The EU and its Eastern Neighborhood: Time for Coherence
Much discussion is underway these days regarding the best way the European Union can approach its eastern neighbours. As a result, and probably to be expected, much confusion abounds as EU member states are divided on how best to address the region.
Undoubtedly, Russia is its dual capacity as one of the Union’s most important partners and new neighbour is at the core of the debate given the on-off nature of EU-Russia talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which has taken a turn for the worse after the Georgian-Russian conflict of August. Do the EU and Russia share the same objectives in managing their common neighbourhood or does the prospect of EU membership, however distant if at all possible it might be at this time, for some of the common neighbours put the two sides on a collision course? Perceptions are important here – the inability of some EU member states to overcome their genuine fears of Russia and therefore insist on EU and NATO membership for those outside hoping to get in coupled with Moscow’s propensity to have its say exclusively along its western periphery suggest that both sides consider the other as ‘revisionist’ and prone to a zero-sum game type of relationship.
Unfortunately, it looks like these perceptions are going to be with us for some time to come, albeit there is some hope that they be somewhat mitigated if good sense prevails. A first step would be to reduce the NATO rhetoric and refocus on a “More EU – Less NATO aspirations” approach. This in effect seems for the time being to be the trend especially since the Alliance’s Bucharest Summit last April, the August war in Georgia and the election of Barack Obama to the White House.
Step Two would necessitate the EU to find a balance between Russia’s projected force and the other countries’ willingness to cooperate further with the EU. The EU should acknowledge the European identity of the states of the region, and keep open the prospect of membership in the long term. This entails the formulation of an ENP+ that neither closes the door nor does it open it further to those countries that aspire to join the EU but allows for a further upgrade of their relations with the Union. Such a ‘European promise’ would help to reinforce the reform process in all the countries of the region including conceivably the unrecognised territories.
Which policy then is the best for the Union and its neighbours? The divisions among member states have led to policy confusion. As a result in response to its Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU has already launched a Black Sea Synergy Policy within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); it is considering an ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy while it is also trying to define the context or place for the Turkish proposal for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” while simultaneously attempting to upgrade its relationship, both working and contractual, with regional organisations such as the BSEC. All these initiatives which are usually led by a country or a group of countries could conceivably create new problems as they seem to be redundant, uncoordinated and lack coherence.
The current debate in Brussels about the adoption of an Eastern Partnership that focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profound integration with the EU to the ENP East partners including Belarus seems to complicate somehow the formulation of a coherent policy as it contains many of the priorities of the Black Sea Synergy. If it is conceived as a parallel track to the Black Sea Synergy process, it should be explicitly made clear as should the interaction/complementarity between the two policies. When drafting a European policy for the Black Sea region, it is important to avoid any possible overlapping between these two policy proposals/documents that might create confusion and thus weaken the credibility and the efficiency of the EU itself.
One suggestion that this author is making would be to rename the Black Sea Synergy policy and call it Enhanced Black Sea Synergy whereby regional cooperation between all regional states (including Russia) and the EU coupled by deeper integration with the EU by the ENP East partners go hand in hand. Overall, there should be a formulation for a new EU regional policy on the Black Sea. In this context, an Eastern Partnership with clear objectives, Europeanising features, strong instruments and promising ‘carrots’ along with an enhanced, project-oriented Black Sea Synergy, is a good start. This could at least help avoid the confusion regarding policy proliferation, replication and incoherence. It should be noted, that the Black Sea Synergy should not be underestimated as it managed to raise from the very beginning the political identity of the region and thus paved the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole. Sidelining it or eventually burying it in favour of, undoubtedly, an ‘in your face’ policy would not help improve the state of EU-Russian relations and, by extension, regional security and stability anytime soon.
Undoubtedly, Russia is its dual capacity as one of the Union’s most important partners and new neighbour is at the core of the debate given the on-off nature of EU-Russia talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which has taken a turn for the worse after the Georgian-Russian conflict of August. Do the EU and Russia share the same objectives in managing their common neighbourhood or does the prospect of EU membership, however distant if at all possible it might be at this time, for some of the common neighbours put the two sides on a collision course? Perceptions are important here – the inability of some EU member states to overcome their genuine fears of Russia and therefore insist on EU and NATO membership for those outside hoping to get in coupled with Moscow’s propensity to have its say exclusively along its western periphery suggest that both sides consider the other as ‘revisionist’ and prone to a zero-sum game type of relationship.
Unfortunately, it looks like these perceptions are going to be with us for some time to come, albeit there is some hope that they be somewhat mitigated if good sense prevails. A first step would be to reduce the NATO rhetoric and refocus on a “More EU – Less NATO aspirations” approach. This in effect seems for the time being to be the trend especially since the Alliance’s Bucharest Summit last April, the August war in Georgia and the election of Barack Obama to the White House.
Step Two would necessitate the EU to find a balance between Russia’s projected force and the other countries’ willingness to cooperate further with the EU. The EU should acknowledge the European identity of the states of the region, and keep open the prospect of membership in the long term. This entails the formulation of an ENP+ that neither closes the door nor does it open it further to those countries that aspire to join the EU but allows for a further upgrade of their relations with the Union. Such a ‘European promise’ would help to reinforce the reform process in all the countries of the region including conceivably the unrecognised territories.
Which policy then is the best for the Union and its neighbours? The divisions among member states have led to policy confusion. As a result in response to its Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU has already launched a Black Sea Synergy Policy within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); it is considering an ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy while it is also trying to define the context or place for the Turkish proposal for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” while simultaneously attempting to upgrade its relationship, both working and contractual, with regional organisations such as the BSEC. All these initiatives which are usually led by a country or a group of countries could conceivably create new problems as they seem to be redundant, uncoordinated and lack coherence.
The current debate in Brussels about the adoption of an Eastern Partnership that focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profound integration with the EU to the ENP East partners including Belarus seems to complicate somehow the formulation of a coherent policy as it contains many of the priorities of the Black Sea Synergy. If it is conceived as a parallel track to the Black Sea Synergy process, it should be explicitly made clear as should the interaction/complementarity between the two policies. When drafting a European policy for the Black Sea region, it is important to avoid any possible overlapping between these two policy proposals/documents that might create confusion and thus weaken the credibility and the efficiency of the EU itself.
One suggestion that this author is making would be to rename the Black Sea Synergy policy and call it Enhanced Black Sea Synergy whereby regional cooperation between all regional states (including Russia) and the EU coupled by deeper integration with the EU by the ENP East partners go hand in hand. Overall, there should be a formulation for a new EU regional policy on the Black Sea. In this context, an Eastern Partnership with clear objectives, Europeanising features, strong instruments and promising ‘carrots’ along with an enhanced, project-oriented Black Sea Synergy, is a good start. This could at least help avoid the confusion regarding policy proliferation, replication and incoherence. It should be noted, that the Black Sea Synergy should not be underestimated as it managed to raise from the very beginning the political identity of the region and thus paved the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole. Sidelining it or eventually burying it in favour of, undoubtedly, an ‘in your face’ policy would not help improve the state of EU-Russian relations and, by extension, regional security and stability anytime soon.
Comments