The Nabucco Pipeline and Energy Dilemmas

In 1990, John Mearsheimer wrote a much discussed article on how he viewed the Post-Cold War world at least on the European continent titled “Back to the Future”. According to Mearsheimer, there would be no new era of peace; instead multipolarity and increased competition between great powers would probably take hold, thereby increasing instability, inequality, unpredictability and uncertainty. In recent years, Mearsheimer’s thesis as well as those of other proponents of the realist school of thought (be it classical realism, offensive realism, structural realism, etc.) seems to be gaining strength albeit the popularity of post-modern schools of thought over the last two decades.

Why all this theoretical babble, you ask? Mearsheimer clearly comes to mind when one attempts to analyse the competition between and among great powers in Europe (and neighbouring regions) today in particular with reference to the energy paradigm. On 13 July 2009, the Prime Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on the planned natural gas Nabucco pipeline from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria. Is Nabucco finally on track or was the ceremony an example of triumphalism on the part of the signatories?

An interesting interpretation is that more than anything the Nabucco signing ceremony is closely linked to the geopolitical realignments at play globally and particularly in Europe. A point of reference is President Obama’s visit to Moscow where he pressed the reset button with Russia leading to an agreement on reduction of nuclear stockpiles and frank talk on a number of other issues. This fundamental upgrade of Russia’s status is having repercussions on how other regional powers (whether of the minor or major kind) interpret the evolving relationship between Moscow and Washington.

An obvious effect is on Turkey – a regional powerhouse aspiring to a greater global standing. Ankara seeks to assure that its unsteady status quo with Moscow in their common neighbourhood (Black Sea and Caucasus) is maintained while it retains (if not augments) its “critical ally” position with Washington. One obvious instrument (both in political and foreign policy terms) to redress the evolving balance of power is the energy card.

For a postmodern entity like the European Union with its negotiated common positions (a product of ongoing power struggles among exigent greater and smaller member states), the energy card is just as relevant. The EU external energy strategy is focused on sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply whereby the diversification of suppliers is crucial in order to avoid overdependence given the fact that the EU on the whole is dependent on imported hydrocarbons. It should be noted that under current trends, the Union’s energy dependence will jump from 50% of total EU energy consumption today to about 65% in 2030 – gas imports will jump from 57% to 84% and oil from 82% to 93% by 2030. Simultaneously, the global demand for oil is bound to grow by 41% during the same period.

What does all of this imply? Basically, energy needs seem to be a crucial contributing factor in defining the world today and, in particular, the relationship between states. The Nabucco signing is indicative. Albeit its shortcomings and uncertainties – Can Turkmenistan come through on its promises of supplying the pipeline with gas given its geography whereby supply can only be through Iran or across the Caspian Sea which has no seabed agreement to date? Will Azerbaijan deliver before the Nagorno Karabakh issue is resolved in a manner suitable to its interests? Will Iran be allowed to become a supplier as Turkey and other states would want without a redefinition of its relations with the United States? Has Turkey’s overreach with its demands for a 15% stake of the pipeline’s potential supply for its own markets or for resale been addressed? Is the principle of “if you build first, the gas will come” viable at the time when the estimated cost of the pipeline tops 7.9 billion euros while construction commitments from the EIB and the European Commission are small and the global financial crisis deters potential investors?

While the pipeline is expected to meet only about 10% of the EU’s gas needs when it becomes operational at up to 31 bcm per year, Russia currently exports 140 bcm of natural gas a year to the EU. Even more telling are the overall figures regarding Caspian oil and gas, where Russia dwarfs all other Caspian and Central Asian producers in terms of reserves, production and export availabilities (and consumption). Thus, the questions as to whether the Nabucco project contributes to the avoidance of overdependence on Russia natural gas; addresses effectively the issue of energy security; and tackles the issue of diversification remain on the table. Nabucco bypasses Russia as well as Ukraine. What does this imply for the latter? What is China’s impact on Central Asia since it is the main driver of the increase in global demand for hydrocarbons? The China-Turkmenistan energy connection is relevant here.

More than anything the Nabucco project has managed to raise awareness of the interests of regional and global stakeholders. For one, it could be interpreted as a catalyst for a more cohesive EU energy security strategy. It has raised the stakes regarding Iran’s present and potential role. It has paradoxically brought Russia and Turkey closer together with Moscow openly talking about Ankara’s participation in the South Stream project. It has also somewhat brought Russia closer to the project with the potential supply of Russian gas to Nabucco via the Blue Stream pipeline. Finally, the perspective of Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi gas gives the whole endeavour a geopolitical dimension.

As such, the Nabucco project contains both the seeds of further great power competition of the Mearsheimer mould as well as the potential for further symbiosis as energy superpowers might reconsider the benefit of using oil and natural gas as extensions of their foreign policies. Verdi’s opera is famous for its inspirational “Va, pensiero” chorus; time will tell whether the more mundane Nabucco pipeline can arouse greater energy cooperation in today’s increasingly complicated world.

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