Dimitrios' World

One of the major symptoms of Greek foreign policy is its chronic inability to be a protagonist beyond its immediate neighbourhoods, i.e. the Balkans, Turkey , and the Mediterranean – in spite of its extensive conscious involvement in the first two regions since the end of the Cold War. Successive Greek governments have used analogous rhetoric and set similar objectives – the need to ‘ Europeanise ’ Greece’s northern and eastern neighbours, the need to see them integrated into the European Union, the need for the wider neighbourhood to become ‘normal’, ‘boring’, ‘regular’. The diplomatic and political energy spent on assuring that the aforementioned comes to pass has been both inexhaustible and exhausting yet results (i.e. change in the desired direction) have been slow almost at snail’s pace. In part, this is due to the inability/unwillingness of the neighbours to completely transform themselves; in part it is due to the inability of the Greek foreign policy machinery to convince n...

Much ink is being spilled of late regarding the uncertainty around Kosovo’s future status and whether the European Union’s policy needs retinkering and rethinking. Is the worry about a unilateral Declaration of Independence by Kosovo’s Albanians and its recognition by many states without a United Nations Security Council imprimatur on a solution warranted? Does this in turn imply further violence, disarray, and a bleak forecast for the region? Or while concern regarding the future sequence of events (both planned and unplanned) in the Balkans is unavoidable, does the deadlock provide for opportunities? Does the stalemate allow for further EU cohesion? Does it help the EU in further anchoring the region within its realm and provide for a new engagement with Russia? After all, greater cohesion, the further Europeanization of the Balkans, and bitter relations with Moscow are all EU priorities. The Union’s track record in the Balkans since at least 1999 has been remarkable. Two Balkan stat...