The Path toward Collective Action

Crises by definition portend systemic adjustments and instabilities. At the same time, however, they –by and large– provide opportunities, be it structural economic and political changes, domestic reforms and cooperation with other states and non-state actors at the regional and international level. The global economic crisis exemplifies this duality. Also, the crisis is at the same time economic and geopolitical in scope. The current crisis also introduces a time element as its likely duration and span are uncertain.

The economic effects lie beyond this commentary albeit it is safe to say that the relevant economic and social models of choice applied by governments to cope with it impact upon their political instruments and policy choices. This is particularly the case given the pressure and demand for the state authorities to assume a more intervening role in the functioning of the market

The crisis finds the international order in flux having entered into a new era characterised by dramatic changes both in terms of structure and process, thus resulting in the emergence of a precarious new world balance. With the election of Barack Obama in 2008 to the Presidency of the United States, the dismantling of a number of policies of the Bush era, and Russian-American relations somewhere between ‘reset’ (to use Hillary Clinton’s term and ‘reconfiguration’ (in the words of Sergei Karaganov), the prospects for increased constructive cooperation at the international level in order to meet global challenges have significantly improved. Nevertheless, security dilemmas ranging from the perpetual Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 terrorist attacks in India combined with the tense relations with Pakistan and the ‘Iranian enigma’, to name a few, persist thereby charging the international (security) agenda.

A number of questions arise in need to redress: Is there a link between the global financial and economic crisis and governance? What is its effect on democracy? What is its effect on the EU? Does the crisis provide for opportunity?

Within the Black Sea regional context in particular, the global economic crisis has undoubtedly impacted it as much as it has other parts of the world, except maybe for the English Premier League where foreign investors continue buying football clubs at exorbitant prices. In fact, the sustained economic growth of the region over the last decade was halted abruptly by the crisis. In other words, while real GDP growth from 2000-2008 averaged 6.0% per annum denoting a cumulative real economic expansion of 68% during this period, the estimate is that GDP growth fell to 4.3% on 2008 and that it is bound to be even lower in 2009 (projected at -6.4%) and 2010.

Nevertheless, the Black Sea Region in 2009 is radically different from what it was two decades ago, both economically and politically. While all the economic indicators over the said period have demonstrated a tremendous rise, indicative to a certain extent of the transformation processes in the former communist space in the post-Cold War period and the advent of globalisation and regionalisation, the changes in relations between the West and Russia have intruded on the political environment with a turn for the worse almost simultaneously with the incursion of the economic crisis. The democracy backlash is particularly relevant. In fact, there is a concern among democracy scholars about the ability of newer and less consolidated democracies to avoid political breakdowns as sharp drops in income and increases in unemployment occur.

The dual nature of the crisis shows how governments have to cope both with the challenges the crisis has posed and to seize the opportunities it has presented in terms of domestic and foreign policy rethinking. Faced with the threat of a democratic backlash in new democracies such as Georgia and Ukraine and with Russia’s renewed determination to regain its lost influence in its “near abroad,” the EU needs to rethink its regional role and to assume a greater leadership role.

This implies a number of dilemmas for the Union such finding the right balance between an ‘ethical foreign policy’ and one that contains elements of realist thinking and ‘hard power’. This is particularly tricky with reference to the Black Sea region where regional hegemons such as Russia and Turkey, have a preference, each for their own particular reasons, for realpolitik. In this context, are collective responses to problems possible? The EU also has to cope with its waning power of attraction in its eastern neighbourhood both because of Russia efforts to exert its influence there and the low expectations (especially financially) of its policies in the region. Another conundrum has to do with the rise of the promotion of effective multilateralism versus effective policies in its eastern neighbourhood. Which comes first in times of crisis? Finally, its prolonged period of institutional introspection with repeated delays at Treaty ratifications implies the need for a rapid implementation of the Lisbon Treaty if the Union is to regain the upper hand as the model of choice in its neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, the myriad of provisos, both real and perceived, that can act as barriers to cooperative action in order to tackle the negative effects of the global crisis should not be an obstacle to joint action. The crisis brings at the forefront the need for coordination among nation states and organizations within the current global financial architecture while it also generates debate on the design of a new global mechanism or structure. The question is how to turn the negative effects of the crisis into an opportunity. In the post-crisis world, will the EU’s Black Sea neighbours demand to establish closer relations with the EU thus promoting integration? Will the EU have the requisite policies in place to accommodate its eastern neighbours? Can Russia and the West develop a more sober relationship, profiting from their shared bitter experience in confronting the crisis?

The crisis conceivably provides the opportunity for a new paradigm, a new strategy in the relations between the European Union and the Black Sea Region which accommodates the interests of regional hegemons like Russia and Turkey as well as those of their smaller and less powerful neighbours. A coordinated common approach very well follows the logic of the promotion of “effective multilateralism” which was highlighted in its 2003 European Security Strategy. With all EU initiatives towards the East (European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy) having their set of problems, a rethink of policy is necessary. The focus should be on stopping neighbouring states from collapsing into deeper crisis (the opportunity) and to curb the return of spheres of influence in the region (the challenge). In order for this to work, the formulation of a new regional dimension enhancing existing policies might be necessary.

Conditions might actually be ripe for a consensus to emerge given a thaw of sorts between Russia and Georgia, and between Russia and the West. Also, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provides for a more cohesive and institutional approach in its international relations (this was very much in evidence in the EU’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of 2008/2009). As such, as key players in the emerging model of global governance, the European Union, Russia and Turkey have a responsibility to put their hubris aside and promote collective action.