One of the major symptoms of Greek foreign policy is its chronic inability to be a protagonist beyond its immediate neighbourhoods, i.e. the Balkans, Turkey, and the Mediterranean – in spite of its extensive conscious involvement in the first two regions since the end of the Cold War. Successive Greek governments have used analogous rhetoric and set similar objectives – the need to ‘Europeanise’ Greece’s northern and eastern neighbours, the need to see them integrated into the European Union, the need for the wider neighbourhood to become ‘normal’, ‘boring’, ‘regular’.
The diplomatic and political energy spent on assuring that the aforementioned comes to pass has been both inexhaustible and exhausting yet results (i.e. change in the desired direction) have been slow almost at snail’s pace. In part, this is due to the inability/unwillingness of the neighbours to completely transform themselves; in part it is due to the inability of the Greek foreign policy machinery to convince neighbours and partners within the EU alike of the inevitability of the process. On the whole, though, the basic problem which supersedes all others has been and, unfortunately, continues to be the inability of Greece and its neighbours to shift their focus from an overt concentration on the past with its myriad of historical baggages and legacies to formulate a joint vision of a common future as has been the case of the Franco-German relationship since the end of the Second World War after three apocalyptic wars and then some between the two countries over an 80 year span.
Much is heard these days about jumpstarting accession talks especially for the countries of the Western Balkans. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, almost from the get go of his term in office has been calling for the entry of all Western Balkan candidates into the EU in 2014, one hundred years after the start of World War I in 1914, much as the International Commission on the Balkans had recommended back in 2005. The 2014 date is important for Greece and the region for another reason as well – it will coincide with the country holding the Presidency of the Union during the first six months of that year.
The opportunities provide by the Greek Presidency in 2014 in combination with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (5 years into its functions) with its enhanced foreign policy chief and the in situ presence of the European External Action Service (the EU’s Diplomatic Corps) in the various capitals of the western Balkan states makes the possibility of enlargement a very real prospect. One can also add to this argument, the imminent membership of Croatia now that the Lisbon Treaty allows for it would signal to the rest of the candidate countries that the EU is committed to eventually including them in its ranks. In this sense, the reality of all of Greece’s land borders in the north being with EU partners (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria) and the fact that these new member states would also border other EU member states fundamentally changes the perceptual landscape – from that of exclusion or being cut off to that of inclusion. The one remaining border with Turkey would be one with a candidate state – Turkey.
Hence the ‘Europeanisation’ paradigm expounded diachronically by successive Greek administrations becomes a matter of fact. The relevance of the inclusion of the Greece’s northern neighbours into the Union should not be underestimated or taken lightly at a time when the debate regarding Turkey’s future prospects is in full ebullition across Europe. If Turkey’s path ends with membership so much the better for the stability, security and prosperity of Greece and its neighbourhoods; if it does not, Greece would have to invest time and energy in redefining its already packed agenda and relations with its neighbour. In this sense, the europeanisation, securitization and normalization of its northern neighbourhood releases Greece from its chronic occupation with two fronts simultaneously.
In this context, on the road to 2020, the relationship between Greece and its neighbourhoods could potentially be different than what it is today albeit the possible thorn regarding Turkey’s European future. Nevertheless, the europeanisation of the neighbourhood combined with the focus on the future rather than the past could conceivably provide for a new dimension in Greece’s foreign policy – that of promoting peaceful change in its ‘wider’ neighbourhood. In other words, the country could begin to reconsider its role in the Mediterranean or parts of it such as its eastern part and the Middle East whose relevance are enhanced due to their proximity. This could in part be done through a more active involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean, the successor policy of the Euro-Mediterranean Process which was launched in 2008 and its priority projects which include the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters; a Mediterranean solar energy plan; higher education and research and the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia; and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. In all aforementioned policy areas, Greece could begin to systematically cultivate an enhanced role for herself within the geographic confines of immediate interest.
The point is that Greek diplomacy is better served by being multi-vectored and pro-active rather than on the defensive. The EU, for example, needs to step up its presence in the Black Sea region, a region where Greece has vital commercial interests given the potential of the Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian markets among others. It could probably start drafting a strategy for the Union in order to stimulate interest. The foreign ministry has the wherewithal for such an engagement given the country’s participation in the wider Black Sea region’s regional cooperation processes since 1992 when it became a founding member of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the only inclusive and institutionally comprehensive organisation of the region. By 2020, the debate regarding the future membership prospects of Ukraine and Georgia, inter alia, would have crystallised and an EU strategy with the imprimatur of the Hellenic Republic could go a long way in contributing to the security of the region given the presence of hegemonic Russia and Turkey and the energy card.
Even more importantly as a country committed to greater cooperation within the EU, Greek initiatives in its wider neighbourhood suggest vital contributions to the promotion of policies postulating cohesion in the Union’s foreign policy mechanisms. In other words, greater involvement in the Union’s activities through the promotion of initiatives and strategies will serve the country better to stand its ground on issues of national interest rather than exclusively focussing on these. The ‘europeanisation’ of its neighbourhoods can only but enhance Greece’s ability to be pro-active and a respected leader in forward-looking cooperative schemes of interest to all.
The 2020 date is particularly relevant in this context. Only a decade away, it exemplifies how close Greece is, given the right policies, in contributing to the transformation of its neighbourhood to a markedly different one and the potential this makeover can have in liberating the country’s foreign policy agenda. Time will tell whether this thesis will eventually materialise.
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