Towards a New EU Approach in the Mediterranean
The Mediterranean region has always been in the spotlight for some reason or other. The most striking reason is an almost daily reference in the press to developments in the Middle East, President Moammar Qadaffi of Libya occasionally finds himself at centre stage for his peculiar remarks on the state of the world, while Egypt is still seen as a regional power whose authority is being challenged in a variety of ways. Like other regions, the Mediterranean was also severely tested by the consequences of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, both in terms of their impact on the Arab world and through their association with militant Islam and in relation to the rise of neoconservative interventionism aspiring to remake the Greater Middle East which led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Closer to home, the sum total of the aforementioned trends and developments has also had an impact on how the states of Europe, especially through the cumulative expression of their interests – the European Union, attempted to deal with many of the issues at hand. These range from supporting the further political, social and economic development of the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean to stemming illegal migration and dealing with the integration of Arab, sub-Saharan and Muslim populations into European societies. The EU and its member states strengthened the Union’s Third Pillar – Justice, Liberty and Security, while the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched to cover relations with the Union’s neighbours to the south and the east. Finally, within the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership, which celebrated its tenth anniversary with a Summit in November 2005, the pillar on cooperation in the area of intercultural dialogue acquired a well deserved importance. The need for an enhanced policy dialogue across the Mediterranean increased especially since the perceived radicalization of Islam became a matter of major concern in today’s globalised world, as the post 9/11 attacks of Casablanca, Madrid, London and elsewhere would attest.
The intent of this paper is not to dwell in particular on the various zones of insecurity around the Mediterranean, the most relevant being the developing civil war between Palestinian factions, but to assess in practical terms the implications of Mediterranean developments for the European Union and its member states. In its Security Strategy of December 2003, the European Union identified the key threats as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the persistence of regional conflicts, state failure and the lack of rule of law, and transnational organized crime. Over time, the list has grown to include energy security, combating pandemics, stemming the flow of illegal immigrants, dealing with natural and man-made disasters and cyber crime with its malware (malicious software) dimension. In response to these threats the Union focused on security in its neighbourhood by promoting ‘a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom [it] can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’
As a result, the ENP was conceived to cover both the eastern and the southern dimensions of the EU regional policies, often leading to confusion, divided loyalties and mixed-up priorities among EU member states. On the one hand, the recently concluded German Presidency heavily invested in promoting an ‘Ostpolitik’ and the formulation of an ENP+ to offer additional incentives to the countries aspiring to join the Union at a time when no imminent new rounds of accession negotiations are on the horizon, to enhance relations with Russia and to devise a new platform for relations with the Central Asian states. On the other hand, the current Portuguese Presidency is understandably giving priority to the preparation of the EU-Africa Summit in December and focusing on the Mediterranean and EU relations with Brazil as an emerging regional power. Together with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ and the recently adopted EU “Global Approach to Migration”, this sets the stage for an increased EU attention to Mediterranean affairs.
The EU interest in the Mediterranean, or at least in some parts of it, is of consequence at a time when there is a lively debate over how to approach relations with the Union’s Mediterranean partners in a cooperative manner. Much has been written about the failure of the Barcelona Process to tie the Southern Mediterranean states to a serious development agenda and about the probable need to focus on sub-regionalism (roughly one made up of Maghreb states and the other of Mashrek states) as a possible remedy for tackling the region’s priorities. The failure of most Arab states to promote free trade among themselves (south-south integration) and the likelihood of being unable to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010, in spite of an average real GDP growth of 4.8% in 2006 suggest the need for a different approach. In this context, converting the European Investment Bank’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) into a Mediterranean Investment Bank separate from the European Investment Bank might be an idea worth reconsidering. Also, a concerted approach to the transfer of financial services know-how to Arab countries in order to liberalise trade in financial services may make a lot of sense.
The EU Global Approach to Migration which links migration to the development agenda, as well as to internal aspects such as legal migration, integration, protection of refugees, border control, readmission and the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking, is based on a genuine partnership with third countries as an integral part of the Union’s external policies. It addresses many of the concerns of the EU Mediterranean member states (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia) which met at Foreign Ministers level in Lagonisi for the first time in October 2006, upon the initiative of the Greek Foreign Ministry, to discuss common concerns in the Mediterranean especially the issues of illegal immigration and further enhancement of cooperation in controlling the EU’s external sea borders.
These concerns, together with the prospects of establishing a European Coast Guard Service and enhanced cooperation between port authorities, suggest a convergence of views among the aforementioned EU-8 on how to tackle the Mediterranean issues. This in turn also plays into the much-discussed Mediterranean Union proposal of the French President, announced first in Sarkozy’s election night victory speech of 6 May 2007, which links the development of the South Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa to a cohesive mutually agreed migration policy.
Taken together, the Sarkozy proposal and the common approach by the EU-8 indicate that the Mediterranean is bound to remain at the top of the EU agenda for some time. It should be noted that the current Portuguese Presidency of the EU is followed by Slovenia and France in 2008. Also of relevance is that the EU-8 form a substantive voting bloc with enough votes to block qualified majority decisions within the EU’s current voting procedures and will probably continue to remain in that position once new provisions are negotiated, ratified and implemented. Another noteworthy development is that the EU-8 member states will, as of next year all be part of the Eurogroup with the accession of Malta and Cyprus thereby enhancing their position within the EU substantially. Should the trend toward a two-tier EU, with a noyau dur centered on the Eurogroup, take shape as the Union’s decision-making mechanism at 27 falters, the EU-8 with their Mediterranean focus could play an even larger role in shaping the Union’s external policies. Though this tendency could in fact complicate the bifurcation of the EU’s external focus to the East and the South, it should nevertheless lead to a new approach toward the Mediterranean which would seek to remedy the failures of the Barcelona Process and address the security concerns of the EU’s Mediterranean borders.
The impact will also be felt in a greater political role for the EU in the Middle East Peace Process. It stands to reason that continued failure to find a solution to the Palestinian civil strife, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Sunni-Shia proxy war in Lebanon would make any targeted policies aimed at enhancing development and curbing illegal migration almost irrelevant. In other words, the EU-8 can only but become all the more active promoters of a greater EU role in the region.
After all, it should be noted that the efforts of the EU-8 and the focus of the Mediterranean Union proposal are relevant independently of Turkey’s EU prospects. Turkey’s eventual accession into the EU would in fact help the implementation of a concerted approach toward the Mediterranean. However, should accession stall, a common approach by the EU’s Mediterranean member states is imperative to deal with the implications of such a prospect. In other words, the key threats to the EU’s and the Mediterranean region’s security will remain and will need to be tackled irrespective of Turkish membership of the Union. Therefore, linking the Mediterranean Union proposal to a possible alternative to full membership for Turkey is largely irrelevant and beside the point if one were to account for the positive synergies a Mediterranean Union could create.
Closer to home, the sum total of the aforementioned trends and developments has also had an impact on how the states of Europe, especially through the cumulative expression of their interests – the European Union, attempted to deal with many of the issues at hand. These range from supporting the further political, social and economic development of the countries on the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean to stemming illegal migration and dealing with the integration of Arab, sub-Saharan and Muslim populations into European societies. The EU and its member states strengthened the Union’s Third Pillar – Justice, Liberty and Security, while the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched to cover relations with the Union’s neighbours to the south and the east. Finally, within the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership, which celebrated its tenth anniversary with a Summit in November 2005, the pillar on cooperation in the area of intercultural dialogue acquired a well deserved importance. The need for an enhanced policy dialogue across the Mediterranean increased especially since the perceived radicalization of Islam became a matter of major concern in today’s globalised world, as the post 9/11 attacks of Casablanca, Madrid, London and elsewhere would attest.
The intent of this paper is not to dwell in particular on the various zones of insecurity around the Mediterranean, the most relevant being the developing civil war between Palestinian factions, but to assess in practical terms the implications of Mediterranean developments for the European Union and its member states. In its Security Strategy of December 2003, the European Union identified the key threats as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the persistence of regional conflicts, state failure and the lack of rule of law, and transnational organized crime. Over time, the list has grown to include energy security, combating pandemics, stemming the flow of illegal immigrants, dealing with natural and man-made disasters and cyber crime with its malware (malicious software) dimension. In response to these threats the Union focused on security in its neighbourhood by promoting ‘a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom [it] can enjoy close and cooperative relations.’
As a result, the ENP was conceived to cover both the eastern and the southern dimensions of the EU regional policies, often leading to confusion, divided loyalties and mixed-up priorities among EU member states. On the one hand, the recently concluded German Presidency heavily invested in promoting an ‘Ostpolitik’ and the formulation of an ENP+ to offer additional incentives to the countries aspiring to join the Union at a time when no imminent new rounds of accession negotiations are on the horizon, to enhance relations with Russia and to devise a new platform for relations with the Central Asian states. On the other hand, the current Portuguese Presidency is understandably giving priority to the preparation of the EU-Africa Summit in December and focusing on the Mediterranean and EU relations with Brazil as an emerging regional power. Together with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for the creation of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ and the recently adopted EU “Global Approach to Migration”, this sets the stage for an increased EU attention to Mediterranean affairs.
The EU interest in the Mediterranean, or at least in some parts of it, is of consequence at a time when there is a lively debate over how to approach relations with the Union’s Mediterranean partners in a cooperative manner. Much has been written about the failure of the Barcelona Process to tie the Southern Mediterranean states to a serious development agenda and about the probable need to focus on sub-regionalism (roughly one made up of Maghreb states and the other of Mashrek states) as a possible remedy for tackling the region’s priorities. The failure of most Arab states to promote free trade among themselves (south-south integration) and the likelihood of being unable to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010, in spite of an average real GDP growth of 4.8% in 2006 suggest the need for a different approach. In this context, converting the European Investment Bank’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) into a Mediterranean Investment Bank separate from the European Investment Bank might be an idea worth reconsidering. Also, a concerted approach to the transfer of financial services know-how to Arab countries in order to liberalise trade in financial services may make a lot of sense.
The EU Global Approach to Migration which links migration to the development agenda, as well as to internal aspects such as legal migration, integration, protection of refugees, border control, readmission and the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking, is based on a genuine partnership with third countries as an integral part of the Union’s external policies. It addresses many of the concerns of the EU Mediterranean member states (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Slovenia) which met at Foreign Ministers level in Lagonisi for the first time in October 2006, upon the initiative of the Greek Foreign Ministry, to discuss common concerns in the Mediterranean especially the issues of illegal immigration and further enhancement of cooperation in controlling the EU’s external sea borders.
These concerns, together with the prospects of establishing a European Coast Guard Service and enhanced cooperation between port authorities, suggest a convergence of views among the aforementioned EU-8 on how to tackle the Mediterranean issues. This in turn also plays into the much-discussed Mediterranean Union proposal of the French President, announced first in Sarkozy’s election night victory speech of 6 May 2007, which links the development of the South Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa to a cohesive mutually agreed migration policy.
Taken together, the Sarkozy proposal and the common approach by the EU-8 indicate that the Mediterranean is bound to remain at the top of the EU agenda for some time. It should be noted that the current Portuguese Presidency of the EU is followed by Slovenia and France in 2008. Also of relevance is that the EU-8 form a substantive voting bloc with enough votes to block qualified majority decisions within the EU’s current voting procedures and will probably continue to remain in that position once new provisions are negotiated, ratified and implemented. Another noteworthy development is that the EU-8 member states will, as of next year all be part of the Eurogroup with the accession of Malta and Cyprus thereby enhancing their position within the EU substantially. Should the trend toward a two-tier EU, with a noyau dur centered on the Eurogroup, take shape as the Union’s decision-making mechanism at 27 falters, the EU-8 with their Mediterranean focus could play an even larger role in shaping the Union’s external policies. Though this tendency could in fact complicate the bifurcation of the EU’s external focus to the East and the South, it should nevertheless lead to a new approach toward the Mediterranean which would seek to remedy the failures of the Barcelona Process and address the security concerns of the EU’s Mediterranean borders.
The impact will also be felt in a greater political role for the EU in the Middle East Peace Process. It stands to reason that continued failure to find a solution to the Palestinian civil strife, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Sunni-Shia proxy war in Lebanon would make any targeted policies aimed at enhancing development and curbing illegal migration almost irrelevant. In other words, the EU-8 can only but become all the more active promoters of a greater EU role in the region.
After all, it should be noted that the efforts of the EU-8 and the focus of the Mediterranean Union proposal are relevant independently of Turkey’s EU prospects. Turkey’s eventual accession into the EU would in fact help the implementation of a concerted approach toward the Mediterranean. However, should accession stall, a common approach by the EU’s Mediterranean member states is imperative to deal with the implications of such a prospect. In other words, the key threats to the EU’s and the Mediterranean region’s security will remain and will need to be tackled irrespective of Turkish membership of the Union. Therefore, linking the Mediterranean Union proposal to a possible alternative to full membership for Turkey is largely irrelevant and beside the point if one were to account for the positive synergies a Mediterranean Union could create.
In conclusion, the protracted instability emanating from the EU’s southern borders has mobilised its Mediterranean member states to converge on the need to refocus on the South. The potential of a future Mediterranean policy based on a genuine partnership among all of the region’s stakeholders exists. It remains to be seen what its future shape and content will be.
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