The Democratisation of Turkey and the European Union
At the official handover ceremony between the Slovenian Presidency and the current French Presidency, on 30 June 2008, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, upon symbolically accepting a relay baton and an EU flag from his Slovenian counterpart commented that the European Union was “in average shape”. Kouchner’s sentiments echoed those of Nicholas Sarkozy who speaking on French television suggested that “something isn’t right, something isn’t right at all.”
In an interview to the Italian daily Corriere della Serra on 25 June 2008, on the eve of the Euro 2008 semi-finals which pitted Turkey against Germany and Russia against Spain, Joerg Haider, the Austrian far-right politician, questioned why Turkey and Russia were allowed to participate in the European Soccer Championships by asking “what have these two countries got in common with Europe?”
Though seemingly unrelated, the two aforementioned references in fact have much to do with each other. On the one hand, they describe a state of malaise about the future of the Union after the stalling of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty thereby reflecting seemingly disparate perspectives regarding what kind of Europe we want. On the other hand, they reveal a lack of clear political vision regarding the EU’s neighbourhood and which parts to incorporate over time.
The question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union is one which raises eyebrows, vivid discussions, periodic diatribes and general inconclusiveness. The debate and the parallel political process have been ongoing for so long that the eventuality of a marriage (i.e. membership) is often put in doubt giving rise to arguments in favour of other arrangements. The 9 July 2008 debate in the European Parliament regarding the Union’s enlargement strategy with its emphasis on alternatives to enlargement and the need for a period of “internal consolidation” by the Union is a case in point.
The paradoxes are many. On the one hand, the Europeanisation process, which is manifested by the EU’s accession criteria, has had a tremendous impact on Turkey as there is a direct correlation between the democratic transformation of Turkish politics and the progress in EU-Turkish relations since the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. One could argue today that the fact that there are two centres of power in Turkey – the deep state and the democratically elected (by overwhelming majority) AKP government – the transformation process of Turkish society and politics is in full bloom. On the other hand, the rise of political Islam in the country, which coincides with the coming to power of the AKP since 2002, implies for many a manipulation of the reform process to challenge the secular nature of the state.
For Europeans committed to Turkey’s transformation and eventual accession, the challenges posed by the presence of political Islam in power are just as poignant as they are for the average Turk. The issue is the survival of Turkish democracy. Yet, the reservations have to do with the lingering doubts that the Europeanisation process cannot be applied wholesale to Turkey as in other parts of the EU neighbourhood. In other words, if further democratisation implies the gradual dismantling of the secular state (such as the headscarf issue) thereby giving rise to the “creeping Islamisation” of the country, than the “uniqueness” of Turkey could entail that it has no place in the EU.
Nevertheless, the changing paradigm regarding the nature of the Turkish state is a condition which has manifested itself repeatedly since Turkey’s European adventure (in its modern edition) began in 1963. Over the last 45 years, reservations regarding the Europeanisation process of the country have arisen repeatedly in particular within Turkey itself through its long modern history of military and post-modern coups and a slow awakening to the fact that “Turkishness” (not necessarily in its inclusive form) is not jeopardized by more Europe. Orhan Pamuk’s honouring with the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006 and the mitigated reception he received back home best reflects this slow acceptance of what are perceived to be non-Turkish values and norms.
This in turn suggests that Turkey’s ability to change, to transform itself into a fully functioning democratic state whose integration would be received without much negative hoopla by other EU member states and their citizens, has more to do with its own ability to europeanise than with the arguments and policies of its opponents. In this sense, the promotion of “membership inclusiveness” – that is the defining and promotion of EU-Turkish relations exclusively through the accession issue through the filters of accession criteria, the Accession Partnership, the Negotiating Framework, and the constantly evolving acquis – is actually beneficial for Turkey. It allows for the Commission, the guardian of the accession process, to support and promote the democratisation of the country and to assure that at the end of the road (wherever and whenever this may be) integration is a given.
Another changing paradigm also has to do with the makeover in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999 with Greece (for its own particular set of reasons) being the steadfast torchbearer of Turkey’s road to Europe. The Greek support should not be dismissed lightly if we are to consider that Greece (unlike the United Kingdom for example) is an active participant in every scheme that promotes further European integration, in particular the Eurogroup and is the EU member state most directly affected by developments in Turkey by virtue of history and neighbourhood.
In other words, the accession process is mostly about the candidate country accepting EU rules and regulations. It is not about targeted opposition to its integration. After all, a survey of past enlargements will reflect that Europe has always had its fair share of naysayers.
Finally, in terms of changing paradigms, the links between the changes in the global environment need to be factored in as well. Fareed Zakaria in his new book on The Post-American World argues that the challenges to the West will not come from the “losers” of globalization but rather from its “winners”. Countries like China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey among others have had tremendous economic growth over the last few years – at a time of Pax Americana or pro-active unilateralism. In Turkey’s case, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, real GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 has averaged 6.9%, real demand growth was on average 8.5% for the same period while FDI inflows averaged 2.1% of GDP. Though other emerging markets have performed better over the same period, the numbers for the country have been impressive if one is to consider that they coincide with the rise of political Islam and a fundamental re-evaluation regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and especially the United States given the divergences over policy on Iraq in particular. Zakaria argues that the winners of the globalised era as a consequence of their changing economic fortunes project national pride and overt nationalism thus conceivably giving rise to the notion that the global agenda is not only a responsibility of the western world and their leaders such as the G-7.
In this context, the trap of “membership inclusiveness” is a danger both for the further democratisation of Turkey and the country’s future relations with the European Union as it does not account for other developments, trends, concerns and threats that affect our shared global environment. In this case, the “average shape” of the Union gives leeway and fodder to opponents of Turkey’s integration by allowing them in part to shape the agenda. It is not so much the fact that no institutional framework for a European Union of more than its current 27 members exists to date but the political impact of the inability to do so both on EU and Turkish public opinions. According to one public opinion poll, whereas in 2004, 73% of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership to the EU, the percentage dropped to 40% in 2007. Similarly, European public opinion today, even in the United Kingdom, is in the majority opposed to Turkish membership.
Hence, the democratisation process and consequently the further Europeanisation of Turkey becomes less relevant while the existentialist debate over the role of political Islam and its impact on secularism dominates the debate. Other existentialist concerns with obvious EU implications such as the Kurdish issue (the integration of Kurds and others in society and whether as a result being Turkish is an inclusive identity) and the resolution of the Cyprus issue are placed on the back burner.
In an interview to the Italian daily Corriere della Serra on 25 June 2008, on the eve of the Euro 2008 semi-finals which pitted Turkey against Germany and Russia against Spain, Joerg Haider, the Austrian far-right politician, questioned why Turkey and Russia were allowed to participate in the European Soccer Championships by asking “what have these two countries got in common with Europe?”
Though seemingly unrelated, the two aforementioned references in fact have much to do with each other. On the one hand, they describe a state of malaise about the future of the Union after the stalling of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty thereby reflecting seemingly disparate perspectives regarding what kind of Europe we want. On the other hand, they reveal a lack of clear political vision regarding the EU’s neighbourhood and which parts to incorporate over time.
The question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union is one which raises eyebrows, vivid discussions, periodic diatribes and general inconclusiveness. The debate and the parallel political process have been ongoing for so long that the eventuality of a marriage (i.e. membership) is often put in doubt giving rise to arguments in favour of other arrangements. The 9 July 2008 debate in the European Parliament regarding the Union’s enlargement strategy with its emphasis on alternatives to enlargement and the need for a period of “internal consolidation” by the Union is a case in point.
The paradoxes are many. On the one hand, the Europeanisation process, which is manifested by the EU’s accession criteria, has had a tremendous impact on Turkey as there is a direct correlation between the democratic transformation of Turkish politics and the progress in EU-Turkish relations since the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. One could argue today that the fact that there are two centres of power in Turkey – the deep state and the democratically elected (by overwhelming majority) AKP government – the transformation process of Turkish society and politics is in full bloom. On the other hand, the rise of political Islam in the country, which coincides with the coming to power of the AKP since 2002, implies for many a manipulation of the reform process to challenge the secular nature of the state.
For Europeans committed to Turkey’s transformation and eventual accession, the challenges posed by the presence of political Islam in power are just as poignant as they are for the average Turk. The issue is the survival of Turkish democracy. Yet, the reservations have to do with the lingering doubts that the Europeanisation process cannot be applied wholesale to Turkey as in other parts of the EU neighbourhood. In other words, if further democratisation implies the gradual dismantling of the secular state (such as the headscarf issue) thereby giving rise to the “creeping Islamisation” of the country, than the “uniqueness” of Turkey could entail that it has no place in the EU.
Nevertheless, the changing paradigm regarding the nature of the Turkish state is a condition which has manifested itself repeatedly since Turkey’s European adventure (in its modern edition) began in 1963. Over the last 45 years, reservations regarding the Europeanisation process of the country have arisen repeatedly in particular within Turkey itself through its long modern history of military and post-modern coups and a slow awakening to the fact that “Turkishness” (not necessarily in its inclusive form) is not jeopardized by more Europe. Orhan Pamuk’s honouring with the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006 and the mitigated reception he received back home best reflects this slow acceptance of what are perceived to be non-Turkish values and norms.
This in turn suggests that Turkey’s ability to change, to transform itself into a fully functioning democratic state whose integration would be received without much negative hoopla by other EU member states and their citizens, has more to do with its own ability to europeanise than with the arguments and policies of its opponents. In this sense, the promotion of “membership inclusiveness” – that is the defining and promotion of EU-Turkish relations exclusively through the accession issue through the filters of accession criteria, the Accession Partnership, the Negotiating Framework, and the constantly evolving acquis – is actually beneficial for Turkey. It allows for the Commission, the guardian of the accession process, to support and promote the democratisation of the country and to assure that at the end of the road (wherever and whenever this may be) integration is a given.
Another changing paradigm also has to do with the makeover in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999 with Greece (for its own particular set of reasons) being the steadfast torchbearer of Turkey’s road to Europe. The Greek support should not be dismissed lightly if we are to consider that Greece (unlike the United Kingdom for example) is an active participant in every scheme that promotes further European integration, in particular the Eurogroup and is the EU member state most directly affected by developments in Turkey by virtue of history and neighbourhood.
In other words, the accession process is mostly about the candidate country accepting EU rules and regulations. It is not about targeted opposition to its integration. After all, a survey of past enlargements will reflect that Europe has always had its fair share of naysayers.
Finally, in terms of changing paradigms, the links between the changes in the global environment need to be factored in as well. Fareed Zakaria in his new book on The Post-American World argues that the challenges to the West will not come from the “losers” of globalization but rather from its “winners”. Countries like China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey among others have had tremendous economic growth over the last few years – at a time of Pax Americana or pro-active unilateralism. In Turkey’s case, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, real GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 has averaged 6.9%, real demand growth was on average 8.5% for the same period while FDI inflows averaged 2.1% of GDP. Though other emerging markets have performed better over the same period, the numbers for the country have been impressive if one is to consider that they coincide with the rise of political Islam and a fundamental re-evaluation regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and especially the United States given the divergences over policy on Iraq in particular. Zakaria argues that the winners of the globalised era as a consequence of their changing economic fortunes project national pride and overt nationalism thus conceivably giving rise to the notion that the global agenda is not only a responsibility of the western world and their leaders such as the G-7.
In this context, the trap of “membership inclusiveness” is a danger both for the further democratisation of Turkey and the country’s future relations with the European Union as it does not account for other developments, trends, concerns and threats that affect our shared global environment. In this case, the “average shape” of the Union gives leeway and fodder to opponents of Turkey’s integration by allowing them in part to shape the agenda. It is not so much the fact that no institutional framework for a European Union of more than its current 27 members exists to date but the political impact of the inability to do so both on EU and Turkish public opinions. According to one public opinion poll, whereas in 2004, 73% of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership to the EU, the percentage dropped to 40% in 2007. Similarly, European public opinion today, even in the United Kingdom, is in the majority opposed to Turkish membership.
Hence, the democratisation process and consequently the further Europeanisation of Turkey becomes less relevant while the existentialist debate over the role of political Islam and its impact on secularism dominates the debate. Other existentialist concerns with obvious EU implications such as the Kurdish issue (the integration of Kurds and others in society and whether as a result being Turkish is an inclusive identity) and the resolution of the Cyprus issue are placed on the back burner.
Thus, a new waiting game is on where proponents of the accession process do their best to maintain it as well as assure that the gains of the last few years (legal and political reforms, a greater role for civil society, increasing student exchanges, etc.) are irreversible while Turkey redefines itself anew. Time has shown that change in Turkey needs it time and all we can ultimately do is accept the process as is while doing our best to keep it on track.
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