Turkey and the EU: Is Symbiosis Possible?
The question of Turkey’s relations with the rest of Europe is one which has dominated (at least the headlines of Greek newspapers) for many years and seems set to do so for many more in the future. What is all the hoopla about? Fundamentally, the issue is a very simple one: it has to do with Turkey’s stated intention and willingness to accept the norms, values and the acquis of the European Union in order to accede to it one day. The difficulty lies in its ability to do so and to, a lesser extent, in the Union’s (sic. its member states and their population) willingness to absorb Turkey.
As negotiations between the EU and Turkey have become more focused since Turkey has passed the threshold from candidacy to that of a country negotiating its accession, its state of preparedness in terms of making the requisite reforms has come to the fore. In other words, the acquis communautaire finds itself clashing with the Turkish acquis or way of governance which includes an undue influence by the military establishment and opponents of the notion of shared sovereignty.
Turkey’s European adventure is part of a process that for Turkey began in 1963 when Turkey and the European Communities at the time signed an association agreement called the the Ankara Agreement. Since then, albeit a number of twists and turns, Turkey has launched itself on the long path towards europeanisation. It is this precise notion that it is called upon now by the EU to define, elaborate, and make more tangible. It is also this specific concept that forces Turkey to come to terms with its contradictions, i.e. between what it is and what it wants to be, between clinging steadfastly to its interpretation of history and identity and adopting a new identity based on shared norms and values and good neighbourly relations.
Does all of the above imply that Turkey is too big in terms of size and population, too poor and too different to be able to accede fully to the European Union? No, it does not. EU enlargement is a historical process based on a vision of a united Europe and has been at the heart of the EU’s developments almost since its inception. The idea of European integration whose essence is to overcome the division of Europe implies that any European country – never mind how big, how poor, and how different – meeting the accession criteria has a place in the EU.
On the other hand, the European Union faces an existential dilemma between over-extending the enlargement process to the point of destroying its own governability versus denying one of its founding values to be open to all European countries. How the European Union will deal with this conundrum remains to be seen though the debate regarding its capacity to absorb new member states and how to do so exists precisely because the Union is attempting to find a way out of the aforementioned predicament. After all, each successive Treaty revision of the European Union was made necessary by the fact that it had to enlarge. The EU as it enlarges also faces the challenge of having the necessary support of the European publics for further enlargements. This is also something the EU is working towards remedying.
Turkey’s ability and preparedness to accede to the EU has nothing to do with the EU’s debate over how to account for Turkey’s future entry. These debates need to be decoupled. Turkey’s accession is fundamentally based on the country’s ability to transform itself into a well-prepared and well-integrated member state. Obviously, a key concern is the impact the europeanisation process will have (and is having) on Turkey’s institutions and polity. Successive EU progress reports suggest that change is slow and difficult but it is nevertheless in the offing. Turkey has no choice but keep at it if it wants to accede.
Here the gridlock regarding the opening of Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes looms large yet it is nevertheless a false dilemma in the sense that the beginning of accession negotiations has de facto forced a change in how Turkey can address the Cyprus question today. In other words, from the moment that the Republic of Cyprus agreed not to block Turkey’s accession talks with the EU in December 2004 in spite the fact that a third of its territory is under occupation by Turkey and its troops, Turkey fundamentally conceded that it has to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and respect its sovereignty over the whole island. This concession needs to be understood by the Turkish elite if it wants its accession talks with the EU not to stall.
It should be reiterated that the EU’s doors are open to any European country meeting accession criteria. The fact that Turkey is currently negotiating its accession implies that the EU considers Turkey to be a European country. The strength of the Union is its ability to absorb and integrate its heterogeneity whether it is expressed in terms of its region, religion, ethnicity, culture and the like. Turkey’s dominant cultural and religious traditions need not necessarily be a barrier to its integration. In, fact, these should strengthen the Union’s multiculturalist and cooperative approach.
The problem though on this note seems to come from Turkey which appears reticent to understand the need for its non-Turkish populations to have their rights, traditions and languages respected. This critique is also valid with regard to the Ecumenical nature of the Orthodox Patriarchate and its right and ability to function. Turkey must join the European family to which it belongs. One should not discount its relevance in playing a vital role in working out the relationship between the West and Islam. But to be able to do so, Turkey itself needs to liberate itself from its contradictions.
Finally, one should not discount the fact that in spite of the difficult path to membership that Turkish public opinion remains in favour of joining the EU although they overwhelmingly believe that accession negotiations will ultimately not be successful. On the other hand, EU public opinion varies from country to country. This suggests that all possible outcomes are on the table including as I have tried to show the full integration of Turkey into the EU. Time will tell if a symbiosis between the European Union and Turkey will ultimately be possible.
As negotiations between the EU and Turkey have become more focused since Turkey has passed the threshold from candidacy to that of a country negotiating its accession, its state of preparedness in terms of making the requisite reforms has come to the fore. In other words, the acquis communautaire finds itself clashing with the Turkish acquis or way of governance which includes an undue influence by the military establishment and opponents of the notion of shared sovereignty.
Turkey’s European adventure is part of a process that for Turkey began in 1963 when Turkey and the European Communities at the time signed an association agreement called the the Ankara Agreement. Since then, albeit a number of twists and turns, Turkey has launched itself on the long path towards europeanisation. It is this precise notion that it is called upon now by the EU to define, elaborate, and make more tangible. It is also this specific concept that forces Turkey to come to terms with its contradictions, i.e. between what it is and what it wants to be, between clinging steadfastly to its interpretation of history and identity and adopting a new identity based on shared norms and values and good neighbourly relations.
Does all of the above imply that Turkey is too big in terms of size and population, too poor and too different to be able to accede fully to the European Union? No, it does not. EU enlargement is a historical process based on a vision of a united Europe and has been at the heart of the EU’s developments almost since its inception. The idea of European integration whose essence is to overcome the division of Europe implies that any European country – never mind how big, how poor, and how different – meeting the accession criteria has a place in the EU.
On the other hand, the European Union faces an existential dilemma between over-extending the enlargement process to the point of destroying its own governability versus denying one of its founding values to be open to all European countries. How the European Union will deal with this conundrum remains to be seen though the debate regarding its capacity to absorb new member states and how to do so exists precisely because the Union is attempting to find a way out of the aforementioned predicament. After all, each successive Treaty revision of the European Union was made necessary by the fact that it had to enlarge. The EU as it enlarges also faces the challenge of having the necessary support of the European publics for further enlargements. This is also something the EU is working towards remedying.
Turkey’s ability and preparedness to accede to the EU has nothing to do with the EU’s debate over how to account for Turkey’s future entry. These debates need to be decoupled. Turkey’s accession is fundamentally based on the country’s ability to transform itself into a well-prepared and well-integrated member state. Obviously, a key concern is the impact the europeanisation process will have (and is having) on Turkey’s institutions and polity. Successive EU progress reports suggest that change is slow and difficult but it is nevertheless in the offing. Turkey has no choice but keep at it if it wants to accede.
Here the gridlock regarding the opening of Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes looms large yet it is nevertheless a false dilemma in the sense that the beginning of accession negotiations has de facto forced a change in how Turkey can address the Cyprus question today. In other words, from the moment that the Republic of Cyprus agreed not to block Turkey’s accession talks with the EU in December 2004 in spite the fact that a third of its territory is under occupation by Turkey and its troops, Turkey fundamentally conceded that it has to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and respect its sovereignty over the whole island. This concession needs to be understood by the Turkish elite if it wants its accession talks with the EU not to stall.
It should be reiterated that the EU’s doors are open to any European country meeting accession criteria. The fact that Turkey is currently negotiating its accession implies that the EU considers Turkey to be a European country. The strength of the Union is its ability to absorb and integrate its heterogeneity whether it is expressed in terms of its region, religion, ethnicity, culture and the like. Turkey’s dominant cultural and religious traditions need not necessarily be a barrier to its integration. In, fact, these should strengthen the Union’s multiculturalist and cooperative approach.
The problem though on this note seems to come from Turkey which appears reticent to understand the need for its non-Turkish populations to have their rights, traditions and languages respected. This critique is also valid with regard to the Ecumenical nature of the Orthodox Patriarchate and its right and ability to function. Turkey must join the European family to which it belongs. One should not discount its relevance in playing a vital role in working out the relationship between the West and Islam. But to be able to do so, Turkey itself needs to liberate itself from its contradictions.
Finally, one should not discount the fact that in spite of the difficult path to membership that Turkish public opinion remains in favour of joining the EU although they overwhelmingly believe that accession negotiations will ultimately not be successful. On the other hand, EU public opinion varies from country to country. This suggests that all possible outcomes are on the table including as I have tried to show the full integration of Turkey into the EU. Time will tell if a symbiosis between the European Union and Turkey will ultimately be possible.
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