The international order has entered into a new era. Barack Obama has taken formally the reigns of power in Washington, the dismantling of a number of Bush-era policies has begun and the expectations of hope across the globe take hold. Amidst an ongoing, evergrowing international financial and economic crisis (where estimates of negative growth globally for the first time since 1950 abound), and the realities of the aftermath of the killing fields of Gaza, Obama’s agenda is filled to the brim and bound to overflow.
The Black Sea region – a region encompassing the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and some of the European Union’s member states – will undoubtedly constitute a high priority region, not in the least due to the presence of Russia. The issues at hand are many, they are complex and they are challenging. They could augur instability as well as the potential for constructive, long-standing cooperation and stability. For one, an interesting challenge has to do with the sort of relationship that will emerge between Russia and the United States. Will the probable engagement of Russia by the Obama administration on a variety on longstanding global imperatives, elevate Russia to greater than regional power status as the Kremlin’s current leadership aspires? As a consequence, what will be the implications of this power shift on the Black Sea region as a whole? How will another regional heavyweight like Turkey with aspirations for an ever greater regional and global role (participation in the G-20, role model as moderate Islamic country, Alliance for Civilizations co-chair, regional leader, etc.) react to greater Russian influence?
As things stand today, at least in the opinion of this analyst, some of the key issues are the following:
- Energy and energy security. The last act in the ongoing energy feud between Russia and Ukraine is a clear indicator of the importance of energy security for the region and its customers, especially the European Union. Oil and natural gas – together with their exploration, production, and transport – are commodities that flow across borders however tenuous these might be.
- The recent winter energy gridlock between the two aforementioned countries has also led to a more balanced, less ideological and subjective analysis regarding Russia and its role. In other words, the muckraking whether periodic, systematic or inherent regarding Russian and its current regime has given way to more realist analyses, especially in western media outlets and research centres regarding the foreign policy and role of the countries of the region. Concepts such as the inevitability of a “soft war” with Russia have given way to concerns about the ability of Ukraine (and Georgia earlier last year) to be reliable partners. Nevertheless the prevailing vestiges of ideological or bloc divisions (whether these come from Moscow or Western capitals) remain a challenge.
- This shaken credibility in Ukraine and Georgia or to be more precise in their current leaderships to bring about the requisite transformation inspired by the Orange and Rose revolutions respectively has placed their eventual Euro-Atlantic integration on the back burner. The question remains as to whether this also implies the end of European integration for Ukraine in particular or a renewed effort to integrate based not on the undelivered promises of reform but on clear conditionality where a condition is cooperation with all its neighbours.
- The redefinition of US-Russian relations as previously mentioned could and would seriously define whether the region enhances cooperation or is further divided. The impact on the uneasy status quo between Turkey and Russia is an important dimension. Turkey recently felt the limits of overreach when it received a firm rebuke from some EU states when it attempted to link its support for the Nabucco pipeline to its EU accession talks.
- The European Union’s role in the region to date leaves much to be desired. EU leadership is needed but is it feasible? The EU is involved in the region in a number of fronts – it launched the Black Sea Synergy in 2007 and the Eastern Partnership in 2008. Both are ambitious policies though somewhat contradictory policies calling for more engagement in the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood. The Union has deployed since October 2008 a monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) under the European security and defence policy. It was also actively involved in mediating the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Finally the EU adopted in December 2008 a report beefing up its European Security Strategy by giving prominence to issues such as energy security, the various protracted conflicts, human security and greater engagement with the EU’s neighbourhood. On the other hand, the lack of progress on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which would beef up the Union’s foreign policy prospects, the continued inability to achieve consensus regarding the status of Kosovo (and hence its implication for separatist region of the Caucasus and their recognition) place serious restraints on the Union’s ability to pull its weight in the region. For example, the inability to arrive on a modus vivendi with Russia on the development of their common neighbourhood continues to be a thorn for the EU.
- Finally, a number of issues that are down the list in terms of priorities will eventually make their way up to the surface and will need to be handled by all stakeholders concerned. One such concern has to do with the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet once the lease on Sevastopol expires in 2017. Reports of the construction of a naval base in Abkhazia actually suggest that the issue needs to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Beyond the tricky issue of the Fleet’s future deployment, the economic impact of the withdrawal of the fleet on Sevastopol itself is a concern in itself. Ideas such as the one propounded by the city’s mayor that Sevastopol become a Free Economic Area merit consideration. Another possible flashpoint has to do with Crimea’s future. Imaginative solutions that assure its future within Ukraine need further study.
In light of the aforementioned concerns, what needs to be done? Conceivably, the countries of the region have to constructively work together either bilaterally or regional within the framework of existing cooperative arrangements such as the BSEC and others. This continued cooperation which in the BSEC, for example, has survived the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war acts as a confidence building measure or mechanism for all stakeholders. In this context, the European Union in its capacity as an observer to the BSEC needs to assert itself that regional cooperation is part and parcel of successful engagement and ever closer ties with its ENP East partners. A lesson from both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s recent troubles with Russia is that attention needs to be paid to their neighbour(s) while they seek to integrate with the West. In other words, further integration into euro-atlantic structures need not imply the severing of relations with powerful neighbours that have no such aspirations. Regional cooperation helps states eventually move away from zero sum thinking and actions. In fact, the BSEC together with other regional initiatives should actually be seen as promoting economic cooperation as a source of security “on the basis of a paradigm of security that is linked to democracy, respect for human rights and good governance.”
Hence, the question that remains is whether the European Union at 27 has the ability to lead and put to use the “smart power” paradigm which Hillary Clinton in her Senate confirmation recently expounded for her country. The transformative experience of the European Union is a manifold process which is sorely needed in the region. At a time when the United States is putting its house in order and seeks to redefine its international relations; the Union is still coping to achieve coherence in its external action as the Lisbon Treaty escapes ratification.
The wider Black Sea region - part EU region and large part of its neighbourhood - seeks guidance, cooperative action and greater engagement by all stakeholders. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. For example, as was recently proposed at a conference on the Black Sea, the Russian proposal for a new Europe-wide security pact could be an opportunity for the EU to introduce and promote the notion of “overriding European interests” and include the dimensions of energy and energy security in the discussions on the shape of the new security framework. Simultaneously, the promotion of a set of commonly defined principles regarding energy and energy security in the BSEC or some other inclusive regional cooperation framework could also be another targeted action that engages all sates of the region and obliges key energy producing and transit states to work with their neighbours. The time for action is now.
“We must use what has been called “smart power”: the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.” Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, nominee for Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009.
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