Attempting to Decypher the Middle East in 2007
The new year will be one marked both by continuity and change. The continuity is a given. It stems from the fact that the key crises and concerns such as developments in the wider Middle East, the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and Iran, the security of our energy supplies, the Darfur and other African crises and the gradual shift of US foreign policy in favour of a more multilateralist approach, will continue to necessitate (and grab) our attention. The change will be due to the transformation of US foreign policy away from the neoconservative and neoliberal approach of reshaping the wider Middle East toward a model that allows for the input of allies (especially the EU), Russia, and a greater role by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.
In many ways, the November 2006 midterm election in the United States served as a wake up call or, if one assumes that alarm bells have been ringing for some time now, as an impetus for policy reevaluation and reassessment as the example of a liberated Iraq as a paradigm for change in the wider Middle East has fundamentally failed. In fact, as a result of the Iraq war, US influence in the region has gradually been waning while sectarian violence has increased in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority (and Afghanistan). Recent developments such as the issuance of the Iraq Study Group report, the assassination of Pierre Gemayel in November and the current attempts by Hezbollah to overthrow the Lebanese government suggest a power vacuum in the making as the influence of the United States is on the wane. Only a realignment of US foreign policy priorities to a more multilateral approach which would give its allies and the United Nations a greater say in the future shape of the Middle East could relaunch the peace process and provide for new approaches of dealing with Syria and Iran, the Palestinian gridlock, and all other pending issues.
Otherwise, the rising anti-western mood of the wider region and the ever-growing Shiite-Sunni split within the Islamic world will continue to exacerbate an already explosive situation where the Shiites seem to have the upper hand. This in turn suggests that a non-Arab state like Iran is becoming an important powerbroker in the Arab world. In fact, other regional heavyweights are, at the moment, Turkey and Israel – both non-Arab states. The role of Arab states as regional leaders is shrinking fast. In fact most Arab states (with the exception of Syria) are on good terms with the West but simultaneously entrenched at home by growing radical Islamic opposition due to the inability of the United States and the West to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan.[i]
On the other hand, the Lebanon conflict has enhanced the EU’s role and potential as a credible mediator despite the fact that few in Europe have caught on to this. EU efforts to bring an end to the violence and to contribute to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 have been instrumental. The EU has also impressed in terms of its willingness to provide the backbone of the enhanced UNIFIL. As Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief has stressed, “without Europe yesterday, no expanded UNIFIL and without UNIFIL no hope for a more lasting peace.” The EU’s actions in Lebanon have enhanced its regional status and could provide for a more pro-active role toward the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This of course could all be torn asunder with a terrorist attack on the European forces in Lebanon should the sectarian split and the anti-Western mood continue to grow.
If anything, the Lebanon War has re-awakened Arabs, Israelis, and the International Community to the stakes at play in the wider Middle East. Once the somber reassessment of the current situation is over, hopefully all stakeholders will seize the opportunity to sit down together bring about the necessary changes to resolve the longstanding conflicts in the region. One can only hope that, during the coming year, the United States will make the necessary policy realignments and begin together with other relevant stakeholders to bridge the divide between the West and the Arab and Islamic worlds.
In many ways, the November 2006 midterm election in the United States served as a wake up call or, if one assumes that alarm bells have been ringing for some time now, as an impetus for policy reevaluation and reassessment as the example of a liberated Iraq as a paradigm for change in the wider Middle East has fundamentally failed. In fact, as a result of the Iraq war, US influence in the region has gradually been waning while sectarian violence has increased in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority (and Afghanistan). Recent developments such as the issuance of the Iraq Study Group report, the assassination of Pierre Gemayel in November and the current attempts by Hezbollah to overthrow the Lebanese government suggest a power vacuum in the making as the influence of the United States is on the wane. Only a realignment of US foreign policy priorities to a more multilateral approach which would give its allies and the United Nations a greater say in the future shape of the Middle East could relaunch the peace process and provide for new approaches of dealing with Syria and Iran, the Palestinian gridlock, and all other pending issues.
Otherwise, the rising anti-western mood of the wider region and the ever-growing Shiite-Sunni split within the Islamic world will continue to exacerbate an already explosive situation where the Shiites seem to have the upper hand. This in turn suggests that a non-Arab state like Iran is becoming an important powerbroker in the Arab world. In fact, other regional heavyweights are, at the moment, Turkey and Israel – both non-Arab states. The role of Arab states as regional leaders is shrinking fast. In fact most Arab states (with the exception of Syria) are on good terms with the West but simultaneously entrenched at home by growing radical Islamic opposition due to the inability of the United States and the West to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan.[i]
On the other hand, the Lebanon conflict has enhanced the EU’s role and potential as a credible mediator despite the fact that few in Europe have caught on to this. EU efforts to bring an end to the violence and to contribute to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 have been instrumental. The EU has also impressed in terms of its willingness to provide the backbone of the enhanced UNIFIL. As Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief has stressed, “without Europe yesterday, no expanded UNIFIL and without UNIFIL no hope for a more lasting peace.” The EU’s actions in Lebanon have enhanced its regional status and could provide for a more pro-active role toward the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This of course could all be torn asunder with a terrorist attack on the European forces in Lebanon should the sectarian split and the anti-Western mood continue to grow.
If anything, the Lebanon War has re-awakened Arabs, Israelis, and the International Community to the stakes at play in the wider Middle East. Once the somber reassessment of the current situation is over, hopefully all stakeholders will seize the opportunity to sit down together bring about the necessary changes to resolve the longstanding conflicts in the region. One can only hope that, during the coming year, the United States will make the necessary policy realignments and begin together with other relevant stakeholders to bridge the divide between the West and the Arab and Islamic worlds.
[i] See, in particular, Roberto Aliboni, “Diplomatic Opportunities After the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict”, The International Spectator, XLI:4, October-December 2006, p. 102.
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