The Kosovo Conundrum Still Haunts Us
The continuing inability to resolve the issue of Kosovo’s future status demonstrates a relative impotence on the part of the international community (in particular the European Union and the United States) put an end or at least put an order to an issue which complicates the path of the states of the western Balkans toward stabilization, integration and Europeanization. The situation that has developed in Kosovo today is one which basically dwells on the following questions: to what degree can the sovereign rights of Serbia over the territory of Kosovo take precedence over the rights of the region’s predominantly Albanian population? Or, in other words, the clash over the application of the principle of national self-determination versus the principle of territorial integrity and the unchangeability of state borders by force; or the quest for territorial separation on the part of a group regarding a region which constitutes metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state.
The other important variable has been and continuous to be the impact of a decision on status on regional security. In other words, which option will likely be the least destabilising for the region? Will a Kosovo remaining part of Serbia with the high probability of armed insurrection be more of a stabilising factor than an independent Kosovo albeit with many provisos attached? The plethora of dictators, such as Slobodan Milosevic, and their careless actions in the Post Cold War era have eroded over time the arguments in favour of non-intervention and the defence of sovereignty in the strict sense of the term. This implies that the security and stability paradigm has become the most relevant over time.
In this context, the independence of Kosovo makes the most sense. My reasoning is based on a simple rationalization of realpolitik that Albanians and Serbs cannot/are not willing to live together (after all, even the Bosnia formula epitomized by the Dayton/Paris Accords of 1995 reflects to a large degree an institutional form of separation among ethnic groups in the region), therefore it is best that they do not. Separation would account for lesser conflict and would allow neighbouring countries like Greece, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania among others which belong both to the European Union and NATO to guide their smaller, weaker, and therefore more manageable, more malleable to change Balkan neighbours in the direction of adopting EU norms and standards, more prone to Europeanization.
But for all of this to occur, one needs a clear input from the European Union and its Member States that they are willing to include the remnants of the former SFRY into their ranks. The message from the EU has been diluted over time on several fronts. The independence of Kosovo can only work if the EU is able and willing to eventually integrate Kosovo, and what remains of Serbia into its ranks. In other words, the EU’s soft power; i.e., what Joe Nye describes as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion,” needs to be clearly defined and to be ever present. The EU might be able to integrate the Western Balkans but is it willing? The 2004 enlargement, the Constitutional debate (debacle) and the clear lack of inspiring leadership in key EU states have all contributed to the seeming deflation of the EU’s commitment toward the region. As a result the initiative or onus has been left to some EU Member States that consider the enlargement to the Western Balkans as crucial to their national interest. Thus the EU’s successful instrument of conditionality has become ever more watered down.
In a far cry from the May 2006 decision to suspend Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) talks with Serbia over Belgrade's failure to capture war crimes suspect Ratko Mladic, the EU Foreign ministers decided on 22 January 2007 to complement Serbia for the orderly conduct of parliamentary elections and called for the speedy formation of a government committed to Serbia’s European course that will be willing to engage in constructive cooperation with the international community. Nowhere is there any mention of the need to turn in suspected war criminals.
This realism by the EU reflects that decision time on Kosovo is fast approaching and that the EU is trying its best to get Serbia to sign on, however grudgingly, to Kosovo’s separateness. Another tell-tale sign of change is the acceptance by EU Member Stats of a possible future ESDP presence in Kosovo. In the evolution of the debate over Kosovo’s future status since the early 1990s, we reached a point where all stakeholders have come to terms with the fact conditional independence is the most probable option. The much awaited report by Marti Ahtisaari is certainly bound to reflect that.
As a result, in an attempt to slow down the process, states that are reticent or uncomfortable with such a development keep mentioning the need for a mutually acceptable solution whatever its outcome might be for fear of creating precedents that might be replicated in the Caucasus and elsewhere. This all sounds logical and civilised but it is totally impractical. The only way forward is for the international community to break the gridlock and impose (however mildly possible) a solution which will in the short term fully satisfy neither side but over the medium- and long terms will allow both sides to transform themselves into stable, functional, well-governed European sides that neither fear nor are feared by their neighbours.
The other important variable has been and continuous to be the impact of a decision on status on regional security. In other words, which option will likely be the least destabilising for the region? Will a Kosovo remaining part of Serbia with the high probability of armed insurrection be more of a stabilising factor than an independent Kosovo albeit with many provisos attached? The plethora of dictators, such as Slobodan Milosevic, and their careless actions in the Post Cold War era have eroded over time the arguments in favour of non-intervention and the defence of sovereignty in the strict sense of the term. This implies that the security and stability paradigm has become the most relevant over time.
In this context, the independence of Kosovo makes the most sense. My reasoning is based on a simple rationalization of realpolitik that Albanians and Serbs cannot/are not willing to live together (after all, even the Bosnia formula epitomized by the Dayton/Paris Accords of 1995 reflects to a large degree an institutional form of separation among ethnic groups in the region), therefore it is best that they do not. Separation would account for lesser conflict and would allow neighbouring countries like Greece, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania among others which belong both to the European Union and NATO to guide their smaller, weaker, and therefore more manageable, more malleable to change Balkan neighbours in the direction of adopting EU norms and standards, more prone to Europeanization.
But for all of this to occur, one needs a clear input from the European Union and its Member States that they are willing to include the remnants of the former SFRY into their ranks. The message from the EU has been diluted over time on several fronts. The independence of Kosovo can only work if the EU is able and willing to eventually integrate Kosovo, and what remains of Serbia into its ranks. In other words, the EU’s soft power; i.e., what Joe Nye describes as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion,” needs to be clearly defined and to be ever present. The EU might be able to integrate the Western Balkans but is it willing? The 2004 enlargement, the Constitutional debate (debacle) and the clear lack of inspiring leadership in key EU states have all contributed to the seeming deflation of the EU’s commitment toward the region. As a result the initiative or onus has been left to some EU Member States that consider the enlargement to the Western Balkans as crucial to their national interest. Thus the EU’s successful instrument of conditionality has become ever more watered down.
In a far cry from the May 2006 decision to suspend Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) talks with Serbia over Belgrade's failure to capture war crimes suspect Ratko Mladic, the EU Foreign ministers decided on 22 January 2007 to complement Serbia for the orderly conduct of parliamentary elections and called for the speedy formation of a government committed to Serbia’s European course that will be willing to engage in constructive cooperation with the international community. Nowhere is there any mention of the need to turn in suspected war criminals.
This realism by the EU reflects that decision time on Kosovo is fast approaching and that the EU is trying its best to get Serbia to sign on, however grudgingly, to Kosovo’s separateness. Another tell-tale sign of change is the acceptance by EU Member Stats of a possible future ESDP presence in Kosovo. In the evolution of the debate over Kosovo’s future status since the early 1990s, we reached a point where all stakeholders have come to terms with the fact conditional independence is the most probable option. The much awaited report by Marti Ahtisaari is certainly bound to reflect that.
As a result, in an attempt to slow down the process, states that are reticent or uncomfortable with such a development keep mentioning the need for a mutually acceptable solution whatever its outcome might be for fear of creating precedents that might be replicated in the Caucasus and elsewhere. This all sounds logical and civilised but it is totally impractical. The only way forward is for the international community to break the gridlock and impose (however mildly possible) a solution which will in the short term fully satisfy neither side but over the medium- and long terms will allow both sides to transform themselves into stable, functional, well-governed European sides that neither fear nor are feared by their neighbours.
In today’s Europe where meta-sovereignty is becoming the rule of thumb, the chasm between Serb and Albanian positions leaves much to be desired but the divergences between EU member states are potentially more threatening. They instead reflect a lack of faith in the EU’s commitment or future role in bringing both Serbia and Kosovo into its fold. This fudging allows for other important stakeholders such as Russia and many of the region’s states like Greece to cast doubts on the possible solution on the eve of decision time. If the EU is committed to assuring that the future of Serbia and Kosovo is a European one, then the only sensible thing to do would be for the Security Council to act upon it.
Comments