alien. The question is at the same time simple and harsh: at a time when a black person in the United States knows he can become President of his country, how many Greeks actually feel that they could become Prime Minister of their country or even aspire to it? The answer is unfortunately almost none. The problem is that the two parties that owe much of their support to clientelist policies leading to a bloated, dysfunctional public sector and requisite public debt which have reached their limits while the private sector is held hostage either to the lack of proper regulatory mechanisms, lack of competitiveness, or to crooked tax inspectors and the like. At the same time, no other credible alternative and inspiring political force exists while the two big parties seem at this stage unable to put their differences aside and do what needs to be done together.

As a result, on Tuesday, 9 December while riots were ongoing in different neighbourhoods in the centre of Athens, 65,000 Athenians were at the Olympic Stadium watching a Champions League game between Panathinaikos and Anorthosis as if the fires in Athens and elsewhere had nothing to do with them! While the rage among the youth is an expression of the need for change; others think that what is going on has nothing to do with them. Fortunately, the latter are wrong. The riots and continued protests have launched vigorous debates and discussions among an ever growing number of citizens that begin to understand that although safe in their middle class cocoons, apathy can only bring about further social, economic and political gridlock as well as more street violence. The audacity of hope, as Barack Obama suggests, will hopefully emerge from this painful process. The need for all to feel that the country, its citizens and its leaders can do better is paramount. Hopefully, 6 December 2008, in spite of its tragedy, marks a new beginning for all.

The EU and its Eastern Neighborhood: Time for Coherence

2008-11-16T06:46:00.002+02:00

Much discussion is underway these days regarding the best way the European Union can approach its eastern neighbours. As a result, and probably to be expected, much confusion abounds as EU member states are divided on how best to address the region.

Undoubtedly, Russia is its dual capacity as one of the Union’s most important partners and new neighbour is at the core of the debate given the on-off nature of EU-Russia talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which has taken a turn for the worse after the Georgian-Russian conflict of August. Do the EU and Russia share the same objectives in managing their common neighbourhood or does the prospect of EU membership, however distant if at all possible it might be at this time, for some of the common neighbours put the two sides on a collision course? Perceptions are important here – the inability of some EU member states to overcome their genuine fears of Russia and therefore insist on EU and NATO membership for those outside hoping to get in coupled with Moscow’s propensity to have its say exclusively along its western periphery suggest that both sides consider the other as ‘revisionist’ and prone to a zero-sum game type of relationship.

Unfortunately, it looks like these perceptions are going to be with us for some time to come, albeit there is some hope that they be somewhat mitigated if good sense prevails. A first step would be to reduce the NATO rhetoric and refocus on a “More EU – Less NATO aspirations” approach. This in effect seems for the time being to be the trend especially since the Alliance’s Bucharest Summit last April, the August war in Georgia and the election of Barack Obama to the White House.

Step Two would necessitate the EU to find a balance between Russia’s projected force and the other countries’ willingness to cooperate further with the EU. The EU should acknowledge the European identity of the states of the region, and keep open the prospect of membership in the long term. This entails the formulation of an ENP+ that neither closes the door nor does it open it further to those countries that aspire to join the EU but allows for a further upgrade of their relations with the Union. Such a ‘European promise’ would help to reinforce the reform process in all the countries of the region including conceivably the unrecognised territories.

Which policy then is the best for the Union and its neighbours? The divisions among member states have led to policy confusion. As a result in response to its Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU has already launched a Black Sea Synergy Policy within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); it is considering an ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy while it is also trying to define the context or place for the Turkish proposal for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” while simultaneously attempting to upgrade its relationship, both working and contractual, with regional organisations such as the BSEC. All these initiatives which are usually led by a country or a group of countries could conceivably create new problems as they seem to be redundant, uncoordinated and lack coherence.

The current debate in Brussels about the adoption of an Eastern Partnership that focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profound integration with the EU to the ENP East partners including Belarus seems to complicate somehow the formulation of a coherent policy as it contains many of the priorities of the Black Sea Synergy. If it is conceived as a parallel track to the Black Sea Synergy process, it should be explicitly made clear as should the interaction/complementarity between the two policies. When drafting a European policy for the Black Sea region, it is important to avoid any possible overlapping between these two policy proposals/documents that might create confusion and thus weaken the credibility and the efficiency of the EU itself.

One suggestion that this author is making would be to rename the Black Sea Synergy policy and call it Enhanced Black Sea Synergy whereby regional cooperation between all regional states (including Russia) and the EU coupled by deeper integration with the EU by the ENP East partners go hand in hand. Overall, there should be a formulation for a new EU regional policy on the Black Sea. In this context, an Eastern Partnership with clear objectives, Europeanising features, strong instruments and promising ‘carrots’ along with an enhanced, project-oriented Black Sea Synergy, is a good start. This could at least help avoid the confusion regarding policy proliferation, replication and incoherence. It should be noted, that the Black Sea Synergy should not be underestimated as it managed to raise from the very beginning the political identity of the region and thus paved the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole. Sidelining it or eventually burying it in favour of, undoubtedly, an ‘in your face’ policy would not help improve the state of EU-Russian relations and, by extension, regional security and stability anytime soon.

(Re)Defining Priorities in the Black Sea and the Caucasus

2008-09-29T20:34:00.001+02:00

The crisis over South Ossetia in August 2008 and the ensuing series of events is symptomatic of a changing global environment where the tectonic plates holding it together are undergoing readjustment. With regard to the wider Black Sea area some conclusions are relatively easy to be made:
1. The ‘frozen’ conflicts are not frozen. This development was in evidence before the 5-day war although now it is a foregone conclusion.
2. Key regional stakeholders such as Russia and Turkey find themselves in the midst of major policy reappraisal.
3. Other regional actors such as the Caucasian States, Ukraine, and Moldova are hereby (re)evaluating this relationship within their neighbourhood.
4. EU regional stakeholders such as Greece, Romania and Bulgaria have come to the conclusion that they need to work together and with their other 24 EU partners not only in the sphere of CFSP and ESDP by enhancing the Union’s tools conflict prevention, conflict resolution and rehabilitation tools, but in assuring that EU policies already in place such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy take hold over the medium to long term and contribute to peace, security, development and stability of the Black Sea region.
5. The United States and the steadfast supporters of NATO enlargement in the region are having a harder time today in gaining the support of their allies in favour of NATO membership for Ukraine or Georgia at this stage.

The crisis and the resulting verbal and political confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation lead one to the conclusion that the security framework of the Black Sea-Caucasus region needs to be reassessed. Are the developments simply a tell tale sign of the quest for regional hegemony by Washington and Moscow? To this end, do they signal the beginning of a “new Cold War” as many commentators have rushed, either cynically or with conviction, to describe? Or do the developments point to a move in the direction of a post-American or multipolar world that is in transition or formation whereby actors like the European Union together with Russia, the United States and other regional stakeholders together define the agenda? One could describe the region at hand as the meeting place of regional hegemons each with its own agendas and priorities which either clash or allow for collaboration with their counterparts depending on the issue at hand.

The issues of energy security, NATO and EU enlargement (linked to the question of the frontiers of Europe to a certain extent), the persisting conflicts (with global implications) and the various attempts to work together in the areas of transport, trade, migration and the environment among others imply that the wider Black Sea region (encompassing the Caucasus) is increasingly becoming a priority for policymakers in Europe, Asia and North America. The (un)frozen conflicts can no longer be contained in terms of their impact in today’s globalised environment as the implications of a change in the status quo has direct implications on the rest of the world. As a result of the crisis, Georgia’s stability has been severely questioned as has its ability to be a reliable transit state for the various oil and natural gas pipelines either traversing its territory or planned to do so. For Russia, its aspiration to join the WTO is threatened while its membership in the G8 is being questioned by some of its partners.

The impact of globalisation is also in evidence with the global implications of the US financial crisis which has had a direct impact on Moscow’s stock exchange where stocks have dropped to low values while the withdrawal of funds by international investors globally might well suggest, as an analyst has recently written, that when “the United States catches a cold, the emerging economies contract pneumonia.” Add to this reduced consumption, especially for oil in this case, leading to reduced revenues for Russia and the vulnerability of the exchange rate mechanisms coupled with a poor banking system and the impact on the country’s economy is great.

Therefore, in this context, the solution, at least in the eyes of this observer, lies in the direction of further cooperation. While the political context remains volatile (at least until the first Tuesday of November when it will be decided who will lead the next American administration), the region’s stakeholders, both local and extraregional, have an interest in defining together how to best enhance the common neighbourhood that is the Black Sea Region by allowing international and regional organizations such as the European Union, the OSCE, the IFIs, and the BSEC among others to implement policies and define synergies that benefit all the countries of the region and their societies.

The Crisis in the Caucasus – a new world order emerges

2008-08-28T15:14:00.002+02:00

The ongoing crisis in the Caucasus is a tell tale sign of a changing world whereby the unipolar world is slowly but surely being replaced by a post-American one. In this new world order, the challenge is to find a way to share power, to create a model of global governance where the United States, the European Union and the winners of globalization – countries such as Russia, China, Brazil, and India among others – all have a role.

The war in Georgia clearly shows that the world has changed from the singular moment of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the splitting up of the Soviet Union soon after. The United States which reassessed its foreign policy and maintained its hegemony as the world’s leading power after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 now finds itself confronted with the reality that it is not omnipotent or at least with the fact that it cannot control the course of events on its own.

In the grand chessboard that is, in this case at least, the quest for power in the Eurasian landmass in the post-Soviet environment of 2008, there is an ongoing tug of war between the United States and Russia in a region the latter claims to be its “near abroad”. The immediate, powerful and deadly Russian response to the Georgian attempts to take control of South Ossetia and its subsequent unilateral recognition of the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a show of strength by Moscow with many recipients. Moscow clearly demonstrates that any resolution of the conflict as well as the neighbouring one of Abkhazia among others can only be achieved with the active and leading participation of Russia nevermind NATO promises that the future of Georgia (and Ukraine) lies in the Alliance. Even the comparisons between the recognition of Kosovo and that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are more of a political nature. Moscow’s message has nothing to do with which context is more legitimate than the other; rather it implies that if the rules of engagement in international relations are to be altered, this cannot be done without Moscow’s consent. In other words, the crisis seems to be defined by Washington’s and Moscow’s simultaneous but opposing quests for regional hegemony.

Albeit, the ‘New Cold War’ discourses by both Moscow and Washington, the crisis provides the European Union with an opportunity to seek a substantive role in conflict management and conflict resolution and ample ammunition to play the key role of honest broker. While the question that arose before the Georgian crisis was whether the EU could play a significant role in the region without stumbling on these secessionist conflicts, the conflict in the Caucasus, in fact, has, for a variety of reasons, managed to establish the EU as the principal diplomatic broker in the conflict. The EU brokered the ceasefire accord and as the ‘war of words’ between Russia and the United States intensifies, the Union, because of its consensus-driven policy-making approach and its contractual policies with the Caucasian states and Russia, stands much to gain as the voice of moderation notwithstanding the danger a protracted conflict could have on achieving consensus.

While a common EU position is difficult to attain due to the disparate positions of its member states regarding Russia’s present and future relations with the Union, the symbiotic relationship between the two sides (the EU accounts for 48,6% of Russia’s foreign trade while more than 90% of Russian energy exports today go to European countries) assumes that cooler heads will prevail on both sides. A combination of political will and a strong and steadfast commitment to contributing to the region’s stability together with a substantial physical presence in the region (both military and civilian) would act as a deterrent to future unilateral actions and contribute both to post-conflict rehabilitation and a future settlement and the strengthening of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

While the crisis has claimed its fair share of civilian victims and has cynically shown the ineptitude of the Helsinki principles regarding territorial sovereignty and the right of self-determination, it strengthens the argument in favour of a multipolar model of governance, at least in this common EU-Russian neighbourhood that is the Caucasus which accounts for the interests all stakeholders. If anything, the crisis reveals that today’s globalised world has nothing in common with that of the Cold War.

The Democratisation of Turkey and the European Union

2008-08-25T15:58:00.001+02:00

At the official handover ceremony between the Slovenian Presidency and the current French Presidency, on 30 June 2008, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, upon symbolically accepting a relay baton and an EU flag from his Slovenian counterpart commented that the European Union was “in average shape”. Kouchner’s sentiments echoed those of Nicholas Sarkozy who speaking on French television suggested that “something isn’t right, something isn’t right at all.”

In an interview to the Italian daily Corriere della Serra on 25 June 2008, on the eve of the Euro 2008 semi-finals which pitted Turkey against Germany and Russia against Spain, Joerg Haider, the Austrian far-right politician, questioned why Turkey and Russia were allowed to participate in the European Soccer Championships by asking “what have these two countries got in common with Europe?”

Though seemingly unrelated, the two aforementioned references in fact have much to do with each other. On the one hand, they describe a state of malaise about the future of the Union after the stalling of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty thereby reflecting seemingly disparate perspectives regarding what kind of Europe we want. On the other hand, they reveal a lack of clear political vision regarding the EU’s neighbourhood and which parts to incorporate over time.

The question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union is one which raises eyebrows, vivid discussions, periodic diatribes and general inconclusiveness. The debate and the parallel political process have been ongoing for so long that the eventuality of a marriage (i.e. membership) is often put in doubt giving rise to arguments in favour of other arrangements. The 9 July 2008 debate in the European Parliament regarding the Union’s enlargement strategy with its emphasis on alternatives to enlargement and the need for a period of “internal consolidation” by the Union is a case in point.

The paradoxes are many. On the one hand, the Europeanisation process, which is manifested by the EU’s accession criteria, has had a tremendous impact on Turkey as there is a direct correlation between the democratic transformation of Turkish politics and the progress in EU-Turkish relations since the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. One could argue today that the fact that there are two centres of power in Turkey – the deep state and the democratically elected (by overwhelming majority) AKP government – the transformation process of Turkish society and politics is in full bloom. On the other hand, the rise of political Islam in the country, which coincides with the coming to power of the AKP since 2002, implies for many a manipulation of the reform process to challenge the secular nature of the state.

For Europeans committed to Turkey’s transformation and eventual accession, the challenges posed by the presence of political Islam in power are just as poignant as they are for the average Turk. The issue is the survival of Turkish democracy. Yet, the reservations have to do with the lingering doubts that the Europeanisation process cannot be applied wholesale to Turkey as in other parts of the EU neighbourhood. In other words, if further democratisation implies the gradual dismantling of the secular state (such as the headscarf issue) thereby giving rise to the “creeping Islamisation” of the country, than the “uniqueness” of Turkey could entail that it has no place in the EU.

Nevertheless, the changing paradigm regarding the nature of the Turkish state is a condition which has manifested itself repeatedly since Turkey’s European adventure (in its modern edition) began in 1963. Over the last 45 years, reservations regarding the Europeanisation process of the country have arisen repeatedly in particular within Turkey itself through its long modern history of military and post-modern coups and a slow awakening to the fact that “Turkishness” (not necessarily in its inclusive form) is not jeopardized by more Europe. Orhan Pamuk’s honouring with the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006 and the mitigated reception he received back home best reflects this slow acceptance of what are perceived to be non-Turkish values and norms.

This in turn suggests that Turkey’s ability to change, to transform itself into a fully functioning democratic state whose integration would be received without much negative hoopla by other EU member states and their citizens, has more to do with its own ability to europeanise than with the arguments and policies of its opponents. In this sense, the promotion of “membership inclusiveness” – that is the defining and promotion of EU-Turkish relations exclusively through the accession issue through the filters of accession criteria, the Accession Partnership, the Negotiating Framework, and the constantly evolving acquis – is actually beneficial for Turkey. It allows for the Commission, the guardian of the accession process, to support and promote the democratisation of the country and to assure that at the end of the road (wherever and whenever this may be) integration is a given.

Another changing paradigm also has to do with the makeover in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999 with Greece (for its own particular set of reasons) being the steadfast torchbearer of Turkey’s road to Europe. The Greek support should not be dismissed lightly if we are to consider that Greece (unlike the United Kingdom for example) is an active participant in every scheme that promotes further European integration, in particular the Eurogroup and is the EU member state most directly affected by developments in Turkey by virtue of history and neighbourhood.

In other words, the accession process is mostly about the candidate country accepting EU rules and regulations. It is not about targeted opposition to its integration. After all, a survey of past enlargements will reflect that Europe has always had its fair share of naysayers.

Finally, in terms of changing paradigms, the links between the changes in the global environment need to be factored in as well. Fareed Zakaria in his new book on The Post-American World argues that the challenges to the West will not come from the “losers” of globalization but rather from its “winners”. Countries like China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey among others have had tremendous economic growth over the last few years – at a time of Pax Americana or pro-active unilateralism. In Turkey’s case, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, real GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 has averaged 6.9%, real demand growth was on average 8.5% for the same period while FDI inflows averaged 2.1% of GDP. Though other emerging markets have performed better over the same period, the numbers for the country have been impressive if one is to consider that they coincide with the rise of political Islam and a fundamental re-evaluation regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and especially the United States given the divergences over policy on Iraq in particular. Zakaria argues that the winners of the globalised era as a consequence of their changing economic fortunes project national pride and overt nationalism thus conceivably giving rise to the notion that the global agenda is not only a responsibility of the western world and their leaders such as the G-7.

In this context, the trap of “membership inclusiveness” is a danger both for the further democratisation of Turkey and the country’s future relations with the European Union as it does not account for other developments, trends, concerns and threats that affect our shared global environment. In this case, the “average shape” of the Union gives leeway and fodder to opponents of Turkey’s integration by allowing them in part to shape the agenda. It is not so much the fact that no institutional framework for a European Union of more than its current 27 members exists to date but the political impact of the inability to do so both on EU and Turkish public opinions. According to one public opinion poll, whereas in 2004, 73% of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership to the EU, the percentage dropped to 40% in 2007. Similarly, European public opinion today, even in the United Kingdom, is in the majority opposed to Turkish membership.

Hence, the democratisation process and consequently the further Europeanisation of Turkey becomes less relevant while the existentialist debate over the role of political Islam and its impact on secularism dominates the debate. Other existentialist concerns with obvious EU implications such as the Kurdish issue (the integration of Kurds and others in society and whether as a result being Turkish is an inclusive identity) and the resolution of the Cyprus issue are placed on the back burner.

Thus, a new waiting game is on where proponents of the accession process do their best to maintain it as well as assure that the gains of the last few years (legal and political reforms, a greater role for civil society, increasing student exchanges, etc.) are irreversible while Turkey redefines itself anew. Time has shown that change in Turkey needs it time and all we can ultimately do is accept the process as is while doing our best to keep it on track.

Η Ευρύτερη Περιοχή του Ευξείνου Πόντου και το Μεγάλο Παιχνίδι της Ενέργειας

2008-06-24T17:14:00.001+02:00

Σε μία εποχή όπου η τιμή του πετρελαίου βρίσκεται σε μια σταθερά ανοδική πορεία, χωρίς να υφίστανται μάλιστα ενδείξεις σταθεροποίησης στον ορίζοντα, τα ζητήματα της ενέργειας και της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας (ασφάλεια του εφοδιασμού, ασφάλειας της ζήτησης) αναδεικνύονται σε ζητήματα μείζονος σημασίας.

Συγκεκριμένα, το ζήτημα της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας κυριαρχεί στην πολιτική επικαιρότητα και, ιδίως μετά από την απόφαση της ρωσικής κυβέρνησης να προβεί σε προσωρινή διακοπή παροχής φυσικού αερίου στην Ουκρανία, αρχικά, τον Ιανουάριο του 2006, και στη συνέχεια στη Γεωργία και στη Μολδαβία ύστερα από παρόμοιες διαφωνίες, έχει λάβει σημαντική έκταση και στην ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο. Ο κυρίαρχος λόγος για αυτό είναι ότι οι κρίσεις αυτές είχαν –έστω και έμμεσα– τελικά σημαντικό αντίκτυπό και στις ευρωπαϊκές αγορές. Οι εντάσεις μεταξύ της Ρωσίας και των γειτόνων της υπήρξαν, δυστυχώς, όμως μόνο η κορυφή του παγόβουνου, καθώς όχι μόνο ανέδειξαν τη σημασία που έχει η ομαλή και αδιάκοπη παροχή ενέργειας για την εύρυθμη λειτουργία της ευρωπαϊκής οικονομίας, αλλά αναβάθμισαν τη θέση και το γεωπολιτικό status της ευρύτερης περιοχής Μαύρης Θάλασσας –μιας περιοχή που εντοπίζεται γεωγραφικά στο σταυροδρόμι της Ασίας, της Ευρώπης και της Μέσης Ανατολής διαθέτοντας σημαντικά αποθέματα φυσικών πόρων (πετρέλαιο, φυσικό αέριο, μεταλλεύματα κλπ.) και αποτελώντας ταυτόχρονα έναν σημαντικό ενεργειακό διάδρομο στρατηγικού χαρακτήρα.

Σε άμεση σχέση με τις προαναφερθείσες παρατηρήσεις βρίσκεται ένας σημαντικός αριθμός παραγόντων και εξελίξεων πού καθιστούν το αναδυόμενο ενεργειακό πάζλ/μωσαϊκό ακόμα πιο ενδιαφέρον. Συγκεκριμένα, μερικοί εξ αυτών είναι: η αυξανόμενη ενεργειακή εξάρτηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΕΕ) από εξωτερικές πηγές ενέργειας, η διαμόρφωση μιας συνεκτικής ενεργειακής πολιτικής σε συνδυασμό με την υπό διαμόρφωση εξωτερική πολιτική, η χρήση της ενέργειας από τη Ρωσία ως εργαλείο εξωτερικής πολιτικής και οι αντιδράσεις εκ μέρους άλλων σημαντικών δρώντων, και οι προοπτικές ενδυνάμωσης και ενίσχυσης των υπαρχόντων περιφερειακών μορφών θεσμοποιημένης συνεργασίας, προεξέχοντος του Οργανισμού της Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας του Ευξείνου Πόντου (ΟΣΕΠ).

Ενώ η ΕΕ ήδη στηρίζεται σε εξωτερικές πηγές –σε ποσοστό 50%– για την ικανοποίηση των ενεργειακών της αναγκών, οι περισσότερες εκτιμήσεις προβλέπουν ότι μέχρι το 2030, η εξάρτηση της ΕΕ θα ανέλθει σε επίπεδα 90% για το πετρέλαιο και 70% για το αέριο. Αυτή η τάση για την ΕΕ υποδηλώνει –και υποδεικνύει συνάμα– την ανάγκη για αξιόπιστες, προσιτές και βιώσιμες πηγές παροχής ενέργειας καθώς επίσης και την αδήριτη ανάγκη διαφοροποίησης των πηγών ενεργειακού εφοδιασμού ώστε οι εισαγωγές της να μην προέρχονται αποκλειστικά από ασταθείς περιοχές και αναξιόπιστους προμηθευτές. Συνεπώς, μια κοινή ενεργειακή διπλωματία της ΕΕ πρέπει να αναπτυχθεί στη βάση κοινών συμφερόντων, κοινών αρχών και μέσα στα πλαίσια πολιτικής συνοχής. Κοινώς, η αναβάθμιση της παρουσίας της Ένωσης στις διάφορες διενέξεις της ευρύτερης περιοχής της Μαύρης Θάλασσας και η ομαλοποίηση των σχέσεών της με τη Ρωσία και την Τουρκία συνδέεται άμεσα με την εξασφάλιση αξιόπιστων ενεργειακών εφοδιασμών. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, η Μαύρη Θάλασσα μπορεί να αποτελέσει έναν ενεργειακό κόμβο ζωτικής σημασίας για την Ευρώπη.

Μια άλλη εξίσου σημαντική διάσταση σχετίζεται με τη χρήση της ενέργειας από τη Ρωσία ως διπλωματικό εργαλείο στις προσπάθειές της να καθιερωθεί ως ενεργειακή υπερδύναμη ενισχύοντας ταυτόχρονα τις σχέσεις της με τα γειτονικά κράτη και τις αγορές τους. Η κατά περιόδους «σκληρή»/ανελαστική ρωσική προσέγγισή, σε συνδυασμό με τον μονοπωλιακό έλεγχό των αποθεμάτων ενέργειας, προκαλεί εντάσεις μεταξύ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ, ως προς το εάν η Ρωσία είναι τελικώς αξιόπιστος προμηθευτής. Παραδείγματος χάριν, η Ελλάδα είναι μεταξύ των κρατών που τάσσονται υπέρ μίας μεγαλύτερης ενεργειακής αλληλεπίδρασης με τη Ρωσία τη στιγμή που άλλα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ διατηρούν σημαντικές επιφυλάξεις και εκφράζουν διάφορες ενστάσεις. Εν προκειμένω, πολύ μελάνι έχει χυθεί σχετικά με την εξάρτηση της Ευρώπης από τους ενεργειακούς πόρους της Ρωσίας σε αντιδιαστολή με την αλληλεξάρτηση που είναι και ο επιθυμητός στόχος και έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι η ενεργειακή υποδομή της Ρωσίας κρίνεται τεχνολογικά παρωχημένη και για να διατηρήσει την ανταγωνιστικότητα της χρειάζεται την ευρωπαϊκή τεχνογνωσία.

Τέλος, σε μια γεωπολιτικά αναβαθμισμένη περιοχή –όπως είναι η ευρύτερη περιοχή της Μαύρης Θάλασσας– όπου αν και υφίστανται εκκρεμείς συγκρούσεις και σημαντικές οικονομικές και αναπτυξιακές ανισότητες, η προστιθέμενη αξία της περιφερειακής συνεργασίας, που είναι σε ισχύ –θεσμικά τουλάχιστον από το 1992 με τη δημιουργία του ΟΣΕΠ– (όπου ειρήσθω εν παρoδώ η Ελλάδα μαζί με την Τουρκία και τη Ρωσία υπήρξε εκ των ιδρυτικών μελών) πρέπει να αξιολογηθεί προσεκτικά. Αν και η ενέργεια είναι ένα ζήτημα που εγείρει πλήθος διαφωνιών μεταξύ πολλών χωρών παραγωγής πετρελαίου και φυσικού αεριού, ενεργειακής διέλευσης και κατανάλωσης, το πλαίσιο δράσης και λειτουργίας του ΟΣΕΠ μπορεί υπό προϋποθέσεις να αξιοποιηθεί ως πλατφόρμα πολιτικού διαλόγου και συζήτησης γύρω από τα ενεργειακά ζητήματα όπου τέτοια ζητήματα μπορούν να συζητηθούν σε μια ήρεμη, λογική ατμόσφαιρα, βοηθώντας κατά συνέπεια στο να δημιουργηθεί ένα κλίμα συνεννόησης που απαιτείται ώστε να προωθηθεί η ενεργειακή συνεργασία όχι μόνο εντός της περιοχής του ΟΣΕΠ, αλλά και ευρύτερα σε όλη την νευραλγική περιοχή της Ευρασίας.

Αυτό θα μπορούσε να έλθει σε αρμονία και με την δήλωση της 16ης Ιουλίου 2006 του G-8 στην Αγία Πετρούπολη αναφορικά με την Ενεργειακή Ασφάλεια που εξετάζει τόσο την ασφάλεια του εφοδιασμού όσο και την ασφάλεια της ζήτησης αναγνωρίζοντας τα κοινά συμφέροντα μεταξύ των χωρών παραγωγής και κατανάλωσης ενέργειας στην κατοχύρωση της παγκόσμιας ενεργειακής ασφάλειας.

Εν ολίγοις, το ενεργειακό ζήτημα και η διάσταση που έχει αποκτήσει στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Μαύρης Θάλασσάς χρήζουν ιδιαίτερης προσοχής δεδομένου ότι ο αντίκτυπός και οι εν δυνάμει επιπτώσεις του είναι παγκοσμίου βεληνεκούς.

The Wider Black Sea Area and its Challenges

2008-05-12T10:39:00.001+02:00

The wider Black Sea area is in flux and at the centre of increased international interest. This momentum is due to several factors which when considered as a whole reflect an enhanced role for the region in international relations. What are these factors?
--A spate of anniversaries reflecting the existence of regional cooperation in the region
--The enhanced interest of the European Union linked to its emerging role as a foreign policy actor on the global arena
--The region’s importance as a key transit region for energy supplies
--The region’s geopolitical location and its transregional dimension
--Russia’s priorities and approach
--The necessity to assure that all the aforementioned factors contribute to rather than disrupt the area’s potential.

Anniversaries galore
The wider Black Sea area has bucked the trend toward regionalism that emerged in the Post Cold War era leading to the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in June 1992. A regional initiative of eleven area states at that time with a bevy of institutional layers which became a full-fledged regional organization in 1998, the BSEC celebrated its first 15 years of existence with an extraordinary Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2007. The commemoration was also marked by the acquisition of Observer Status to the BSEC by the European Commission (EC). In 2008, the BSEC marks its tenth year anniversary as an organization while its parliamentary dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC) celebrates its 15th anniversary. The importance, however symbolic, of these celebrations is that they reflect comprehensive regional interaction over a long period of time thereby giving rise to the need to take stock of achievements, failures and obstacles. The fact that the BSEC is an inclusive organization in that it includes all the states of the wider Black Sea area, and in particular the Russian Federation is no small feat. Also of relevance is that the aforementioned commemorations coincide with the fact that since early 2007, the Union has become a Black Sea entity. In other words, these ceremonial landmarks signaling the passage of time and concrete cooperation between disparate states have raised awareness about the region.

In comes the European Union
The European Union has also awakened of late with regard to the Black Sea area. Though the first act of its interest dates back to 1997 when the EC had issued a Communication about regional cooperation in the Black Sea region, it was the momentum of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU on 1 January 2007 that allowed the EU to adopt a regional cooperation initiative titled “Black Sea Synergy” as part of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The new policy stresses the need to build synergies in a number of functional thematic domains such as transport, energy, environment, fisheries, good governance, trade, science and technology, and research among others. The Union also emphasizes the need to find ways to resolve a number of unresolved conflicts – the so-called “frozen conflicts” – such as those in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorny-Karabakh. The focus on “hard” security issues, though consistent with and necessary for the Union’s efforts to become a major foreign policy actor in this part of the world, does not necessarily sit well with some of the region’s stakeholders such as Russia. Not a party to the ENP, Russia has its own framework agreement with the EU – the four Common Spaces – which in the relevant road map makes no reference to the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Russia has also expressed its reservations with regard to the Black Sea Synergy by refusing to be a signatory to the Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union and the wider Back Sea area which was the culmination of the first Black Sea Synergy Ministerial meeting in Kyiv on 14 February 2008. Nevertheless, the EU by virtue of its new policy is becoming more engaged in the region and the dynamics of interaction with it are bound to bring about new momentum as well as problems to regional cooperation in the wider Black Sea area (more below).

The North Atlantic Alliance in search of a role
Contrary to popular belief, NATO does not have a specific policy for the region. In fact, the interest of the United States and other NATO member states such as Poland and the three Baltic countries for a more active involvement by the Alliance and the search for a Euro-Atlantic strategy for the region has often led to confusion. This attention derives from the continued NATO expansion eastwards and the expectations raised a few years ago by the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia respectively. There is also an element of standing up to a resurgent Russia behind this thinking widely supported by neoconservatives and neoliberals ideologues alike in the United States. Nevertheless, NATO has not been able to date to act in concert with regard to the region except to “reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro Atlantic security” as it did in its April 2008 Bucharest Summit. The failure of Ukraine and Georgia to receive Membership Action Plan (MAP) status in spite of the Bush Administration’s strong support indicates that many NATO member states are not ready to challenge head on Russia in its “near abroad”.

Oil, Gas, and Pipelines
The energy security question is linked to Europe’s (and the rest of the world’s) quest for alternative sources of energy supplies given the greater Middle East’s woes. Energy-dependent Europe is in desperate need of steady and reliable energy supplies at a time when the rapidly developing and expanding economies of China and India among other also seek more oil and gas to fuel their growth. This makes the wider Black Sea area together with the Caspian important energy producing and transit regions. The debate as to whether energy supplies should be held hostage to the monopolistic energy power of Russia or should be assured through market rules is one which will not go away any time soon. As a consequence, the region has become the central battleground for competing energy corridors and alternative pipelines thereby reflecting the need to assure the security and stability of the region and its oil and natural gas wealth. The EU has been struggling to define a common energy policy given the energy security dimension; this will undoubtedly be reflected in the forthcoming revision of its European Security Strategy. NATO for its part has prepared a report on “NATO’s role in Energy Security” which identifies the principles which will govern the Alliance’s approach in this field.

Transregional Considerations
The geographic proximity of the wider Black Sea area to the greater Middle East makes is a central player in the need to address terrorism and other destabilizing forces (such as radical Islamism or the prospects of a nuclear Iran) stemming from the Middle East. The transregional dimension is also linked to more proactive and constructive examples of regional cooperation whereby energy pipelines from Central Asia via the Black Sea feed into Southeastern Europe or transport networks passing through the region link Europe to Asia and Northern Europe with the Middle East. The Danube region’s links with the Black Sea is another growing transregional development where environmental concerns and rights of navigation factor into play. In other words, the Black Sea region is an ever-growing transit hub for transport networks (both land and sea based), oil and natural gas pipelines as well as threats from elsewhere. According to an American analyst, “the wider Black Sea region is the linchpin between core Europe and the wider Middle East.” As a consequence, competing strategies have emerged with regard to whether the region should look to the West, stay within Russia’s (and Turkey’s) sphere of influence or pursue a model of regionalism to the benefit of all.

The Russian Perspective
For Russia, the wider Black Sea area is an important part of its foreign policy given that is constitutes part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and its relevance as an energy transit region. More specifically, Russia seeks to remain as one of the main stakeholders in the region given the emergence of new strong regional (Turkey) and external actors (the US/NATO); it wants to counter and curb extremism, separatism and terrorism in the region; it wants to secure continuous energy, trade, civil and military communications within and throughout the Black Sea and the Bosporus Straits; and it seeks to prevent new dividing lines in the region including the expansion of military coalitions which exclude Russia as a full member.(Alexandrova-Arbatova 2008) At the same time, Russia is not convinced that the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy could successfully contribute to making the shared neighbourhood more stable (an objective shared by Russia) as it does not effectively bar the road to further future EU enlargement. The analysis by Arkady Moshes could not be more telling:
Brussels cannot ignore a consolidated push of EU new member states to be more active on the eastern periphery. As long as it denies membership perspective for its neighbours, the policy of Wider Europe that it pursues, (however palliative it may look) nevertheless stimulates their search for alternatives to staying within the same geopolitical and geo-economic space as Russia. Moscow, in this situation, starts viewing the EU not so much as a partner, but rather as a systematic rival to its foreign policy goals in the Western NIS and the Caucasus; a revisionist power; and is instinctively inclined to get involved in a “zero-sum game” type of relationship with the EU. (Moshes 2006)

This implies that while there is conjunction on dealing with fundamental concerns between the EU and Russia, major differences remain as to how Russia perceives the interest and approach of the EU in the common neighbourhood.

Concrete Synergies or an Uncertain Future?
The contrasting and competing interests of the various stakeholders, a few of which have been highlighted, above raise serious questions about the ability of the wider Black Sea area to continue with its emphasis on regional cooperation. Can the region survive this enhanced international interest? Can it find a modus vivendi between the various forces that have made their presence and interests felt? The challenges ahead are many as each new initiative, policy or issue could potentially destabilize an existing one. For example, the enhanced interest of the European Union could conceivably disrupt the BSEC – an organization through which the Russian Federation has clearly stated that it is wiling to promote cooperative projects and policies in the region. The spreading of the process of europeanisation through BSEC member states Greece, Bulgaria and Romania combined with the desire of all other BSEC member states – except Russia – to eventually join the EU, could disrupt the delicate balance among BSEC member states.

After the Bucharest Summit, five of the twelve BSEC member states are (or soon to be) members of the Alliance (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania) with Georgia and Ukraine lobbying for an invitation to join in the near future. The implications of this development in conjunction with peaceful co-existence with Russia remain to be seen. The energy question will continue to fuel discontent among the countries of the region as different interests (political, economic and strategic) make a common approach extremely complicated. The list of challenges is long and is bound to grow. Within this context, the wider Black Sea area, which is more than the sum of its parts as extraregional actors and extraregional concerns also need to be factored in, faces the daunting task to enhance its existing synergies while addressing issues it has avoided for lack of consensus to date. Failure to do so will ultimately reflect badly on all involved: The European Union is its quest to become a leading foreign policy actor in its neighbourhood and beyond; Russia is its resurgence as a benign and positive contributor to regional and global stability; the United States in its efforts to regain the moral authority as a constructive and respected world leader after its deviations over the last few years; and the countries of their regions in their attempt to consolidate regional cooperation so that their political, economic, and social betterment remain on target and their integration in the structures, bodies and organizations they aspire to join becomes a reality.

Can a common strategy for the region be formulated or are the differences between all stakeholders concerned so disparate and insurmountable? Symbiosis is the issue at hand.

References

Alexandrova-Arbatova, Nadia. Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area in the Context of EU-Russia Relations, Xenophon Paper no 5. Athens: International Centre for Black Sea Studies, April 2008.

Asmus, Ronald D. ed. Next Steps in Forging a EuroAtlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea. Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006.

Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Bucharest, 3 April 2008.

Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Black Sea Synergy - a New Regional Cooperation Initiative [COM(2007) 160 final]. Brussels, 11 April 2007.

Ferrero-Waldner, Benita. “The European Union and its place in the world – the current agenda.” Speech at the College of Europe, Bruges, 7 April 2008.

Hatto, Ronald και Odette Tomescu. “The EU and the Wider Black Sea Region: Challenges and Policy Options”. GARNET Policy Brief, No. 5, January 2008.

Jackson, Bruce. “The ‘Soft War’ for Europe’s East,” Policy Review, June/July 2006.

Moshes, Arkady. “Prospects For EU-Russia Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation”. The EU-Russia Review, Issue Two, A report commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre, November 2006.

Svante, E. Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson and Per Häggström. “The Wider Black Sea Region: An emerging Hub in European Security”. Silk Road Paper. Washington D.C., Uppsala: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, December 2006.

Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios. “Energy Security and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The Wider Black Sea Area Context”. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7, No. 2 (June 2007), 289-303.

The Greek Veto and the Name Issue

2008-04-09T17:10:00.002+02:00

The NATO Summit of 2-4 April in Bucharest was in itself extraordinary in that it seemed to confirm the coming of age of Europe. In Bucharest, several European member states of NATO were able, bluntly and overtly, to obtain unanimous decisions which did not necessarily reflect the aspirations of the United States. Buoyed by the clear positions of Germany and France among others stating their opposition to granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, Greece was able to insist that the former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia (FYROM) was not yet meriting of NATO membership as it had been acting in bad faith by not actively engaging in resolving the name issue within the framework of the UN. As a result, FYROM was seen to be faltering in the promotion of good-neighbourly relations with its neighbour and NATO member, Greece and its invitation to join NATO was put on hold pending resolution of the name issue.

Greece was certainly aided by the coming out of “Old Europe” to lucidly declare its opposition hurried decision taking which in the case of further NATO involvement in Ukraine and Georgia would have meant further antagonizing Russia. The position of many European countries that Europe (and the European Union in particular) and Russia are bound by a symbiotic relationship which includes energy imports from Russia and export of technologies, goods and services to it is diametrically in opposition with attempts to politically and militarily expand NATO into Russia near abroad.

As a consequence, Greece found solidarity among many of its partners and allies that it might not have expected. It also found itself strengthened because it too seems to be coming to terms with its role as a mid-size European state taking the lead in support of the Europeanisation of its wider neighbourhood (the countries of the Balkans and Turkey) that has the ability to stand firm in its objections to any deviations from the Alliance’s requirements regarding membership. The conclusions of the Summit now have direct implications on FYROM’s EU bid where the obligation of maintaining good-neighbourly relations with EU member states is even more clearly defined. This in turn implies that, given the fact that a decision on whether EU accession negotiations with FYROM will probably be taken at the European Council of December, the resolution the name dispute before the end of 2008 is highly probable, on the proviso that FYROM’s political leadership remains steadfast in its aspirations to join NATO and the EU.

In conclusion, one could assume that Greece was able to stand its ground because of a newfound assertiveness among key European states on the necessity of Europe to manage its affairs and insist upon the fulfillment of obligations and commitments by aspirants wishing to join the wider Euro-Atlantic community of nations. Whether this change is ephemeral or has long-term implications remains to be seen; nevertheless, this perceived Europeanisation of NATO provides Greece with the opportunity to hopefully bring the name issue to a close.

A Time for Realism

2008-03-03T10:59:00.005+02:00

Sitting in Athens, one’s perspective, regarding developments in Greece’s wider neighbourhood, is obviously different from that of many other allied capitals. Here one has the impression, as it is cultivated by the mass media especially in its electronic form and many of the country’s elite, that uncontrollable, irreversible processes have taken hold and that the world as we know it is steadily being reshaped and recalibrated. An unusually high and troubling recent rate of seismic activity does certainly not help alleviate a general feeling of malaise.

What seems to be troubling public opinion? Kosovo has unilaterally declared independence with the blessing of most great and not so great powers of the West, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) wants to become a NATO member preferably without compromising in its name dispute with Greece, Turkey is simultaneously beset by two existentialist crises – the head scarf issue and the Kurdish conundrum, and Cyprus has a new President – the EU’s only sitting Communist leader – thereby effectively relaunching the UN’s efforts to bring the country’s division to an end.

As a result, the mainstream reaction inside the region’s most stable and oldest EU member state is atavistic and not befitting Greece’s international standing and its constructive influence in the region as one of its biggest investors and a steadfast proponent of the continued europeanisation of South Eastern Europe and Turkey. While Greece’s current government and the country’s main opposition have acted responsibly to date in trying to cope constructively with the aforementioned developments, their room for maneuver is severely hampered. When on a daily basis the influential main television channels bombard the public with alarmist analysis of doubtful credibility regarding the stakes in the region, Greece’s belonging in the postmodern world of the European Union is threatened by premodern sentiments giving rise to nationalism, irrational theories, and a perverted sense of history.

The promotion and defense of a country’s national interests is a process that cannot be held sway to the emotions of the day and the rhetoric of firebrands which unfortunately abound. More realism and clear headedness is needed by all of the country’s institutional elite – and its fourth estate in particular which should not forget its role as a responsible watchdog. The same applies to all of the country’s political forces, especially those with parliamentary representation and the church which should remember that the separation between church and the affairs of the state has not been abolished (as some of its more influential clergy seem to think).

The plethora of developments in Greece’s wider neighbourhood should be seen as an opportunity for constructive engagement rather than the manifestation of helplessness and revindication of lost causes due to overt great power influence. This is the time for realism not hyperbole.

The EU’s Balkan Policy and Kosovo’s Impact: An Assessment

2008-01-04T15:37:00.000+02:00

Much ink is being spilled of late regarding the uncertainty around Kosovo’s future status and whether the European Union’s policy needs retinkering and rethinking. Is the worry about a unilateral Declaration of Independence by Kosovo’s Albanians and its recognition by many states without a United Nations Security Council imprimatur on a solution warranted? Does this in turn imply further violence, disarray, and a bleak forecast for the region? Or while concern regarding the future sequence of events (both planned and unplanned) in the Balkans is unavoidable, does the deadlock provide for opportunities? Does the stalemate allow for further EU cohesion? Does it help the EU in further anchoring the region within its realm and provide for a new engagement with Russia? After all, greater cohesion, the further Europeanization of the Balkans, and bitter relations with Moscow are all EU priorities.

The Union’s track record in the Balkans since at least 1999 has been remarkable. Two Balkan states, Bulgaria and Romania, have for a year now enjoyed the fruits and trials of membership. Croatia has its negotiations on track (baring some bumps along the road such as its maritime dispute with Slovenia), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a candidate for accession while the rest of the states of the Western Balkans are all making some headway with their stabilization and Association Agreements and their potential candidacy status. Similarly, the door to NATO membership for Croatia, Albania, and FYROM is ajar, provided they meet the requisite conditions. The EU has meanwhile sharpened its ESDP tools through its past, present and future operations in the region while the bulk of the NATO operation in Kosovo has for a long time been made up of troops from EU member states. Regional cooperation and good neighborhood relations, both part of the Union’s conditionality package, are slowly taking hold while the economic indicators are generally improving.

Nevertheless, the Kosovo conundrum continues to distract by adding melancholic (some might say pragmatic) overtures to an albeit positive EU influence. For one, achieving cohesion regarding Kosovo’s status is a markedly more difficult exercise. The EU 27 is a different animal than the EU 15. Yet a quick throwback to post June 1999 when Slobodan Milosevic raised the white flag over Kosovo reveals a number of lost opportunities regarding status. Milosevic’s presence at the helm of Serbia’s government made independence for Kosovo more morally acceptable. After all, the NATO operation was based on the premise of the concept of a humanitarian intervention which reflected the inability of the cherished Helsinki principles of 1975 to justify intervention in the post bipolar world. As such, cohesion at 15 was easier as it was within NATO to intervene, ant to probably deal with status once and for all. The transatlantic relationship was also better at the time, although unbalanced to reflect the US’s then paramount unipolarity. Also, as a consequence, coordination with Russia was easier and more consensual. Nevertheless, the newfound consensus was reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 rather than a more dynamic (and probably more uncertain) formula.

Today, not only is the achievement of cohesion in Europe a product of more refined diplomatic skills, but relations with the United States are being redefined and Russia has become more assertive globally. Moscow’s differences with Washington on a number of fronts including missile defense, Iran, Iraq and Kosovo suggest a power game between the two sides on a global scale that leaves the EU and the rest of the world on the sidelines awaiting for the match to end and picking up the pieces from there depending on the outcome. While it might well be that the United States is not setting on establishing the realities anymore in the Balkans, its bras de fer with Russia makes EU strategy more difficult or uncertain. In this context, how can the EU engage Russia over Kosovo when Moscow’s Washington policy implies using Kosovo as a bargaining chip? How can the EU insist on its conditionality policy under these adverse conditions while Washington and Moscow are pitted against each other in their own World Cup which is being played in overtime but there is no referee to say for how long while it is a safe bet to say that it will end in a tie. In other words, is there a Russia-US deal in the making? If so, what is its impact on the region and the EU going to be?

The linkages theory propounded by Moscow is an obvious immediate side effect. That is to say that diplomatic recognition of an independent Kosovo without a United Nations Security Council stamp of approval could imply that South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transdnistria could do the same with Moscow’s (and its allies) full blessing. Hence, what is the impact on Georgia’s or Moldova’s territorial sovereignty? What are the implications elsewhere? For the rest of the world, especially the EU, the question is whether Moscow’s series of dilemmas are real or a ploy. Cyprus, one the Union’s newest and smallest member states that has to live with a third of its territory under foreign occupation seems to think that the resilience of Kosovo’s Albanians would imply that its Turkish Cypriot citizens would do the same and eventually opt for a de jure partition of the country. On 14 December 2007, EU leaders clearly stated that their “conviction that resolving the pending status of Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case that does not set any precedent.” Whether this is possible remains to be seen.

Another unexpected sided effect of Moscow’s direct involvement in the global chessboard is that Belgrade uses the Russian position to justify its inability to consent to a velvet divorce with its disenfranchised Kosovo Albanians and smugly stands in defiance. Of course, it must be stressed that its political situation with its uneasy governing coalition and the spectre of its hard-line opposition coming to power, severely limits its room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, Serbia’s position is untenable over time because it is based on too many unknowns. What would happen if Moscow and Washington tire of snarling at each other and Moscow plays down its linkages theory? What would Belgrade do when Nicosia puts aside its reticence regarding Kosovo’s independence? After all, an independent Kosovo which includes the territory north of the Ibar with its Serbian population is a strong ally of Cyprus given its whole and undivided character. It might make more sense for Cyprus to support Kosovo’s independence as a multiethnic state which resists efforts at secession or division of its territory on ethnic grounds much as Cyprus faces in its occupied North.

Albeit the uncertainties, the EU has many weapons available to enhance its presence, The first of these is its new Reform Treaty which upon ratification would provide the requisite legal and institutional framework to allow for further enlargement. Upon completion of this process in early 2009, Croatia’s road to membership is opened wide. The positive effect of such a development on the Western Balkan states should not be discounted.

Another relevant instrument in the newly-established, Sarajevo-based Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) which not only replaces the Brussels-based Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe but also accounts for regional ownership by upgrading the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the only locally-owned regional cooperation initiative. In other words, the RCC provides the EU with a mechanism of regional cooperation which seriously and openly allows the region’s stakeholders to effectively lead the process. This has been a long-standing demand of the states of the region at least since 1996 when the SEECP in its present form was launched. The priority should be on making the RCC as operative and effective as possible.

Finally, the EU has to refocus on its accession priorities. The questions facing it are many: How to make the process of accession more relevant for the candidate countries? How to maintain momentum without making serious discounts on accession and conditionality criteria? The continued deadlock over Kosovo risks clouding the European perspective in particular vis-à-vis Serbia, which needs more incentives than any other candidate given Kosovo’s probable future independence. There is already evidence of watering down the ICTY requirements and lessening the pressure for the capture of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadic. The departure of Carla del Ponte from the position of the Tribunal’s chief prosecutor could be a sign of changing times and priorities. The same can be said of the 17 December 2007 European Council which “considered that a stable and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is important for the stability of the region. In this regard, it encouraged Serbia to meet the necessary conditions to allow its Stabilisation and Association Agreement rapidly to be signed and, in the light of Serbia's considerable institutional capacity, and recalling its conclusions of December 2006, it reiterated its confidence that progress on the road towards the EU, including candidate status, can be accelerated.”

Nevertheless, the insistence on maintaining accession criteria and conditionality does not imply that the EU cannot seek to formulate proposals and establish policies that specifically aim at increasing the relevance of the accession process. Many such proposals have seen the light of day over time. These include a junior membership option for candidate countries or a formula of “Copenhagen minus, SAP plus”. Recent ideas put forward by the Greek government, among others, which include the notion of providing Western Balkan states with a road map that would convert the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements with the countries of the Western Balkans that entered into force on 1 January 2008 into a visa liberalization regime merit further consideration. Another interesting proposal is the platform propounded by the Coalition for Regional Cooperation and European Integration (Coalition REI) made up of seven influential civil society organisations from Skopje, Podgorica, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Tirana, Belgrade and Prishtina. The aforementioned platform calls for a new phase of the Stabilisation and Association Process that accounts for a clearer perspective for the Western Balkan states “in the reformed EU” and support for its quicker “adjustment to the new trends within the EU.”

In other words, albeit Serbia’s 26 December 2007 parliamentary resolution that “[a}ny treaty Serbia signs, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, must be in keeping with preservation of [Serbian] sovereignty and territorial integrity”, the EU together with its Balkan partners and their civil society forces cannot but press on with the further Europeanisation of the region.

Finally, the negotiations with Russia over Kosovo’s future status highlight the need to continue engaging Moscow. The European Union and Russia, in spite of their differences, have a symbiotic relationship which is reflected by their geographic proximity, shared neighbourhoods, growing trade and global roles (after all both are global powers albeit of a different nature). Both the EU and Russia espouse the notion of multilateralism in their diplomatic endeavors. The EU’s principle of “effective multilateralism” as spelled out in the European Security Strategy of December 2003, in part in response to the United States’ growing unilateralism in the post 9/11 world admittedly implies (re)building bridges with both Washington and Moscow.

The same could be said of the EU’s policy of building a “ring of well-governed states” in its neighbourhood which to its East is Moscow’s neighbourhood as well. After all, the EU’s emphasis on the good governance of its neighbourhood should also be one of Russia’s priorities as well. The negotiations for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia coupled with the coming to power of a new government in Warsaw that is willing to find a modus vivendi with Moscow make the engagement with Russia all the more relevant and promising.

Also, in this context, the EU together with Russia and the United States could conceivably find a solution for Kosovo within one of the many UN-mandated ad hoc structures (such as the G8, the Contact Group, the Troika, the Quartet) that have emerged in the post-Cold War period reflecting the UN’s inadequacies to cope with pressing international concerns yet accounting for its blessing in order to facilitate resolution whenever possible.

In conclusion, the challenges ahead for the Union in the Balkans are many but they are fraught with opportunity. That is to say that while the Kosovo conundrum puts a damper on the europeanisation process that the EU has set in motion, it is unlikely that it will derail the eventual accession of the countries of the region into its ranks. Serbia’s obfuscation regarding its future relations with the EU in that Kosovo will not be sacrificed in exchange for future EU and NATO membership is a reality that cannot be sidestepped. It can only be considered more calmly after the Serbian Presidential election process runs its course in early February. The other opportunity that presents itself is the possibility of further interaction with Russia as Moscow’s involvement in the Kosovo negotiations reflected the changing dynamics of relations between key global actors and the need for constant engagement between Brussels and Moscow in the Balkans and elsewhere. The European Union’s successful policy of europeanising the Balkans should not and must not be held hostage to lack of progress regarding Kosovo’s pending status.

Ninety Years after the October Revolution -- A Brief Comment

2007-11-06T10:10:00.000+02:00

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Today’s posturing over missile defences, Kosovo, Iran, Iraq, and the practicalities of the CFE Treaty clearly suggest that Russia as in the past (especially the Cold War era) always wanted to be considered as an equal member in the club of global powers. Ninety years after the October Revolution, one could conclude that Russia demonstrates a marked continuity in its approach toward the rest of the world. A careful reading of history teaches us that Russia whether in its Tsarist, Soviet or Post-Cold War version remained and remains committed to the ambition of being a strong European power with a droit de regard over its neighbourhood, its “near abroad”. One of the reasons for the Communist Revolution of 1917 was that Tsarist Russia was considered to be the weak link in the Concert of Europe that had, in effect, ruled Europe with its Balance of Power concept since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In other words, apart from creating a worker’s democracy, Russia’s revolutionaries dreamt of a powerful centrally-ruled Soviet Union dominant on the global stage.

This continuity seems accompanied by a change though which could imply a significant and qualitative difference from the past. This change is linked to Russia’s economic strength whereby the country boosted by high energy prices has repaid a lot of its Soviet-era international debt, covered Russian Pension Fund deficits and created a Stabilization Funds estimated at over 145 Billion USD today to provide for a rainy day, all at a time when the country’s average GDP grows at an annual average of 8%.

Thus 90 years after the October Revolution, Russia remains committed to acquiring and maintaining Great Power status but with a booming economy which implies that today’s Russia could have a longer lifespan that its Soviet predecessor.

Terrorism and Rage

2007-08-27T20:19:00.000+02:00

The last four days I along with over 10 million Greeks have been living a surreal nightmare. Brushfires helped along by arsonists have been raging all over the country and at the time I am writing these words over 60 of my fellow citizens have lost their lives and unfortunately the body count is bound to grow.

I am beset by a feeling of helplessness sitting in my living room watching live coverage of the over 170 fires across the land, while my parents are stuck in Euboea, not necessarily under threat at this time but cut off from land access to Athens for the better part of 48 hours as the fires in Aliveri and Amarinthos raged on. While I could talk to my parents on the phone, I had no physical access to them. When at some stage I could reach them, we decided that I stay in Athens to keep a watchful eye over our properties in the capital. Low and behold, a huge fire broke out in Athens and soon the streets and our homes were filled with ashes like snowflakes in August.

I did cry a lot this past weekend watching the human suffering as my country was ablaze. It feels like we are under attack from either ruthless profit-makers that put fire to forest lands late at night in the hope that these might soon be converted to plots for future homes or from ideologically-motivated individuals aiming to weaken the country's democratic institutions or at least to bring about the government’s downfall in the general election slated for 16 September.

As a result, in this fantastic yet real world, one feels both terror and rage. The terror comes about due to the magnitude of the catastrophe which has stretched to its limits the state’s ability to cope (thank God for the help for allies from the EU and elsewhere). “My God, can things get any worse than this?”, one wonders.

The rage stems from the political manipulation of the tragedy by the opposition parties (unfortunately especially by the main opposition party) in a last-ditch attempt to augment their votes in the forthcoming elections.

The rage also comes from the unethical role of most television channels and other print and electronic media outlets that have blurred their role as transmitters of information and news, unable or not wanting to understand that this is among the greatest disasters to strike Greece since World War II, to providing tilted commentaries by professional know-it-all commentators as to how to fight fires and how incompetent the government is at a time when the fires are still raging, homes are being burned and lives are being extinguished, and the birthplace of the Olympic Games is nearly razed.

The rage is due to the inability to come together at a time when the damage from the work of the arsonists amounts to over 2% of the country’s GDP, when the land’s olive and agricultural wealth is in smithereens, when most of those untouched directly by the ravage are beginning to lend a helping hand. In this deeply politicized country, the polarization sought by some should not and must not be allowed to prevail.

I hope we all come together in solidarity and after the fires are put out we are all mobilized to rebuild together the country. One apt parallel is the New Deal promoted by FDR after the Crash of 1929. My country deserves much more than this desolation and I for one will not stand idly and see it mired in misery. Reconstruction is in the offing and with it hope.

Towards a New EU Approach in the Mediterranean

2007-07-12T09:18:00.000+02:00

The Mediterranean region has always been in the spotlight for some reason or other. The most striking reason is an almost daily reference in the press to developments in the Middle East, President Moammar Qadaffi of Libya occasionally finds himself at centre stage for his peculiar remarks on the state of the world, while Egypt is still seen as a regional power whose authority is being challenged in a variety of ways. Like other regions, the Mediterranean was also severely tested by the consequences of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, both in terms of their impact on the Arab world and through their association with militant Islam and in relation to the rise of neoconservative interventionism aspiring to remake the Greater Middle East which led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Closer to home, the sum total of the aforementioned trends and developments has also had an impact on how the states of Europe, especially through the cumulative expression of their interests – the European Union, attempted to deal with many of the issues at hand. These range from supporting the further political, social and economic development of the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean to stemming illegal migration and dealing with the integration of Arab, sub-Saharan and Muslim populations into European societies. The EU and its member states strengthened the Union’s Third Pillar – Justice, Liberty and Security, while the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched to cover relations with the Union’s neighbours to the south and the east. Finally, within the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership, which celebrated its tenth anniversary with a Summit in November 2005, the pillar on cooperation in the area of intercultural dialogue acquired a well deserved importance. The need for an enhanced policy dialogue across the Mediterranean increased especially since the perceived radicalization of Islam became a matter of major concern in today’s globalised world, as the post 9/11 attacks of Casablanca, Madrid, London and elsewhere would attest.

The intent of this paper is not to dwell in particular on the various zones of insecurity around the Mediterranean, the most relevant being the developing civil war between Palestinian factions, but to assess in practical terms the implications of Mediterranean developments for the European Union and its member states. In its Security Strategy of December 2003, the European Union identified the key threats as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the persistence of regional conflicts, state failure and the lack of rule of law, and transnational organized crime. Over time, the list has grown to include energy security, combating pandemics, stemming the flow of illegal immigrants, dealing with natural and man-made disasters and cyber crime with its malware (malicious software) dimension. In response to these threats the Union focused on security in its neighbourhood by promoting ‘a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom [it] can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’

As a result, the ENP was conceived to cover both the eastern and the southern dimensions of the EU regional policies, often leading to confusion, divided loyalties and mixed-up priorities among EU member states. On the one hand, the recently concluded German Presidency heavily invested in promoting an ‘Ostpolitik’ and the formulation of an ENP+ to offer additional incentives to the countries aspiring to join the Union at a time when no imminent new rounds of accession negotiations are on the horizon, to enhance relations with Russia and to devise a new platform for relations with the Central Asian states. On the other hand, the current Portuguese Presidency is understandably giving priority to the preparation of the EU-Africa Summit in December and focusing on the Mediterranean and EU relations with Brazil as an emerging regional power. Together with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ and the recently adopted EU “Global Approach to Migration”, this sets the stage for an increased EU attention to Mediterranean affairs.

The EU interest in the Mediterranean, or at least in some parts of it, is of consequence at a time when there is a lively debate over how to approach relations with the Union’s Mediterranean partners in a cooperative manner. Much has been written about the failure of the Barcelona Process to tie the Southern Mediterranean states to a serious development agenda and about the probable need to focus on sub-regionalism (roughly one made up of Maghreb states and the other of Mashrek states) as a possible remedy for tackling the region’s priorities. The failure of most Arab states to promote free trade among themselves (south-south integration) and the likelihood of being unable to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010, in spite of an average real GDP growth of 4.8% in 2006 suggest the need for a different approach. In this context, converting the European Investment Bank’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) into a Mediterranean Investment Bank separate from the European Investment Bank might be an idea worth reconsidering. Also, a concerted approach to the transfer of financial services know-how to Arab countries in order to liberalise trade in financial services may make a lot of sense.

The EU Global Approach to Migration which links migration to the development agenda, as well as to internal aspects such as legal migration, integration, protection of refugees, border control, readmission and the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking, is based on a genuine partnership with third countries as an integral part of the Union’s external policies. It addresses many of the concerns of the EU Mediterranean member states (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia) which met at Foreign Ministers level in Lagonisi for the first time in October 2006, upon the initiative of the Greek Foreign Ministry, to discuss common concerns in the Mediterranean especially the issues of illegal immigration and further enhancement of cooperation in controlling the EU’s external sea borders.

These concerns, together with the prospects of establishing a European Coast Guard Service and enhanced cooperation between port authorities, suggest a convergence of views among the aforementioned EU-8 on how to tackle the Mediterranean issues. This in turn also plays into the much-discussed Mediterranean Union proposal of the French President, announced first in Sarkozy’s election night victory speech of 6 May 2007, which links the development of the South Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa to a cohesive mutually agreed migration policy.

Taken together, the Sarkozy proposal and the common approach by the EU-8 indicate that the Mediterranean is bound to remain at the top of the EU agenda for some time. It should be noted that the current Portuguese Presidency of the EU is followed by Slovenia and France in 2008. Also of relevance is that the EU-8 form a substantive voting bloc with enough votes to block qualified majority decisions within the EU’s current voting procedures and will probably continue to remain in that position once new provisions are negotiated, ratified and implemented. Another noteworthy development is that the EU-8 member states will, as of next year all be part of the Eurogroup with the accession of Malta and Cyprus thereby enhancing their position within the EU substantially. Should the trend toward a two-tier EU, with a noyau dur centered on the Eurogroup, take shape as the Union’s decision-making mechanism at 27 falters, the EU-8 with their Mediterranean focus could play an even larger role in shaping the Union’s external policies. Though this tendency could in fact complicate the bifurcation of the EU’s external focus to the East and the South, it should nevertheless lead to a new approach toward the Mediterranean which would seek to remedy the failures of the Barcelona Process and address the security concerns of the EU’s Mediterranean borders.

The impact will also be felt in a greater political role for the EU in the Middle East Peace Process. It stands to reason that continued failure to find a solution to the Palestinian civil strife, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Sunni-Shia proxy war in Lebanon would make any targeted policies aimed at enhancing development and curbing illegal migration almost irrelevant. In other words, the EU-8 can only but become all the more active promoters of a greater EU role in the region.

After all, it should be noted that the efforts of the EU-8 and the focus of the Mediterranean Union proposal are relevant independently of Turkey’s EU prospects. Turkey’s eventual accession into the EU would in fact help the implementation of a concerted approach toward the Mediterranean. However, should accession stall, a common approach by the EU’s Mediterranean member states is imperative to deal with the implications of such a prospect. In other words, the key threats to the EU’s and the Mediterranean region’s security will remain and will need to be tackled irrespective of Turkish membership of the Union. Therefore, linking the Mediterranean Union proposal to a possible alternative to full membership for Turkey is largely irrelevant and beside the point if one were to account for the positive synergies a Mediterranean Union could create.

In conclusion, the protracted instability emanating from the EU’s southern borders has mobilised its Mediterranean member states to converge on the need to refocus on the South. The potential of a future Mediterranean policy based on a genuine partnership among all of the region’s stakeholders exists. It remains to be seen what its future shape and content will be.

Σε απόγνωση η ΠΓΔΜ;

2007-06-08T17:14:00.000+02:00

Το Μακεδονικό ζήτημα συνεχίζει να μας ταλαιπωρεί αλλά μια προσεκτική ανάλυση της παρούσας φάσης του θα μπορούσε να μας οδηγήσει στο συμπέρασμα ότι βαίνει οριστικά προς λύση.

Οι πρόσφατες, πολυσυζητημένες δηλώσεις του προέδρου της ΠΓΔΜ περί ένταξης της χώρας του στο ΝΑΤΟ με την προσωρινή ονομασία Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας, πέρα από τακτικός ελιγμός, θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί ως κίνηση πανικού. Από το 2004-2005, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση έχει τονίσει ξεκάθαρα προς κάθε φύσης εταίρους και μη, ότι η ένταξη της γειτονικής χώρας στους κόλπους του ΝΑΤΟ και της ΕΕ πρέπει να επικυρωθεί από την Βουλή των Ελλήνων και ως εκ τούτου δεν θα πρέπει η ψήφος του Κοινοβουλίου να θεωρηθεί δεδομένη εάν δεν προκύψει ένας έντιμος συμβιβασμός στο θέμα του ονόματος.

Η αποδοχή της πρότασης Νίμιτς του Απριλίου 2005 με την ονομασία Republika Μakedonija-Skopje αμετάφραστη (Ρεπούμπλικα Μακεντόνιγια-Σκόπιε σε ελληνική απόδοση) συνιστά, ως βάση για διαπραγμάτευση, μια ξεκάθαρη μετακίνηση προς μια συμβιβαστική λύση από την ελληνική πλευρά. Μερικούς μήνες αργότερα, ο Έλληνας Πρωθυπουργός σε ταξίδι του στο εξωτερικό δήλωσε ότι το όνομα Ρεπούμπλικα Μακεντόνιγια-Σκόπιε αποτελεί βάση για επίλυση του εν λόγω θέματος.

Στην πραγματικότητα, η αποδοχή της ονομασίας αυτής από την χώρα μας αποτελεί επιστροφή στην πάγια θέση των ελληνικών κυβερνήσεων μέχρι τις αρχές της δεκαετίας του ‘90 στην αναγνώριση γειτονικού κράτους (έστω και της μορφής Σοσιαλιστικής Δημοκρατίας εντός της Ομοσπονδιακής Σοσιαλιστικής Δημοκρατίας της Γιουγκοσλαβίας) με μια ονομασία που περιέχει υπό κάποια μορφή τον όρο «Μακεδονία». Το κράτος αυτό που κατοικείται από σλαβομακεδόνες οι οποίοι ομιλούν την σλαβομακεδονική, τοποθετείται στον ευρύτερο γεωγραφικό χώρο της Μακεδονίας, ο οποίος περιέχει την ελληνική Μακεδονία, την Μακεδονία του Βαρδάρη (Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία) και την Μακεδονία του Πιρίν (επαρχία Μπλαγκόεβγκραντ της Βουλγαρίας).

Οι εθνικιστικές κορόνες των αρχών της δεκαετίας του ‘90 δυστυχώς ανέτρεψαν πάγιες πολιτικές δεκαετιών, οδηγώντας πολιτικές ηγεσίες όλων των αποχρώσεων στην υιοθέτηση ιστορικά αβάσιμων θέσεων περί μη ύπαρξης σλαβομακεδονικού κράτους (όπως το ότι η Μακεδονία είναι μόνο ελληνική). Προσέφεραν με αυτόν τον τρόπο το ηθικό πλεονέκτημα στην ΠΓΔΜ για διεθνή στήριξη των απόψεών της στην προσπάθεια καθιέρωσης της εθνογένεσης της χωράς, οδηγώντας σε βάθος εικοσαετίας, τουλάχιστον στο επίπεδο της παγκόσμιας κοινής γνώμης, στο συμπέρασμα ότι η Μακεδονία είναι μόνο των σκοπιανών.

Η αποδοχή της πρότασης Νίμιτς τον Απρίλιο του 2005 επανάφερε, τουλάχιστον στο διπλωματικό πεδίο, μια ισορροπία δίνοντας στην Ελλάδα την δυνατότητα να αναγκάσει την άλλη πλευρά να κάνει και αυτή ένα βήμα προσέγγισης προς οριστική λύση. (Είναι δεδομένο ότι μια εξισορρόπηση της παγκόσμιας κοινής γνώμης μπορεί να λάβει χώρα μόνο σε βάθος χρόνου).

Έκτοτε η ηγεσία της ΠΓΔΜ έχει κάνει μια σειρά από τακτικά λάθη πιστεύοντας ότι η στήριξη των ΗΠΑ για ένταξη στο ΝΑΤΟ από μόνη της θα την απελευθέρωνε από το βάρος ενός συμβιβασμού. Όσο πλησιάζει η Σύνοδος Κορυφής του ΝΑΤΟ του 2008 και η πιθανή είσοδος της Αλβανίας, της Κροατίας και της ΠΓΔΜ στους κόλπους του, η σταθερή ελληνική θέση περί έντιμου συμβιβασμού φέρνει την ΠΓΔΜ σε απόγνωση. Η ΠΓΔΜ δεν ωφελείται επίσης από την γενικότερη σταθεροποίηση και ομαλοποίηση της κατάστασης στα Bαλκάνια, γεγονός που καθιστά ανούσιο ή τουλάχιστον λιγότερο πειστικό οποιοδήποτε επιχείρημα υπέρ της ένταξής της στο ΝΑΤΟ για λόγους ασφαλείας.

Η προτεινόμενη ονομασία Republika Μakedonija-Skopje περιέχει το συνταγματικό όνομα της ΠΓΔΜ που, όπως η ίδια δηλώνει, δεν το διαπραγματεύεται. Η πρόταση Νίμιτς ουσιαστικά υπενθυμίζει στην γειτονική χωρά και στη διεθνή κοινότητα ότι το συνταγματικό της όνομα είναι Republika Μakedonija (Ρεπούμπλικα Μακεντόνιγια) και όχι Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας, Republic of Macedonia, République de Macédoine ή Republik Mazedonien όπως η ίδια ισχυρίζεται και θα ήθελε να πιστέψουμε. Ως εκ τούτου, η αποδοχή της πρότασης αυτής ως βάση για διαπραγμάτευση ή λύση από την ελληνική πλευρά, μειώνει αισθητά την δυνατότητα ελιγμού της άλλης πλευράς και την φέρνει αντιμέτωπη με τις αντιφάσεις της θέσης της και σε κατάσταση πανικού.

Το ζήτημα της οριστικής διευθέτησης του ονόματος της ΠΓΔΜ είναι μια υπόθεση έντιμου συμβιβασμού. Η ελληνική πλευρά το έχει καταλάβει και πράττει αναλόγως. Η γειτονική χώρα συνεχίζει να ακολουθεί μια πολιτική του “winner takes all” όπου θα υπάρχουν νικητές και ηττημένοι. Με άλλα λόγια, η Ελλάδα μπορεί να ζήσει με μια ΠΓΔΜ εκτός Ατλαντικής Συμμαχίας, όμως η ΠΓΔΜ δεν μπορεί. Η Ελλάδα μπορεί να επιβιώσει με μια ΠΓΔΜ εκτός Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, όμως η ΠΓΔΜ δεν μπορεί διότι η όλη προσέγγιση της εκάστοτε πολιτικής ηγεσίας της είναι ότι το θέμα του ονόματος μπορεί να το κερδίσει χωρίς να το διαπραγματευτεί και ότι η είσοδος της χώρας στους ευρωατλαντικούς θεσμούς είναι δεδομένη. Η ένταξη της ΠΓΔΜ στο ΝΑΤΟ και την ΕΕ προϋποθέτει την εκπλήρωση μιας σειράς ουσιαστικών κριτηρίων, όπως η τήρηση σχέσεων καλής γειτονίας. Σήμερα, λοιπόν, λόγω της άρνησής της να διαπραγματευτεί στο θέμα του ονόματος και να εκπληρώσει τα ουσιαστικά κριτήρια ένταξης οποιασδήποτε χώρας στην Ατλαντική Συμμαχία, η ΠΓΔΜ οδηγείται στην απομόνωση με το ενδεχόμενο ένταξης στο ΝΑΤΟ να απομακρύνεται.